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Abstract
The main goal of this PhD thesis is to investigate some of the problems related to
optimization of resources in environments with unpredictable behavior where: (i) not all
information is available and (ii) the environment presents unknown temporal changes.
The investigations in this PhD thesis are divided in two parts: Part I presents the in-
vestment model and some analytical as well as numerical analysis of the dynamics of this
model for fixed investment strategies in different random environments. In this invest-
ment model, the dynamics of the investor’s budget x(t) depend on the stochasticity of
the exogenous return on investment r(t) for which different model assumptions are dis-
cussed. The fat-tail distribution of the budget is investigated numerically and compared
with theoretical predictions. Â Furthermore, it is shown that the most probable value
xmp of the budget reaches a constant value over time. Using simulations, the influence
of the stochastic factors on the stationary most probable budget value is investigated.
The results of these investigations suggest the presence of a scaling function between
xmp and the parameters characterizing the stochastic dynamics. The simulation results
are corroborated by obtaining the scaling function analytically. Finally, the evolution
of the budget of the agent is investigated for real returns from stock market data for
different fixed proportions of investment and incomes. Part II investigates an invest-
ment scenario with stylized exogenous returns characterized by a periodic function with
different types and levels of noise. In this scenario, different strategies, agent’s behaviors
and agent’s capacities to predict the future r(t) are investigated. Here, ’zero-intelligent’
agents using technical analysis (such as moving least squares) are compared with agents
using genetic algorithms to predict r(t). The performance of an agent is measured by
its average budget growth after a certain number of time steps. In order to ensure fair
comparison between the strategies, the respective parameters of each of these strategies
are adjusted so that they lead to maximal gains. Results are presented for extensive
computer simulations, which shows that for exogenous returns with periodicity: (i) the
daring behavior outperforms the cautious behavior and (ii) the genetic algorithm is able
to find the optimal investment strategy by itself, thus outperforming the other strate-
gies considered. These investigations are extended to find the best investment strategy
for returns with changing periodicity. For this, the complexity of the strategy based on
a Genetic Algorithm GA is extended by allowing the chromosomes to have a different
length and considering more complex cross-over and mutation operators. In this way,
the algorithm may find the correct mapping of proportions of investment to patterns
that may be present in the returns. The performance of this adaptive investment strat-
egy is compared with the performance of other investment strategies that were used
as a reference. It is shown that after a number of time steps, the adaptive strategy
reaches a set of investment strategies that can outperform simple strategies like those
that always invest a constant proportion. Furthermore, it is shown that even though
the adaptive strategy has no knowledge of the dynamics of the returns, it may lead to
large gains, performing as well as other strategies with some knowledge. Finally, the
investment model is extended to include the formation of common investment projects
between agents. In this scenario, each project is conducted by an initiator who tries to
convince other agents to invest in his project. An agent’s decision to invest depends on
its previous experience with the particular initiator. The influence of the parameters
on the dynamics of the budget and the dynamics of the investment networks are in-
vestigated. It is shown that the agents’ budgets reach a stationary distribution after a
certain number of time steps and present a power law distribution on the tail. Further-
more, the investment networks emerging from the model show that the networks present
some of the typical characteristics of real-life networks like a high clustering coefficient
and short path length. However, the degree distribution of the investment networks
does not follow a power-law behavior which is usually found in real-world networks, but
v
rather a binomial distribution which is found in random networks. Although the main
focus of this PhD thesis is more related to the area of computer science, the results
presented here can be also applied to scenarios where the agent has to control other
kinds of resources, such as energy, time consumption, expected life time, etc.
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Zusammenfassung
Die folgende Arbeit befasst sich mit den Untersuchungen von Problemen der Op-
timierung von Ressourcen in Umgebungen mit unvorhersehbarem Verhalten, wo: (i)
nicht alle Informationen verfügbar sind, und (ii) die Umgebung unbekannte zeitliche
Veränderungen aufweist. Diese Dissertation ist folgendermaßen gegliedert:
Teil I stellt das Investitionsmodell vor. Es wird sowohl eine analytische als auch ei-
ne numerische Analyse der Dynamik dieses Modells für feste Investitionsstrategien in
verschiedenen zufälligen Umgebungen vorgestellt. In diesem Investitionsmodell hängt
die Dynamik des Budgets des Agenten x(t) von der Zufälligkeit der exogenen Rendite
r(t) ab, wofür verschiedene Annahmen diskutiert wurden. Die Heavy-tailed Verteilung
des Budgets wurde numerisch untersucht und mit theoretischen Vorhersagen vergli-
chen. Darüber hinaus wurde gezeigt, dass der wahrscheinlichste Wert xmp des Budgets
einen konstanten Wert im Laufe der Zeit erreicht. Mit Hilfe von Simulationen wurde
der Einfluss der stochastischen Faktoren auf den stationär wahrscheinlichsten Wert des
Budgets untersucht. Die Ergebnisse der Simulationen deuten die Präsenz einer Skalie-
rungsfunktion zwischen xmp und den Parametern an, die die stochastische Dynamik
charakterisieren. Die Ergebnisse der Simulationen wurden durch die Beschaffung ei-
ner analytischen Skalierungsfunktion bestätigt. Schließlich wurde die Entwicklung des
Budgets des Agenten für reale Rendite aus Börsendaten für verschiedene feste Investi-
tionsstategien und Einkommen untersucht.
In Teil II wurde ein Investitionsszenario mit stilisierten exogenen Renditen unter-
sucht, das durch eine periodische Funktion mit verschiedenen Arten und Stärken von
Rauschen charakterisiert ist. In diesem Szenario wurden unterschiedliche Strategien,
Agenten-Verhalten und Agenten Fähigkeiten zur Vorhersage der zukünftigen r(t) un-
tersucht. Hier wurden Null-intelligenz-Agenten, die über technischen Analysen verfügen
(wie z.B. Moving-Least-Squares), mit Agenten, die über genetischen Algorithmen ver-
fügen, verglichen. Die Leistung eines Agenten wurde mit dem Wachstum seines Budgets
nach einer bestimmten Anzahl von Zeitschritten gemessen. Um einen fairen Vergleich
zwischen den Strategien zu garantieren, wurden die jeweiligen Parameter der Strategien
an maximale Gewinne angepasst. Umfangreiche Ergebnisse von Computersimulationen
wurden präsentiert, in denen nachgewiesen wurde, dass für exogene Renditen mit Pe-
riodizität: (i) das wagemutige das vorsichtige Verhalten überbietet, und (ii) die gene-
tischen Algorithmen in der Lage sind, die optimalen Investitionsstrategien zu finden
und deshalb die anderen Strategien überbieten. Diese Untersuchungen wurden erwei-
tert, um die beste Investitionsstrategie für Rendite mit wechselnder Periodizität zu
finden. Zu diesem Zweck wurde der genetische Algorithmus, durch die Variierung der
Länge der Chromosomen und durch komplexere Gestaltung von Crossover- und Muta-
tionsoperatoren erweitert. Durch dieses Verfahren kann der Algorithmus die korrekte
Zuordnung der Anteile der Investitionen zu Mustern, die in Renditen vorkommen kön-
nen, finden. Die Leistung dieser adaptiven Investitionsstrategie wurde mit der Leistung
anderer Strategien, die als Referenz dienen, verglichen. Es wurde gezeigt, dass nach
einer Reihe von Zeitschritten die adaptive Strategie eine Reihe von Investitionsstrate-
gien finden kann, die einfache Strategien überbieten können, wie z.B. diejenigen, die
immer einen konstanten Anteil investieren. Darüber hinaus wurde gezeigt, dass obwohl
die adaptive Strategie keine Kenntnisse über die Dynamik der Renditen hat, sie trotz-
dem zu genauso großen Gewinnen führen kann, wie andere Strategien, die über diese
Kenntnise verfügen. Schließlich wurde eine Erweiterung des Investitionsmodell für die
Bildung von gemeinsamen Investitionsprojekten zwischen Agenten präsentiert. In die-
sem Szenario wurde jedes Projekt von einem Initiator angeführt, der versucht andere
Agenten zu überzeugen in seinem Projekt zu investieren. Die Entscheidung des Agenten
zu investieren hängt von den bisherigen Erfahrungen mit dem jeweiligen Initiator des
Projektes ab. Der Einfluss der Parameter in der Dynamik des Budgets und in der Dy-
namik der Investitionsnetzwerke wurde untersucht. Es wurde gezeigt, dass das Budget
der Agenten nach einiger Zeit eine stationäre Verteilung erreicht und eine Heavy-Tailed
Verteilung des Budgets auftritt. Außerdem zeigen die Investitionsnetzwerke, die sich
aus diesem Modell entwickeln, dass die Netzwerke einige typische Merkmale der rea-
len Netzwerke zeigen, wie z.B. einen hohen Clustering-Koeffizienten und einen kleinen
Durchmesser. Jedoch folgt die Verteilung von Knoten und die Anzahl von Verbindun-
gen nicht jenem Potenzgesetz, das normalerweise in realen Netzwerken auftritt, sondern
einer Binomialverteilung, die im Zusammenhang mit zufälligen Netzwerken steht.
Obwohl der Schwerpunkt dieser Dissertation im Zusammenhang mit dem Gebiet der
Informatik präsentiert wurde, können die hier vorgestellten Ergebnisse auch in Szenarien
angewendet werden, in denen der Agent anderere Arten von Ressourcen steuern muss,
wie z.B. Energie, Zeitverbrauch, erwartete Lebensdauer, etc.
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1. Introduction
This chapter gives the motivation for the research made during the PhD studies, a short
review of the state-of-the art in machine learning and computational economics. Finally,
the structure of the thesis is presented.
1.1. Motivation and Goals of the Thesis
For decades, researchers have dealt with the problem of optimization of resources in envi-
ronments with unpredictable behavior.
In this PhD thesis, the main goal is to precisely investigate some of the problems related
to optimization of resources in environments with unpredictable behavior where: (i) not all
information is available and (ii) the environment presents unknown temporal changes.
In this PhD thesis, different types of environments are proposed in order to study the
performance of different decision-making processes for optimization problems. The decision-
making process is considered to be the strategy of an agent in its interaction with its en-
vironment. In terms of computer science, an agent is considered to be a software entity.
For the purposes of this thesis agents may have different strategies and their performance
may depend on: (i) available information and (ii) the processing capabilities (internal ar-
chitecture) of the agent. Thus, the main goal in this PhD thesis is to investigate some
of the problems related to the optimization of resources using software agents in environ-
ments with unpredictable behavior where: (i) not all information is available and (ii) the
environment presents unknown temporal changes.
The essence of the problem is captured in Fig. 1.1 where r(t) is the changing environment
which influences q(t) the strategy of an agent that has to adjust properly in order to reach
optimal performance.
Figure 1.1.: The essence of the problem addressed in this PhD thesis. The agent, immersed
in an environment with unpredictable behavior, r(t), has to adjust its strategy,
q(t), to optimize its performance.
Note that for simplicity in this scenario, we do not consider the influence that the adaptive
1. Introduction
strategy has on the environment. Thus, the challenge for the agents is twofold: first, agents
have to predict r(t) as accurately as possible, and second, they have to adjust q(t) to the
proper values as quickly as possible. This is a complex and difficult task for environments
with uncertain and fluctuating dynamics.
Thus, the investigations in this PhD thesis are mainly focused on studying the perfor-
mance of different types of agents with different capabilities to adapt to their environment.
In other words, we would like to know to what extent agents with more complex capabilities
perform better than others with less complexity in different types of environments. In the
following section, some contributions of computer science to this problem are described and
the different types of agents considered in the investigations of this PhD thesis are presented.
In Section 1.4 the testbed for strategies, performance and complexity is described. In Sec-
tion 1.3 the testbed is related to some work done in the area of computational economics
and econophysics. Finally, in Section 1.5 the outline of this PhD thesis is presented.
1.2. Contributions of Computer Science
For computer scientists, the problem of optimization of resources in environments with
unpredictable behavior is usually an exciting topic which involves different steps. The first
step is to model the system; for this we mainly use software entities. In order to avoid
too much generalization or too much explicit description of the system, different types of
software entities as well as parameters and properties are added step by step to the system
until the latter has a similar desired behavior as the original environment. Afterwards, we
generally handle the problem of finding an optimal solution by means of different types of
algorithms and intensive computer simulations.
The main area of interest for this PhD thesis is the area of artificial intelligence. This
research area focuses mainly on giving machines the ability to learn and understand their
environment in order to solve problems and make decisions. One of the first contributions to
this area is attributed to Turing [1950], who introduced the famous Turing test used to de-
termine whether or not a machine may be referred to as intelligent. For a nice introduction
to the area of artificial intelligence see [Negnevitsky, 2002]. Within this area, the investi-
gations in this PhD thesis fall more specifically under the field of machine learning, which
mainly investigates different learning processes that can be used in computer programs to
improve their performance (see [Mitchell, 1997] for an introduction to this area).
There are different definitions for learning; I particularly like Gonzalez and Dankel [1993]
definition:
Learning is the improvement in the performance of a specific task (intellectual
or physical) after previous exposure to that task or a related one.
On the other hand, Machine Learning is defined by Mitchell [1997] as follows: “Ma-
chine Learning is the study of computer algorithms that improve automatically through
experience”.
Machine Learning approaches progressively learn from past experience; examples of these
approaches are: Genetic Algorithms (GA), Artificial Neural Networks (NN), Reinforcement
Learning (RL) and Expert Systems (ES).
Genetic Algorithms (GA) are powerful techniques inspired in natural selection that ex-
plore progressively from a large number of possible solutions which find after a number of
generations, the best solution for the problem. Usually, a possible solution to the problem
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is represented by an artificial chromosome consisting of a number of genes, where each each
can be binary (represented by 0 or 1), or a float-point number. In this manner, based
on some defined evolution operators, a number of initial solutions are evolved iteratively
(where each iteration is called a generation) and after a number of generations the best pos-
sible solutions to the problem are obtained [Forrest, 1996; Goldberg, 1989; Holland, 1975;
Michalewiçz, 1999]. Other techniques that are also based on evolutionary computation are:
evolutionary strategies and genetic programming. Evolutionary strategies, first introduced
by Rechenberg [1973], were initially designed for solving parameter optimization problems
using random changes in the parameters and are now also used in optimization problems
[Ebeling, 1990; Schwefel, 1995]. On the other hand, genetic programming techniques do
not evolve solutions that represent the problem but computer code that solves the problem
[Koza, 1992]. Moreover, many of these approaches are applied to environments that are sta-
tionary; however, some researches have recently investigated the use of genetic algorithms
in changing environments [Branke, 1999; Grefenstette, 1992; Harvey, 1992].
First introduced by McCulloch and Pitts [1943], Neural Networks (NN) are structures
capable of processing information that resemble some of the processes of nervous systems.
An artificial neural network usually consists of an input layer, an output layer and a number
of intermediate layers where each layer consists of basic information-processing units called
neurons. Each neuron is interconnected by weighted links with other neurons where and
has a numeric value representing an activation energy. Given the inputs and numerical
weights; a neuron computes an activation level and passes it as an output signal to another
neuron. The way NNs learn the solution to a problem is via the iterative modification of the
weights according to the desired input/output relationship. NNs have been attracting the
interest of many researchers leading to different investigations regarding the dynamic of the
neurons and their interconnections as well as their use; for example for pattern recognition
and adaptive controllers [Carpenter and Grossberg, 1991; Hopfield, 1982; Kohonen, 1984;
Minsky, 1954; Rojas, 1996].
On the other hand, Reinforcement Learning (RL) is a computational approach which
deals with learning from interaction based on the idea that agents in an environment can
improve their performance over time by processing the feedback they receive from the envi-
ronment. This means that the agent accounts for its actions and rewards obtained during
its interaction with the environment, where sometimes the rewards might be received with
some delay after a sequence of actions [Sutton and Barto, 1998]. Most of the solutions to
RL problems consist of implementing behavior rules to guide the agents in their decision
making process. Usually, the following two distinct approaches are used to solve RL prob-
lems: (i) to search in value function space, or (ii) to search in policy space. Examples of
these approaches are temporal difference methods and evolutionary algorithms. Temporal
difference methods approach RL problems through the iterative update of reward estima-
tion rules. For this purpose, several methods based on dynamic programming have been
proposed and studied so far. However, they are designed for special cases when the problem
can be formulated as a Markov Decision Process (MDP). The most popular among these
methods is the Q-learning algorithm [Watkins, 1989]. On the other hand, evolutionary al-
gorithms to solve RL problems are based on learning classifier systems. See Holland et al.
[1986] for some of the foundations of this approach. More recently, Moriarty et al. [1999]
investigated the application of evolutionary algorithms to RL problems, proposing differ-
ent kinds of policy representations and problem-specific genetic operators. The authors
show some of the advantages and disadvantages when using this approach to different RL
problems.
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Finally, Expert Systems (ES) consist mainly of a knowledge base a database and an infer-
ence engine. The knowledge base contains a set of rules of the type if(condition) then(action)
and the database stores facts that are matched against the rules from the knowledge base by
means of the inference engine [Newell and Simon, 1972]. This approach has been extended
by many researchers where the main goal is to have expert systems that are able to manage
uncertainty in a feasible way [Bonissone and Tong, 1985; Burkhard, 1998; Pearl, 1988].
Machine Learning has numerous applications, and in the following section some of the
most important contributions related to signal processing, pattern recognition and forecast-
ing are mentioned as they are relevant for the purposes of this thesis.
1.2.1. Signal Processing and Pattern Recognition
Evolutionary Computation
Other techniques developed from machine learning that are frequently used for investment
decision problems are those based on evolutionary computation - for example, those using
genetic programming (GP) and genetic algorithms (GAs) for portfolio management, induc-
ing rules for bankruptcy prediction and assigning credit scoring, see [Bauer, 1994; Dawid,
1999]. For a recent review of the use of GAs for forecasting stock market prices and foreign
exchange see also [Drake and Marks, 2002].
It has been shown that some investment strategies based on genetic programming tech-
niques usually lead to profitable trading strategies. For instance, Pereira [1996] has used
GAs for optimizing technical trading rules which are able to give a buy or a sell signal
depending on the historical price and volume data. Neely et al. [1997] discussed the use of
a GP approach for technical analysis in the foreign exchange market, reporting significant
excess returns that could have been earned in currency markets using their GP approach.
The authors also compare the performance of the trading rules found by the GP approach
against standard statistical methods, reporting that the former detects patterns in the data
that the latter is not able to detect. A similar approach is used by [Schulenburg and Ross,
1999, 2001], where the authors present a GP approach for modeling the behaviors of financial
traders. The authors compare the performance of the GP with other well known investment
strategies: buy-and-hold, trend-following, random walk and cash-hold. The authors present
results for the stock of IBM, where the average wealth reached by the agents using the GP
approach was in most cases higher than that of those using buy-and-hold and in all cases
higher than that of those using the investment strategies of cash-hold, trend-following and
random walk. A different approach is used by Kassicieh et al. [1998], the authors propose
the use of a genetic algorithm to develop the closest to perfect foresight for guiding the
switching between stocks and bonds. The authors use singular value decomposition (SVD)
and neural networks to transform the initial data information and the output is introduced
to a genetic algorithm which determines the best switching strategy. The authors report
that non standardized SVD yields better results than neural networks. Moreover, Jiang
and Szeto [2003] investigate the use of GP to calibrate the use of different technical anal-
ysis techniques based on moving averages in four different stocks from the NASDAQ. The
authors assumed the rate of overall return to account for the performance of the strategies
and compared these against benchmark methods such as random walk, buy-and-hold and
exhaustive search. The authors report that in their experiments the GP approach is better
than random walk and buy-and-hold, showing that the GP approach can result in good
strategy sets. More recently, Schoreels and Garibaldi [2006a,b] investigated the use of a
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GP to evolve agents’ trading strategies on real historical equity market data using three
approaches: technical analysis, the capital asset pricing model and a hybrid model of these
two approaches. The authors report that the approach based on technical analysis per-
formed better than the one based on the capital asset pricing model. However, the hybrid
approach outperformed both non-hybrid approaches; supporting the use of multi-method
based approaches in agent-based systems.
The previously mentioned approaches mainly use genetic programming (GP) approaches
to optimize rules that are able to describe the environment and forecast the time series
involved. However, they usually find strategies which are difficult to understand and which
sometimes cannot be funded. Even though investment strategies that are based on genetic
algorithms (GA) may be also difficult to abstract and to explain, I believe that they are more
natural, understandable and flexible than those based on genetic programming techniques.
For example, Szpiro [1997] proposes the use of GA to find equations that describe the
behavior of a time series. The method permits global forecasts of chaotic time series using
very little data. The author also discusses the fact that sometimes the equations found
indicate the functional form of the dynamic that underlies the data. The algorithms are
tested with clean and noisy chaotic data, as well as with the sunspot series. Alvarez et al.
[2001] present DARWIN, an efficient evolutionary algorithm to approximate the functional
relationship, in symbolic form, that describes the behavior of a time series. The authors
report that DARWIN is particularly useful when the dynamic model that creates the time
series is nonlinear, and discuss also the application of DARWIN as a predictor in a satellite-
based ocean forecasting system. Kishtawal et al. [2003] use a GA for the prediction of
summer rainfall over India. The authors report that the GA finds the equations that best
describe the temporal variations of the seasonal rainfall, enabling the forecasting of future
rainfall. More recently, Manimaran et al. [2006] used a GA in conjunction with discrete
wavelets to forecast the trend in financial time series. The method proposed uses discrete
wavelets to isolate the local, small-scale variations in the time series. Afterwards, the GA is
used to find proper analytic equations predicting the time series. The authors report that
the trends of the NASDAQ composite index and the Bombay stock exchange composite
index are well captured by their approach.
Neural Networks
Several researchers have used artificial neural networks for forecasting time series, however,
it has been noted that there are some disadvantages when using this approach. For instance,
Zell [1995] refers to the following two disadvantages when using simple feed-forward neural
networks to find patterns in time series: (i) the size of the input window is always fixed
and (ii) for two sequences with the same information the network yields the same result
independent of the context of the sequences in the whole time series. To circumvent these
problems, some researchers have proposed different methods for dealing with the problem
of a priori determination of the best topology for the network. One approach is to use a
special class of neural networks, called ontogeny neural networks [Fiesler, 1994]. The main
goal of this approach is to adapt the topology of the neural network automatically based on
growing methods - in order to avoid getting trapped in local minima (adding new units) -
and pruning methods - in order to improve generalization. A different approach is handled
by Neuneier and Zimmermann [1998], in which the authors propose the use of sensitivity
analysis to determine the best topology and the best way to train neural networks.
In economical contexts, neural networks have been used, for example, by Nikolopoulos
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and Fellrath [1994]. The authors propose a unified model that joins connectionist and logic
programming paradigms for investment advising. By means of neural networks the authors
detect the interest rate trends and use these as input to a deductive reasoning component
which infers the most appropriate investment strategy depending on the investor’s lifestyle,
tolerance for risk and financial goals (short-, intermediate- and long-term goals). A survey
of different approaches using neural networks for forecasting economical time series is given
by Moody [1994, 1998]. Moreover, Magdon-Ismail et al. [2001] deal with the problem of
how to learn the most important features from a large amount of data with noise. The
authors use neural networks to find patterns from financial time series, where the main goal
is to find changes in volatility. Lee et al. [2003] report the performance results of an auto-
associative neural network for trend detection that was trained with the trend data obtained
from the intra-day KOSPI 200 future price. As reported by the authors, simple investment
strategies based on the detector achieved convincing gains. More recently, Castiglione [2004]
presents a method based on a simple artificial neural network to forecast the sign of the
price increment. The author reports a success rate of above 50 percent when predicting the
sign of price increments for series from the S&P500, Nasdaq 100 and DowJones Ind. Kuo
et al. [2004] provide another example. The authors propose the use of k-chart analysis and
over-whelming self-organizing map neural networks and not only endeavor to improve the
accuracy of uncovering trading signals but also to maximize the profits of trading.
Other examples of learning problems using neural networks for trading environments are
investigated by Moody and Saffell [2001]. Some other authors have also focused their efforts
on improving the performance of the neural networks in different investment instruments.
For example, White and Racine [2001] included statistical resampling techniques to improve
the performance of feed-forward neural networks. The authors report that the returns con-
tain information that is can be used for prediction. However, the authors also show that the
nature of the predictive relationships evolves over time. Prediction results for the foreign
exchange market as well as for daily stocks from IBM are shown [White, 1998]. Another
example is given by Zimmermann et al. [2001]. Here, the authors introduce a multi-agent
approach for the modeling of multiple foreign exchange markets based on feed-forward neu-
ral networks. The novelty of this approach is the merging of economic theory of multi-agents
with neural networks, which considers semantic specifications instead of being limited to
ad hoc functional relationships. The authors report that their approach is superior to more
conventional forecasting techniques when fitting data from the USD/DEM and YEN/DEM
FX-Market. Some authors have considered some other techniques that are based on the
theory of neural networks. For instance, Schittenkopf and Dorffner [2001] consider the con-
cept of mixture density networks to investigate one of the central problems in finance which
is to find better models for pricing and hedging financial derivatives. A well-known model,
for example, for call and put options is the model attributed to Black and Scholes [1973].
Schittenkopf and Dorffner [2001] present a new semi-nonparametric approach to risk-neutral
density extraction from option prices. The advantage of this approach is that it captures
some stylized facts such as negative skewness and excess kurtosis. The authors show that
this approach leads to significantly better results than when using the Black-Scholes model
and a GARCH option pricing model, which includes a time-dependent volatility process.
Van Gestel et al. [2001] use least squares support vector machine (LS-SVM) regression based
on a Bayesian evidence framework in order to infer nonlinear models for predicting the time
series and the volatility of different financial instruments. The authors report significant
out of sample sign predictions with respect to the Pesaran-Timmerman test statistic when
predicting the weekly 90-day T-bill rate and the daily DAX30 closing prices.
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Reinforcement Learning
Recently, several models based on reinforcement learning have been used to explain exper-
imental findings in strategic encounters (see [Camerer and Ho, 1999] for a review of them).
On the other hand, some other researchers have proposed some learning theoretical foun-
dations for evolutionary game theory, see [Börgers and Sarin, 1997, 2000]. More recently,
Burgos [2002] analysed the relevance of adaptive learning in explaining phenomena like
the fact that people tend to overvalue sure gains relative to outcomes which are merely
probable and tend to accept bets when payoffs involve losses rather than gains. The au-
thor considers a type of adaptive learner first studied by Erev and Roth [1998]; Roth and
Erev [1995] and shows, by means of simulations, that adaptive learning induces risk averse
choices. More recently, Geibel and Wysotzki [2005] proposed the use of a risk-sensitive
reinforcement learning algorithm to find the best policy for controlling under constraints
and applied it to the control of a feed tank with stochastic inflows. Finally, some authors
have shown that the performance of reinforcement learning algorithms can be improved by
including supervised learning approaches [Uc-Cetina, 2007].
Methods Based on Data Mining
Other methods used to solve the problem of forecasting in time series include Rough Set
theory and Independent Component Analysis. Rough Set Theory aims to discover and ana-
lyze data regularities and was originally proposed by Pawlak [1991]. For example, Skowron
and Polkowski [1996] used rough set methods and Boolean reasoning techniques for deriv-
ing decision rules from experimental data, while Fernández-Baizán et al. [2000] used rough
sets for short-term prediction of one variable, where inputs are historical values. The rules
resulting from these approaches to predict time series are fairly similar to the kind of rules
obtained using Genetic Programming approaches.
Other signal processing techniques that have been used for prediction in financial time
series are independent component analysis (ICA) or blind source separation of multivariate
financial time series such as a portfolio of stocks [Back and Weigend, 1997]. The key idea
of ICA is to create a linear map of the observed multivariate time series in a new space
of statistically independent components (ICs). Back and Weigend [1997] applied ICA to
three years of daily returns of some Japanese stocks and compared the results with those
obtained using principal component analysis. The authors report that the estimated ICs
fall into the categories of infrequent large shocks and frequent smaller fluctuations. The
authors also show that the overall stock price can be reconstructed effectively by means of
a small number of thresholded weighted ICs.
Finally, note that methods based on the principle of entropy have been also proposed by
many researchers, one measure that is commonly used is for example the measure of mutual
information [Shannon and Weaver, 1949]. This measure is used for example for the analysis
of symbolic sequences derived from the time series. The predictability of such methods has
been investigated for different type of time series [Ebeling, 1993; Ortiz-Tánchez, 2004].
1.2.2. Testbeds for Machine Learning approaches
The previous sections presented approaches for signal processing based on machine learning
algorithms which are used for specific problem-related scenarios. If other approaches are
tried for the same problem, there may be difficulties in assuring a correct performance com-
parison between different approaches. For this performance comparison, different testbeds
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have been proposed in order to facilitate a comprehensible and reliable comparison of ma-
chine learning mechanisms and its complexity. Following Fromm [2004], complexity may
have different definitions, however, for the purposes of this PhD thesis an entity like an
agent or a learning mechanism is said to be complex if the manner they execute decisions or
carry out tasks are difficult to analyse or understand. For example, the complexity of learn-
ing mechanisms has been investigated by Arthur [1994]. The author proposes the following
three mechanisms for increasing complexity within an evolutionary approach: growth in evo-
lutionary diversity (by coevolution), structural deepening, and capturing software. On the
other hand, Dempster et al. [2001] compared the power of computational learning methods
like reinforcement learning and genetic programming against simple heuristic-based meth-
ods for the problem of finding the most profitable trading rules in the foreign exchange
market. The authors considered popular technical indicators as input for the strategies and
showed that the performance of all methods resulted in significant profits when transaction
costs are zero, whereas for non-zero transaction costs the genetic algorithm approach was
superior. In another example, Gencay and Qi [2001] study the effectiveness of different
techniques for daily pricing and hedging derivative securities from the S&P 500 index. The
authors report that the use of Bayesian regularization produces less errors than when using
the baseline neural network model and the Black-Scholes model. The authors also show
that bagging provides the most accurate pricing and delta hedging, however, computation-
ally, this the most demanding technique compared in this study. A more general testbed
for machine learning algorithms is presented by Yannakakis et al. [2003]. The authors
evaluate the performance, robustness and required computational effort of two different
learning mechanisms in a multi-agent complex environment called “Flatland”. The authors
show that for high performance values an evolutionary approach like genetic algorithms
outperforms a gradient-based approach (like neural networks trained with standard online
back-propagation algorithm) in robustness, performance and computational effort. The au-
thors noted that neural networks had lower computational effort than the genetic algorithm
for lower performance values only.
1.3. Contributions from Computational Economics
The problem of optimization of resources in environments with unpredictable behavior has
been addressed not only by researchers from Computer Science, but also by researchers from
other areas like economics and physics. Economists usually analyze the different processes
that are involved in the system and propose different economic models to reproduce some of
the properties observed in the environment. Once the system is modeled, economists usually
find the maximum using different mathematical techniques, mainly based on calculus. On
the other hand, physicists interests lay more in finding the most important features that
generate the unpredictable behavior. Following the principle keep it simple, the system
is modeled using basic characteristics and the rules for achieving optimal allocation of
resources are found mainly by solving the equations: analytically, through simulations, or
using randomized search methods like simulated annealing.
Thus, the approach taken in this PhD thesis may also draw the interest of at least two
distinct research areas: economics and physics. Together these two yield the emerging
research area of econophysics, which mainly makes use of methods from statistical physics
to analyze data available from different economic sectors.
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1.3.1. Econophysics
The area of econophysics studies economic systems from a physicist’s perspective, providing
interesting methods developed in statistical mechanics and theoretical physics to analyze
financial markets, among others. Although, the main work of this PhD is in the area of
computer science, the investigations have groundwork in concepts from econophysics like:
power-law distributions, scaling and time series prediction. A nice introduction to some
concepts in this field can be found in [Mantegna and Stanley, 2000; Schweitzer, 2003].
The motivation of this PhD thesis lies specially in the study of power law distributions
in multiplicative stochastic processes.
Investigations Based on Statistical Physics
Several theoretical aspects of stochastic processes with multiplicative noise have been the
focus of research in physics. For instance, Schenzle and Brand [1979] investigate different
multiplicative stochastic processes from the perspective of statistical physics. The authors
compare some general properties of multiplicative processes with those in additive ones.
One important fact reported by the authors is that the most probable values of these pro-
cesses have different behavior. For example, in the case of multiplicative fluctuations, the
most probable values do not coincide with the deterministic stationary points. This means
that the threshold conditions are not only determined by deterministic parameters but also
by the strength of the fluctuations. More recently, Levy and Solomon [1996] investigated
different multiplicative random processes leading to power laws distributions. For their
investigations, they assumed a set of investors, whose wealth follows a simple multiplicative
dynamic and applied a lower limit for the process values, which can be understood as sub-
sidy so as not to allow individuals to fall bellow a certain poverty line. The authors present
a master equation for the probability distribution of their wealth and obtain an analytical
description of the asymptotic distribution of the process leading to a power law distribu-
tion. Their analytical results are validated using Monte Carlo simulations and experimental
data. These investigations have been extended by other physicists using the Kesten pro-
cess [Kesten, 1973], which extends the dynamics by introducing an additive stochastic term
which is independent of the multiplicative coefficient. This extension has the advantage
that the stochastic process is repelled from zero, provided some constraints on the additive
term are satisfied, thus, avoiding the use of barriers or limits in the dynamics. For instance,
Sornette and Cont [1997] study both multiplicative stochastic processes with a barrier and
with an additive term, i.e. multiplicative processes repelled from zero. The authors describe
the evolution of the process using a Fokker-Planck equation and propose a generalization
of a broad class of multiplicative process with repulsion. Similar research for multiplicative
stochastic processes with additive external noise has been conducted by Takayasu et al.
[1997]. This research presents sufficient conditions to obtain steady power law fluctuations
with divergent variance are presented as well as an equation to determine the exponent
of the power law. The authors also prove the uniqueness and stability of the steady so-
lution. Sornette [1998a] uses some of the previously mentioned results to extend some
investigations done by Takayasu et al. [1997], where by means of characteristic functions
the author studies the cases in which stochastic processes with multiplicative noise produce
intermittency characterized by a power law probability density distribution. In a related
study, Richmond [2001] find a steady state solution for a generalized Langevin equation of
the form: ϕ˙ = F (ϕ) + G(ϕ)ηˆ where η is Gaussian white noise. These previous results are
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complemented by Malcai et al. [2002], in which a generalized Lotka-Volterra system under
non-stationary conditions is studied. An analytical solution for the steady state is proposed
and compared against numerical simulations for different parameter values. The authors
conclude that the presence of a power-law distribution is a sign of “market efficiency”, anal-
ogous to Boltzmann distributions in statistical mechanics systems. Despite their incredible
simplicity, the dynamics of these processes have gained a considerable amount of atten-
tion in various fields. It was, for example, used in 1931 by Gibrat to describe the annual
growth of companies – an idea extended in different works by economists [Sutton, 1997] and
econophysicists [Aoyama et al., 2004]. In another example, Amaral et al. [1997] analyzed
the Compustat database, which is comprised of publicly traded manufacturing companies
in the U.S. between 1974 and 1993. The authors describe the distribution of growth rate
of companies and propose a model for the growth of companies based on a multiplicative
process. The distribution of wealth in a dynamic model of capital exchange is analyzed
by Ispolatov et al. [1998], where amounts of money are exchanged between two individ-
uals when they meet and different exchange rules result in different wealth distributions.
These authors also discuss the wealth distributions in multiplicative processes and show
that a steady state distribution is reached with random multiplicative exchange, whereas
in a greedy exchange, where the rich get richer and the poor poorer, non-steady power law
distributions arise. Marsili et al. [1998] study a simple model of dynamical redistribution of
capital in a portfolio and review different results for multiplicative random walk processes.
These include the typical and average values of the process for discrete and continuous time
approaches. Also, the authors discuss the problem of multiplicative random walk in the
presence of a lower wall introduced by means of an additive positive term. The authors
show that for a particular lower wall term, the analytic solution for the Fokker-Planck equa-
tion that describes the process leads to a Boltzmann distribution. The authors demonstrate
that the strategy they propose to dynamically redistribute the capital results in a larger
typical growth rate than a static “buy-and-hold” strategy, where the capital is initially
equally distributed among the assets with no redistribution. Another example is presented
by Carlson and Doyle [1999]. The authors introduced a mechanism for generating power law
distributions based on natural selection. The emergence of power laws are due to tradeoffs
between yield, cost of resources and tolerance to risks. The authors also considered lattice
models where percolation problems and sand piles were investigated. Moreover, Dragulescu
and Yakovenko [2001] analysed the income distribution of individuals in the the United
Kingdom and the United States. The authors found that the majority of the population is
described by an exponential distribution, whereas the wealth of the minority, corresponding
to the richest people, follows a power law. A different approach is to consider models for
capital exchange where buying and selling of goods between individuals is simulated with
agents. For example, Iglesias et al. [2004] investigated different capital exchange models
and try to explain the emergence of power-law wealth distributions. The authors focused
their investigations on the influence of the risk aversion of the agents in the wealth distri-
bution. The authors used the term “risk aversion” to describe the fraction of capital that
the agent saves, where the rest is exchanged with other agents. Note that in the language
of economics, this fraction of resources saved is referred to as a measure of the agent risk
aversion, see [Chakraborti and Charkrabarti, 2000; Gusman et al., 2005; Scafetta et al.,
2004a]. Both models investigated by Iglesias et al. [2004] considered that the poorer of the
two partners is favored in each transaction with a given probability. This assumption is
made in accordance with the notion of stable society presented by Scafetta et al. [2004b]:
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In order for a society to be stable rather than the poor being exploited in trades
with the rich they must have an advantage, at least in a statistical sense.
Iglesias et al. [2004] report a correlation between wealth and risk aversion showing that
a more equitable society emerges in the case in which extremal (minimum) dynamics are
considered, i.e. one of the partners is an agent with minimum wealth and the other is chosen
at random. On the other hand, when Monte Carlo dynamics are considered, i.e. both agents
in a transaction are chosen at random, the authors report that a capitalist society emerges.
[Gusman et al., 2005] extend these investigations, focusing on the characterization of the
most probable budget of the poorest agent in the population. To do this, the authors use the
Gini coefficient, which is a measure of statistical dispersion used in this study to measure
the inequality of income distribution. The authors also consider connectivity between the
agents and find that if the average connectivity is increased then the power-law distributions
emerge in most of the different cases they considered. In a related study, Scafetta et al.
[2004a] investigates a model with both investment and trade mechanisms which favor the
less wealthy agent, reproducing the stratification of the society into poor, middle and rich
classes respectively. Moreover, Fuentes et al. [2006] study a model for wealth distribution
where the partners in a transaction have some previous knowledge about the return that
may be received and adjust their risk aversion accordingly. The authors report that in
their model, when agents engage in a rational behavior, i.e. risking proportionally to their
probability of winning, then a relatively equalitarian society emerges. Unfortunately, this
approach does not agree with empirical data which suggests the contrary, i.e. individuals
with an irrational behavior, risking more than reasonable. More recently, Moukarzel et al.
[2007] presented some analytical investigations for these type of models. The authors derived
the condensation conditions and compared them against the numerical results. For the non-
condensed phase, the authors show that the equilibrium wealth distribution corresponds to
a power law, in which exponents are also derived analytically. Finally, the authors discuss
that the effect “rich get richer” is probably due to the multiplicative dynamics in the model.
Different applications for the multiplicative stochastic processes have been also consid-
ered. For example, Blank and Solomon [2000] show the presence of scaling effects in dif-
ferent systems like cities population, finance markets and Internet sites. More specifically,
Huang and Solomon [2002] have modeled financial markets as a stochastic multiplicative
system composed of finite asynchronous elements and shown that the wealth fluctuations
of the system can be described by truncated Lévy-like distributions. Moreover, the au-
thors also show that the origin of other properties of the returns in financial markets, like
power law distribution and long-range persistence of volatility correlation, are caused by
the cross-correlation between relative updated wealths. Another interesting investigation
for characteristics of financial time series was conducted by Gorski et al. [2002]. The au-
thors analyzed data from the Deutsche Aktienindex (DAX) and find different power law
behavior governing the distribution of the returns with exponents exceeding that of Lévy
regime. On the other hand, Mizuno et al. [2002] analyzed databases of Japanese companies’
incomes, confirming Zipf’s law in the income distribution, and found that small and large
companies have similar statistical chances of growth. This has been shown using the dis-
crete version of the linear Langevin equation for a stochastic variable, see [Takayasu et al.,
1997], to estimate the exponents of the power law distribution using data of growth rates.
In a related study, Sato and Takayasu [2002b] constructed an analog electrical circuit that
generates fluctuations for which the probability density function shows a power law in the
tail. The circuit is constructed based on the theory of random multiplicative process and
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the authors show that the fluctuations have statistical properties similar to those from the
foreign exchange rates. Multiplicative models for firm dynamics from the physics point of
view are also treated by Richiardi [2004]. Using simulations, the author investigates the
modifications to the standard multiplicative model of firm dynamics needed in order to
obtain stable distributions of firm size. To this end, the author shows that to this end
either heteroskedasticity in the growth rates or entry/exit mechanisms have to be assumed.
A related investment strategy for improving firm growth is presented by Takayuki et al.
[2004], where both real data and numerical data from a multiplicative stochastic process
process are used to estimate the average growth of a company’s income. Different invest-
ment strategies are evaluated in the numerical model leading to a strategy that numerically
gives the best average annual growth.
Investigations Based on Random Processes
The importance of multiplicative stochastic processes was also reflected by several math-
ematical investigations. For instance, some fundamentals of the theory of multiplicative
schemes (M-schemes) based on the multiplication of random variables were presented by
Zolotarev [1962]. In his paper, the author describes a class of M-infinitely divisible distri-
bution laws and general limiting theorems, which are proved using characteristic transfor-
mation of the random variables. And the convergence of such multiplicative schemes to
log-normal distributions is shown by Bakshtis [1972].
As it was mentioned earlier, Kesten [1973] studied the limit distribution of the solution
of a difference equation with multiplicative and additive coefficients represented by ran-
dom matrices and vectors respectively. Some mathematical properties of the multiplicative
stochastic processes with an additive term were also studied by Vervaat [1979]. The author
presents some mathematical proofs for the converge of the process to a power law distri-
bution. The author makes also reference to some applications of the processes modeled
by a simple multiplicative dynamic with an additive term. In general, the main variable
represents a stock of objects, the additive term represents a number of objects added to
the stock and the multiplicative term represents the decay or increase of the stock at every
time step. For example, Lassner [1974] assumes that the process represents the value of a
savings account and the additive and multiplicative term represent the deposit made and
the interest factor at every time step respectively, which may fluctuate stochastically with
time. In a related study, Perrakis and Henin [1974] evaluate risky investments where the
multiplicative terms are the cash returns with random timing. Another example is the
study conducted by Uppuluri et al. [1967], in which the authors assume that the process
represents a stock of radioactive material, the additive term represents the quantity added
or taken away at every time step and the multiplicative term represents the natural decay
of radioactivity. This latter quantity depends on the material that is added or removed at
every time step, resulting in a model with multiplicative and additive stochastic coefficients.
The previously mentioned investigations are extended by Brandt [1986]. In this study, the
stability of the process with multiplicative and additive terms is investigated in the case of
stationary coefficients. Haan and Karandikar [1989] deal with the problem of transforming
multiplicative stochastic processes with an additive term from discrete to continuous time,
i.e. the authors transform the difference equation of the model into a differential equation.
The authors also examine the cases for which the continuous-time process converges in dis-
tribution. This previous investigations are complemented by Haan et al. [1989]. Here, the
authors study multiplicative additive random process as a generalization of a first order
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ARCH process. The authors also analyze the extremal behavior of the process, analyti-
cally determine the existence of an extremal value limit law and numerically compute the
extremal index of the process. Redner [1990] present a tutorial for random multiplicative
processes, in which the author shows that the logarithm of the probability of the process
follows a Gaussian distribution, i.e. the distribution of the product has a log-normal distri-
bution. The author emphasizes the differences in asymptotic behavior between a random
product of variables and a sum of random variables. A more practical approach is taken by
Maslov and Zhang [1998], in which the authors try to determine the portfolio strategy that
provides the maximal typical long-term growth rate of investor’s capital. In their approach,
the evolution of the capital of an investor is modeled by means of a multiplicative pro-
cess, in which the stochastic fluctuations are due to risky assets modeled by multiplicative
Brownian motion processes. In a related study, Kotlyar and Antonov [2000] discuss the
use of multiplicative schemes based on multiplicative random variables for financial calcula-
tions. These include determining inflation rate, market value of securities and investments,
variability of production indices and depositary accumulations. The authors are able to
construct confidence intervals for estimates of geometrical expectation of logarithmically
normal distribution for known and unknown standard relative deviation. In more recent
contributions, Horst [2001] investigated the stability of linear stochastic difference equa-
tions with multiplicative and additive terms for non-stationary coefficients. This previous
work is extended for strategically controlled random environments [Horst, 2004] and com-
plemented by the investigations done by Saporta et al. [2004], in which the authors study
the behavior at infinity of the tail of the stationary distribution of the process with random
coefficients. The authors present an extended class of multiplicative coefficients that satisfy
irreducibility and proximality, which lead to a heavy tail behavior of the process.
1.3.2. Computational Intelligence in Investment Strategies
In the previous section we presented some state-of-the art techniques regarding machine
learning and some of the applications and test-beds that are more related to the area of
robotics, control and automatization were mentioned. In this section some contributions
made to the area of agent-based computational economics are described, in which different
machine learning algorithms are also frequently used for modeling behavior or cognitive
processes for artificial agents. We start by presenting some general work that has been done
in the areas of decision making and utility theory and afterwards some research work done
related to the simulation of agent intelligence for artificial financial markets is presented.
Decision Making and Utility Theory
When we talk about decision making with uncertainty and the use of utility theory to
measure the preferences of an individual when choosing between different prospects, we
need to start with the concept of risk. The term risk, according to many researchers, can
be defined as a measure of uncertainty and is associated with the statistical concept of
variance (see [Holton, 2004; Knight, 1921; Rothschild and Stiglitz, 1970] for more details
about the definition of risk). Usually, in the fields of decision making and utility theory
under uncertainty, one can see two research branches. In the first, researchers focus their
attention on the important task of how to measure risk, leading to different types of measures
[Artzner et al., 1999; Pratt, 1964]. In the second one, researchers focus their attention on
finding appropriate strategies when dealing with risky processes [Kahneman and Tversky,
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1979; Kahnemann and Riepe, 1998; Kelly, 1956; Maslov and Zhang, 1998; Tobin, 1958]. In
the following, both approaches are reviewed more in detail.
Measures of risk aversion:
Some researchers have focused their investigations on trying to find different measures
of risk aversion. For instance, Pratt [1964] discussed the concept of risk-aversion, where a
decision maker has to choose between receiving a random or non-random amount. According
to the author, risk aversion is present when an agent prefers to receive the expected value
of a lottery rather than to participate in it. In this article, the author analyses two cases of
risk aversion: local and proportional risk aversion. For each case, Pratt proposes different
measures of risk aversion, which are known as ARA (absolute risk aversion) and RRA
(relative risk aversion). The author also presents equations to calculate the risk premium
and the probability premium based on these measures. Concepts like constant risk aversion
as well as increasing and decreasing risk aversion are also discussed for both cases. A
similar study with extended examples and detailed explanations is presented by Arrow [1965]
and some economic concepts of risk are treated by Rothschild and Stiglitz [1970]. More
recently, Montesano [1991] considered Arrow-Pratt’s risk aversion measure and analyzed
this for Expected and Non-expected Utility, noting that measuring risk aversion through
the ratio between the risk premium and the standard deviation of the lottery captures
the main feature of risk aversion. Moreover, Artzner et al. [1999] presented four desirable
properties for measures of risk and demonstrated the universality of scenario-based methods
for providing coherent measures. The authors also discuss the use of previously proposed
measures of risk aversion and classify investors by their behavior towards risk (e.g. risk-
averse, risk-neutral or risk-seeking behaviors). Finally, [Holton, 2004] presents a detailed
review of the definitions of risk and the subjective vs. objective interpretations of probability
along with some historical remarks.
Strategies for risky processes:
As previously mentioned, some other researchers focus their attention on finding not
only appropriate measures for risk aversion but also appropriate strategies to control risk-
exposure in environments with uncertainty. It is important to note that the investigations
in this thesis are more in line with this approach. Finding a proper investment strategy
in environments that are uncertain and where fluctuations are present is a complex and
difficult task and methods from artificial intelligence are often utilized for this task. For
example, choosing to avoid investment may lead to the loss of major opportunities to win
large amounts of money. On the other hand, choosing to invest large amounts of money
may lead to situations where the chances of losing the entire investment are very high.
Thus, the task of finding an appropriate strategy that balances these two extrema is by far
not trivial. The usual approach to this problem is to find a proper investment policy based
on the average return and the volatility of the asset. For instance, a first description of
optimal strategies for placing bets in gambling is presented in the seminal contribution of
Kelly [1956]. Take, for example a game, in which the odds are in the favor of the gambler
but with a large uncertainty factor. The author shows that for a gambler knowing the
result of the bet with a given probability, if the gambler speculates the result of the bets
in advance, he can maximize the exponential rate of his wealth by betting a fraction of his
capital. The author also shows that in such scenarios the profits of the gambler will be
larger if he bets a fraction of his budget rather than if he bets his whole capital at every
time step. In modern finance, investing in risky assets is similar to gambling as shown by
Breiman [1960], who described multi-asset optimal investment strategies for risky assets.
A different approach for the problem of portfolio optimization is the one addressed by Sor-
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nette [1998b], who uses tools developed in statistical physics to address the problems of risk
controlling and optimal diversification in finance and insurance. The author demonstrates
for different scenarios that in order to perform a complete assesment of risk management,
the agent needs to consider the full distribution of price variations, not only the conven-
tional mean-variance approach. The author also discusses the role of large deviations in
multiplicative processes and presents different optimal strategies that consider additional
parameters like the time-horizon and the aversion to rare and relatively large risks. A similar
approach is taken by Crama and Schyns [2003], in which the authors consider a simulated
annealing meta-heuristic approach to find the optimal diversification strategy for a portfo-
lio selection model based on a classical mean-variance portfolio model and enriched with
realistic constraints like lower and upper limits on held proportion of the asset, lower limits
on the variations of the holdings (representing investors not willing to modify the portfolio
for only a few assets) and maximum number of assets for easy and faster management. In
a related study, Urbanowicz and Holyst [2004] use properties of coarse-grained entropy to
analyze the noise level for the Dow Jones index and some stocks from the New York Stock
Exchange, showing that an investment strategy based on a threshold for minimal noise
results in average positive returns.
Liu et al. [2003] takes a different approach combining historical data and finance theory.
Here, the authors consider soft data which includes news, announcements from the govern-
ment or industry and political events to feed a set of linear belief functions for portfolio
evaluation. The authors report outperformance in comparison with some previous similar
approaches that include not only historical data but financial knowledge as well.
More recently, some researchers considered assets with prices modeled by means of a
multiplicative random walk process and described an investment strategy to readjust the
portfolio [Merton, 1990]. This has been extended by Maslov and Zhang [1998] for a gen-
eral distribution of return per capital. All these contributions consider exogenous returns,
which are drawn from a probability distribution, or modeled by stochastic processes. These
approaches are extended by Kahnemann and Riepe [1998], who investigate different util-
ity functions for preferences and beliefs for investment advisors and by Thorp [2000] who
analyses the Kelly Criterion for simple gambling games like blackjack and more complex
scenarios like the stock market. Another example of risk-controlling under uncertainty is
presented by Rogers [2001]. In this study, the author models the effect of infrequent policy
review for an agent that re-balances its portfolio and consumption behavior only at given
periods of time. Different investment strategies under uncertainty are also analysed by Thi-
jssen [2003]. The author presents the effect of information streams on investment decisions
and the role of information spillovers in strategic investment. The author also investigates
the role that bounded rationality has on the evolution of different type of markets.
Another interesting problem is that of learning and expectation formation in macroe-
conomics, in which the expectations of the risky processes influence the time path of the
economy and on the other hand the time path of the economy influences the expectations.
In order to analyse this problem a rational expectation approach is usually assumed which
balances both relationships [Evans and Honkapohja, 2001]. Moreover, some researchers
have used computational intelligence approaches to investigate the convergence of models
and learning approaches to a Rational Expectation Equilibria (REE). One important con-
tribution is due to Arifovic [1994, 1996]. Here, the author demonstrates that the genetic
algorithms can be effectively used in models to converge to the REE.
Testbed scenarios:
The typical scenario used to study decision-making processes with uncertainty and, more
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specifically, those related to investment strategies, is to allow an agent to choose between
investing in a risk-free asset or in a risky asset, see [Pratt, 1964; Tobin, 1958]. For example,
Tobin [1958] showed that sometimes it may be more reasonable to invest in a risk-free asset
as a means to transfer wealth over time. This was investigated more recently by Loomes
[1998], who analyzed some fundamental assumptions about rational decision making in
general economic scenarios. More specifically, Potters and Bouchaud [2005] have shown
that it may be better not to follow trends as this strategy sometimes leads to more losses
than gains. On the other hand, assuming a model with no consumption, Hens and Schenk-
Hoppé [2006] have shown that those agents investing in risk-free assets will be driven out
of the market in the long run by agents investing in risky assets.
Other researchers have investigated the performance of different strategies following a
different approach, for example based on two types of agents: agents which only react
on external changes (also known as “zero-intelligence agents” [Farmer et al., 2005]) and,
agents which have a complex internal architecture [Gode and Sunder, 1993]. For instance,
Lohmann and Baksh [1994] analyzed the performance of different strategies for dealing with
risk in different scenarios. The authors refer to the problem when analyzing the relative
performance of different decision procedures in attaining the decision maker’s financial
objectives. From their point of view, it is not clear how to achieve this while also dealing
effectively with risk in long sequences of capital rationing decisions. The authors performed
empirical investigations by conducting Monte Carlo computer simulation of long sequences
of capital rationing decisions and used this data to evaluate the performance of six different
capital budgeting decision procedures for dealing with risk. The performance was measured
in terms of the relative effects on the capital growth rate and risk of ruin. Another interesting
approach was presented by MacLean et al. [2003], who compared a variable planning horizon
approach with the standard Value-at-Risk methodology with a fixed time horizon. The
authors show that their proposed strategy has greater expected return with equivalent
downside risk which may be attributed to the fact that this strategy comes into action
when the wealth deviates from the expectations. Many textbooks also address the topics of
risk aversion, choice under uncertainty and adjustments on risk (see for example [Nicholson,
1992; Pindyck and Rubinfeld, 1992]).
A different testbed is proposed by Helmbold et al. [1996]. Here, the authors present an
on-line algorithm based on a multiplicative update rule that performs as well as the best
constant-re-balanced portfolio when the actual market outcomes are known. The authors
performed experiments with real returns from the New York Stock Exchange and showed
that their strategy performed better than the best single stock and the universal portfo-
lio selection algorithm proposed by Cover [1991]. However, the authors do not consider
trading costs and they also address the problem that most of the investigations done on
investment strategies assume that the market is stationary. This is an unrealistic situation
as markets are changing constantly and comparing strategies against the best single con-
stant re-balanced portfolio does not ensure the best performance of a strategy for all types
of markets and for all time steps. In a similar study performed by Dempster et al. [2003],
the authors evaluate the performance of dynamic investment strategies based on fixed-mix
portfolio rules. The authors test their approach for stationary stochastic processes and show
that for stationary markets their strategy yields exponential growth with a probability of
one. In a related study, Gaivoronski and Stella [2003] propose a family of adaptive portfolio
selection policies to re-balance the portfolio when the number of decision periods is large
and new information about market arrives during each period. The strategy re-balances
the current portfolio by adopting the portfolio from a family with best performance on the
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past data. If no transaction costs are present, the performance is the same as that of those
strategies with full knowledge of the future. On the other hand, for nonzero transaction
costs, the performance is asymptotically congruent to the performance of the strategy with
perfect knowledge of the future.
Parkes and Huberman [2001] propose a different testbed for optimal portfolio diversifi-
cation, in which three different portfolio selection strategies are compared. The first one
consists of a constant re-balanced portfolio which maintains the same proportion of wealth
invested in each stock. The second is an adaptive strategy in which an agent’s portfolio
is updated based on its recent performance and stock changes by means of a learning rate
parameter. Finally, the third strategy performs a multi-agent cooperative search, adding
communication between agents that promotes cooperation through hint exchange. Ex-
perimental results show better performance for strategies that include communication in
simulated stock market time series based on geometric Brownian motion. When using the
Capital Asset Pricing Model to generate time series, communication between agents seems
to be unnecessary to outperform the non-communicative strategies.
Another interesting topic in the area of computational investment strategies is the iden-
tification of strategies acting in the market. For example, Popkov and Berg [2002] propose
a method of identifying an economic agent’s competitive strategies based on empirical data
gathered from the Russian financial market.
Artificial Financial Markets
When referring to the simulation of artificial markets, one of the most referenced investiga-
tions in this area is the study done by Bachelier [1900], who in his PhD thesis proposed the
use of Brownian Motion for modeling stock market time series. However, when referring to
machine learning and artificial markets, we usually think of a software agent buying and
selling artificial stocks. Some researchers have been interested in the properties that emerge
in an artificial market from the interaction between agents, however other researchers have
focused their efforts in finding the investment strategies that result in larger profits in such
environments. In this section, we present some work done in both areas, however, for the
purpose of this PhD thesis we start by presenting some investigations related to the prob-
lem of finding optimal strategies for profitable economic trading, and address research work
done in analyzing the stylized properties that emerge from artificial markets at the end of
the section.
Some researchers have been interested in defining intelligent trading algorithms and op-
timal pricing strategies. For example, Gode and Sunder [1993] reported one of the first
experiments on a continuous double-auction system with computational agents. A contin-
uous double auction is an auction for standardized units in which the offers to buy and
sell units are posted and continuously matched by a market maker. A broader approach
was taken by Rust et al. [1994] who made a comparative analysis of thirty trading al-
gorithms which were part of a double-auction tournament held at the Santa Fe Institute
between 1990 and 1991. The winner in this contest was one algorithm where the strategy
was to wait while others negotiate, then when the bid comes, jump into the game, steal
the deal and ask prices sufficiently close to the bid. Another approach for trading study is
to consider different kind of traders, some of whom have access to more information than
others. Arthur [1999] shows that speculations and herding behavior can also be observed
when computers negotiate with each other in a fully autonomous way. The author inves-
tigates artificial programs that act like investors, making bids and offers and generating
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and discarding expectations hypotheses about the price of artificial stocks. The author also
presents the “El Faron Bar” problem, relating this to financial markets and the strategy
that in the beginning one should perform short steps while trying to learn more about the
complex environment. Howitt and Clower [2000] studied the role of a trade specialist in a
model of a decentralized market. They define a trade specialist as a trader who can reduce
the costs of searching, bargaining and exchange by setting up a trading facility communica-
tion medium between non-specialist traders. They determined that in just over 90 percent
of their simulations, a "fully developed" market economy emerges. Ingber and Mondescu
[2001] described a process for the optimization of trading in physics-based market models.
The authors developed stochastic nonlinear dynamic models for futures trading systems
and used recursive and adaptive optimization with adaptive simulated annealing in order
to fit the parameters of the trading models. Nagel et al. [2004] investigate a simple model of
an economy, in which each agent produces exactly one good and is able to buy many other
goods. The main goal of the agents is to find the correct balance between work and con-
sumption. The authors present analytical solutions and simulation results for their model.
Particularly, the authors find that a well-defined market only emerges when prices adapt
on a slower time scale than consumption noting the importance of timescales for economic
markets.
Some of the previously mentioned artificial market models have been used to investigate
the performance of investment strategies based on adaptive or evolutionary approaches
like reinforcement learning algorithms, neuronal networks, genetic algorithms and genetic
programming, see Section 1.2.1. The main goal is to represent learning processes of com-
putational agents in which different local learning schemes are placed in each individual
agent or in a group of agents that evolve their strategies based on their own local benefits
[Andreoni and Miller, 1995; Arthur et al., 1997; LeBaron, 2000; Takahashi and Terano,
2003]. For more applications of evolutionary learning in studying the behavior of agents in
a broad array of social settings, see [Chamley, 2003; Gilbert and Troitzsch, 1999a; Gintis,
2000].
On the other hand, some researchers have focused their attention on the regularities
found in artificial markets and the properties of the returns generated by means of con-
stant trading between heterogeneous agents. Some of these approaches agree that the best
way to find a good investment strategy is to take some empirical features of real financial
markets into consideration. These include fat-tailed asset return distributions, high trad-
ing volumes, persistence and clustering in asset return volatility, cross correlations between
asset returns, trading volume and volatility, among others. Some related research has fo-
cused on the problem of finding the relationship between the properties and mechanisms
included in the agent’s investment strategies at the micro-level and the emerging empirical
features of the artificial financial markets at the macro-level. For some interesting surveys
on the earliest ACE (Agent-based Computational Economics) financial market studies see
[LeBaron, 2000; Levy et al., 2000]. Moreover, Bak et al. [1999] analyze the dynamics of
price determination in a simple toy model where agents try to estimate the quantity of
goods that their neighbor will order and at which price. The authors also analyze the ways
in which agents determine the value of money based on maximization of utility functions.
Another interesting contribution is due to Blok [2000], the author presents different simple
models of stock exchange and analyse them analytically and by means of simulations. The
author shows that the decentralized model reproduce different properties that can be ob-
served empirically in real markets. Moreover, it is shown that these empirical phenomena
emerge endogenously from the interactions between agents and not from a stochastic driv-
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ing force. This suggests that the complexity of the market dynamics does not arise from
the complexity of the agents itself but from their interactions, as it is shown that some of
the properties (like fat taills and long-range correlations in volatility) emerge even from the
interaction between simple agents.
Some other researchers have shown that in different artificial financial markets, chartist
behavior is outperformed by fundamentalist behavior and that the presence of chartist be-
havior may be the cause for some stylized characteristics of exchange markets [Anufriev,
2005; Day and Huang, 1990; Farmer and Joshi, 2002; Follmer et al., 2005; Potters and
Bouchaud, 2005]. However, not only chartists and fundamentalists are of interest for the
research community. For instance, LeBaron [2001] uses a genetic algorithm to co-evolve
the collection of trading rules available to the agents, showing that this model is able to
generate financial features from real markets. The author proposes to fit the parameters
of an artificial financial market to match empirically observed regularities for real financial
markets. This is done by calibrating an agent-based computational stock market model,
which is used to aggregate macroeconomic and financial data. In this model, the artificial
investors have different memory lengths which they use to evaluate the past performance
of their trading rules. Amir et al. [2002] also analyzed market selection and the survival of
different investment strategies in a toy model for a financial market. A similar approach is
the one taken by Alfarano et al. [2003], who show that the universality of stylised character-
istics of financial markets lies in the strategies. They found, for example, that by connecting
some micro variables of the market to a macro variable, in speculative markets, the tail of
the distribution becomes fatter if the importance of the herding mechanism increases. In a
related study, Takahashi and Terano [2003] used an agent-based approach to analyze how
investors’ interactions and investment strategies based on behavioral finance affect asset
prices. The authors compare fundamentalist and non-fundamentalist investors in a virtual
financial market, showing that fundamentalists outperform non-fundamentalists in most
of their experiments. Additionally, Lawrenz and Westerhoff [2003] present a Model where
market participants apply technical trading rules or fundamental trading rules according
to a weighting scheme. Strategies are selected based on a genetic algorithm. The results
exhibit features typically observed in the foreign exchange market. More recently, Lux and
Schornstein [2005] investigated the use of genetic algorithms for updating agents’ decision
rules in a model of exchange rate formation. The authors show that for some particular
parameterizations, the dynamics of the model are similar to those exhibit by empirical data.
Other related contributions investigate, for example, the impact of shocks in banks
[Drehmann, 2005]. In this study, different scenarios for stress testing in credit exposures are
simulated and analyzed. The author’s main interest is the impact of systematic risk factors
in driving correlated losses. His study shows that the UK banking system is robust and
that even under the worst macroeconomic conditions, the expected losses of banks are not
high enough to cause a bank failure. The main problematic of the micro-macro link is also
discussed by Schillo et al. [2000], where the authors describe some micro-macro relations in
Distributed Artificial Intelligence (DAI) and sociology. In addition, LeCorre and Mischke
[2005] detail the process of innovation management in three layers: the microscopic, meso-
scopic and macroscopic layers. The authors present the particular problems for each layer
and discuss how to solve them using mainly strategies that control the probability of an
innovation success by computing and optimizing the respective success-changes.
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Formation of Trade Networks
In recent years, the topological structure and the evolution of complex networks have been
of great interest for many researchers [Albert and Barabási, 2002; Erdös and Rényi, 1959;
Milgram, 1967; Newman, 2003; Xulvi-Brunet, 2006]. Some other researchers have focused
their investigations on the analysis of different properties of networks that emerge from
the interaction of agents [Axelrod, 1997; Bornholdt and Schuster, 2002; Dorogovtsev and
Mendes, 2003; Ebel et al., 2003; Wasserman and Faust, 1994; Watts and Strogatz, 1998].
Some of these researchers have focused on the endogenous formation of trade networks
[Albin and Foley, 1992; McFadzean et al., 2001; Tesfatsion, 1997; Vriend, 1995]. A key
concern in these studies is the emergence of a trade network among a collection of buyers
and sellers, who adaptively select their trade partners. In this approach, buyers and sellers
make this selection by assesing at their experiences with previous partners. For example,
Kirman and Vriend [2001] shows a model of the wholesale fish market in Marseilles. The
authors investigate the price dispersion and widespread buyer loyalty to sellers by analyzing
repeated business. They use a version of Holland’s classifier system [Holland, 1992] to
separate decisions for each agent. The authors report that price dispersion and loyalty
emerge as a result of the co-evolution of buyer and seller decision rules. The authors also
have seen that in their model, buyers learn to be loyal as sellers learn to offer a higher payoff
to loyal buyers.
Other researchers have focused their research on trying different models in which the
trading between agents result mainly in small-world type networks. For instance, Wilhite
[2001] used a model of a bilateral exchange economy and found that there are micro-level
incentives for the formation of small-world trade networks. A different approach taken by
some researchers is to fix the topology of the network by concentrating the investigations on
analyzing the performance of the market. For example, da Silva et al. [2005] present a simple
artificial financial market where the investment of the agent depends on its own motivation
level and the motivation level of its neighbors. The authors assume a ring interaction
network for the agents and characterize the performance of the agents in the market using
the concept of persistence [Majumdar et al., 1996], which measures the chance of keeping a
positive balance relative to the initial amount invested. In their model, returns depend on
both a random variable and on the investment. The authors study the performance of the
agents for cases in which a fraction of the agents are conservatives or deceivers, finding that
if the fraction of conservatives is increased, a phase transition in the persistence occurs and
that a small ratio of deceivers makes the market profitable. Finally, the authors report that
if the motivation is updated depending on the returns, agents become more risk-averse and
the market becomes more persistent, but the profits and the losses become smaller.
Another interesting approach that applies behavioral models for agents is the area of
Agent-based Computational Economic (ACE) for labor markets (see [Tesfatsion, 2001b,
2002] for a review). For example, different labor market models have been proposed to study
the relationship between market structure and worker-employer interaction networks [Tes-
fatsion, 1997, 1998, 2001a]. In these investigations, workers and employers repeatedly search
for preferred work-site partners in which interactions are modeled by prisoners’ dilemma
games. Moreover, the agents evolve their search strategies over the course of time based on
their earnings in past interactions. Tesfatsion uses descriptive statistics to study the corre-
lations between market structure and worker-employer network formations. Also of interest
is the analysis of job concentration (number of workers to number of employers) and job
capacity (total potential job openings to total potential work offers). Tesfatsion finds that
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if the job capacity is fixed, the changes in job concentration have only small, unsystematic
effects on relative market power levels. However, the distribution of the networks exhibits
two or three sharp isolated peaks corresponding to distinct types of worker-employer in-
teraction networks. This means that the interaction effects are strong, which, Tesfatsion
comments, may help to explain the “excess of heterogeneity” observed in labor markets.
Other types of networks that are of interest for many researchers are those between buy-
ers and suppliers. For instance, Klos and Nooteboom [2001] investigate the evolution of
interaction networks among buyers and supplier firms that repeatedly choose and refuse
their partners on the basis of continually updated anticipations of future returns. In this
model, firms have to decide between searching for suppliers for the production or handling
production themselves. The authors show that if there is more product differentiation,
firms tend to choose to produce themselves due to higher switching costs and scale effects.
Rouchier et al. [2001] investigated a more complex model dealing with the conditions that
determine how nomadic herdsmen access pasture lands. A key finding is that the grazing
patterns and interaction networks established among herdsmen, village leaders, and village
farmers tend to be very regular. The authors also studied the dynamics of relationships
among three different types of agents: nomadic herdsmen, village leaders and village farm-
ers. Nomadic herdsmen are represented by agents that need both water and grass for their
cattle and who seek access to these resources granted by village leaders and farmers in
return for access fees. Village leaders are represented by agents that provide herdsmen with
either good or poor access to water depending on their order of arrival. Village farmers
are agents who own pasture land and they may or may not permit the herdsmen to use it
for cattle grazing. The authors simulate two different reasoning models for their agents: a
“cost-priority” model, in which agents care only about minimizing their cost and a “friend
priority” model, which is based on ideas from institutional theory, in which agents also care
directly about the stability of their relationships. The authors find that the global efficiency
of the cost priority model is relatively low compared with that of the friend priority model
because the cost priority model tends to result in agent behavior that is less flexible.
Another interesting approach is the study of interaction mechanisms in the micro level
that lead to high performing network systems. For example, Schweitzer et al. [1996] use
evolutionary strategies that arise from the interaction of active Brownian agents in order
to optimize the network. Schweitzer [2003] also discusses self-organization of networks and
presents an agent-based model of network formation that is able to adapt the connectivity
of the network to the stochastic influences in the system accordingly. More recently, the
behavior of agents in innovation networks has been also investigated [König et al., 2008;
Seufert and Schweitzer, 2007].
A similar research area that has attracted many researchers is coalition formation, where
software agents are equipped with behavioral or cognitive models and the main goal of
the agents is to find the most efficient manner in which to assign tasks to the agents and
to distribute the revenues among themselves. In general, the main goal is to maximize
the social welfare of the agents by means of efficient interaction protocols, strategies and
coalition formation mechanisms [Larson and Sandholm, 2000; Lerman and Shehory, 2000;
Shehory and Kraus, 1999; Vassileva et al., 2002]. For instance, Fiaschi and Pacini [2005]
propose a model based on human capital and coalition formation. In this model, the
dynamics required to form a coalition between agents depend on voluntary agreement and
the payoff of the agents. This means that an agent is excluded from a coalition if the payoff
of all members in the coalition may increase without having this agent in the coalition.
On the other hand, an agent may join a coalition if the payoff for all members in the
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coalition is estimated to increase if this agent is accepted. In the same way, an agent has
an incentive to enter in a coalition if his payoff increases with respect to the payoff of his
actual coalition. The authors suggest in their model that the increasing returns favor the
formation of coalitions, but the distributive rule of coalition makes rich agents to avoid
poor agents, which leads to polarization in the resources of the agents. The authors also
report that in their simulations, if the inequality in the initial distribution of resources
is large, then a lower long-run growth rate of economy is observed. Kraus et al. [2004];
Shehory and Kraus [1999] present protocols and strategies for coalition formation in systems
with uncertain heterogeneous information and for systems with incomplete information
under time constraints. In particular, the authors investigate environments with limited
computational resources and show that the compromise strategy that they propose is more
stable and results in a greater increase in the social welfare of agents than non-compromise
strategies.
1.4. Testbed Outline
In computer science, a software agent is a computational entity that is able to perceive the
state of its environment and depending on this state, perform some actions in pursuit of a
goal. An agent is said to be autonomous if its actions depend on the way that it processes
environment information, its internal knowledge and previous experience. In the literature,
there is not a clear agreement for the classification of agents (see [Wooldridge and Jennings,
1994, 1995]). For example, in the field of artificial intelligence and complex systems, one
can distinguish between two types of agents: first, agents which react only to external
changes (also known as “zero-intelligence agents” [Farmer et al., 2005; Gode and Sunder,
1993]) and second, agents which have a complex internal architecture (e.g. “belief-desire-
intention agents”). Moreover, these agents may be immerged in multiagent systems with
different purposes, for example: (i) for decision making which results from the collective
cooperation between the agents,in which the main goal is to optimize resources; and (ii)
for modelling, where the main goal is to explore and understand some real phenomena by
means of abstracting the components and factors involved in the process, into the properties
of the agents and the interaction mechanisms (for more on multiagent systems see [Russell
and Norvig, 1995; Wooldridge, 2002]).
For the purpose of this thesis, we divide the classification of “zero-intelligence agents” into
reactive agents and experience-based agents. This is done in order to make a clear distinction
between these agents with respect to their internal complexity. Thus, we classify agents
using three types:
• Reactive agents.- base their actions on simple reactions to their environment, i.e their
behavior is based in functions like: State(i)→ Action(i). For this, the reactive agent
usually has a repository of state-action rules. An agent first performs a perception
process in which it receives information about the actual state of its environment.
Afterwards, in the the decision-making process, it selects an appropiate action for the
current state using the set of state-action rules. Finally, an action is performed which
may modify the state of the environment. A schematic diagram of a simple reactive
agent is shown in Fig. 1.2. For more on these type of agents see [Schweitzer, 2003].
• Experience-based agents.- these base their actions on previous experiences, meaning
that they consider previous events or previous states of the environment in order to
22
1.4. Testbed Outline
select their current actions. Unlike a reactive agent, the experience-based agent has
a history repository, where the agent saves previously observed states of the envi-
ronment. This information is processed together with previously defined state-action
rules to determine the best action to perform in the environment. In other words,
the agent doesn’t learn how to adapt to its environment, it only applies predefined
knowledge to determine the best course of action given the previously observed states
of the environment. A schematic diagram of an experience-based agent is shown in
Fig. 1.2.
• Machine learning-based agents.- these have history repositories for both states of the
environment and state-action rules to be mapped. Unlike experience-based agents,
these agents have an adaptive learning module which modifies the set of “state-action”
rules according to the previously observed states in the environment and the actions
performed. This means that these agents are able to adapt to their environment,
and learn the best actions for the different states of the environment. A schematic
diagram of a machine learning-based agent is shown in Fig. 1.2. For more on these
type of agents, see [Burkhard, 1993; Burkhard et al., 1998; Rao and Georgeff, 1991;
Wooldridge and Jennings, 1995].
Despite these clear differences in agent architecture, it is difficult to determine what
influence these properties have on the overall performance of the agents. Thus, given these
different agent types, the primary concern in this PhD thesis is to study the complexity
of an agent and its performance in different environments in order to answer the following
questions:
• How does the (internal) complexity of an agent enhance its performance in a hard-to-
predict environment?
• For which cases do agents with adaptive learning outperform reactive and experience-
based agents?
• To what extent is it worthwhile to equip an agent with complex learning mechanisms
instead of reactive responses to exogenous stimulus?
In order to study these questions, the scenario is expressed in an economic context, in
which the main goal of an agent is to perform investments that result in larger profits. For
this, an investment model has been chosen to investigate the effect of different properties,
behavioral rules and learning methods on the performance of agents. A schematic general
diagram for these investigations is shown in Fig. 1.2. The agent-based economical approach
describes agents as investors which are given an initial budget and one goal: to maximize the
amount of money over time. Thus, the budget of the agent will change over time depending
on two factors: the agents’ determination of the size of its investment and environmental
factors. For each investment, the environment returns a payoff to the agent. Different
types of environments have been chosen for these investigations: from random and stylized
returns to real returns from stock market data.
Note that we can map this environment to different contexts; for example, we can think
of agents that instead of trying to increase their wealth try to optimize the time they
spend in performing a task. Another example is an agent with a food depot. By utilizing
energy from the food depot, the agent is able to look for more food. This leads to the
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Figure 1.2.: Schematic general diagram for studying agent’s complexity and performance in
different environments.
optimization problem of knowing where to look for food and how much energy to use for
this task [Schweitzer et al., 1998].
Because it is a necessary step in the study of more complex scenarios, an initial study
of the performance of different agent architectures/investment strategies in the following
simple setup is needed: each agent has a certain budget x(t) and is able to invest a certain
fraction of its budget in a market. The gain or loss it yields depends on the market return,
or return on investment (RoI). In other words, at each time step t, the agent adjusts its
investment proportion, the fraction of its budget that it is willing to invest on the market,
denoted by q(t), thereby controlling gains and losses resulting from the RoI, denoted by
r(t). The dynamics for the investment scenario can be then defined as follows:
x(t+ 1) = x(t)
[
1 + r(t) q(t)
]
(1.1)
where r(t) ∈ (−1,∞) is the market return at time step t and q(t) is the strategy of the
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agent which can have different degrees of complexity.
Moreover, it is assumed that only the past and current values of r(t) are known to the
agent; it does not know the dynamics governing future values of r(t). In other words, agents
observe the market through the value of r(t) and, based on their analysis of a set of past
r(t) values, they predict future r(t) values and select their behavior with respect to that
market by specifying q(t).
1.5. Structure of the Thesis
The research done in this PhD thesis is divided into two parts: the first part focuses on
presenting the investment model and some analytical as well as numerical analysis of the
dynamics of this model for fixed investment strategies in different random environments;
the second part focuses on comparing the performance of different kinds of agents and
investments strategies in environments that exhibit periodicities or seasonalities and an
extension of the investment model for the establishment of investment networks is presented
and analysed.
This PhD thesis is organized as follows: Part I presents the investment model and inves-
tigates the dynamics of the budget for fixed investment strategies. In this part, Chapter 2
presents the investment model and discusses some of its basic dynamics. Chapter 3 analyses
the budget distribution and its evolution over time for different fixed investments and dif-
ferent random returns. Chapter 4 investigates more in detail the influence of the stochastic
factors on the evolution of the budget and presents a scaling function for the most probable
budget value. Chapter 5 analyses the dynamics of the budget for fixed investment strategies
in returns drawn from stock market data. Part II presents different investment strategies
and compares their performance in periodic environments, an extension of the investment
model for the formation of investment networks is also investigated. In this part, Chapter 6
presents different agent strategies for an artificial investment scenario where the return on
investment is characterized by a periodic function with different types and levels of noise.
Chapter 7 compares the performance of the different strategies presented in Chapter 6.
Chapter 8 extends the adaptive investment strategy based on a genetic algorithm presented
in Chapter 6 and compares its performance in an environment characterized by returns
with changing seasonalities. Chapter 9 extends the investment model to include forma-
tion of common investment projects. Finally, Chapter 10 presents the main contributions,
conclusions and the future extensions for the investigations in this PhD thesis.
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Part I.
Investment Model and Fixed
Investment Strategies
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2. The Investment Model
This chapter presents the investment model and a review on multiplicative random pro-
cesses which basic dynamics facilitate the apprehension of the fundamental ingredients of
the investment model.
2.1. Introduction
In the literature, a number of different kind of investment models can be found. Some
of them are based on simple assumptions (like those based on physical models mentioned
previously in Section 1.3.1), and others are based on more complex assumptions (like those
based on agent-based computational economic models presented in Section 1.3.2). In this
chapter, we review some of the basic dynamics that lay the fundamental ingredients for the
investment model presented and discussed more in detail in the second part of this chapter.
Following Kelly [1956], assume a gambler with a given amount of money x(t) at time t
and he is offered the chance to bet in a lottery. To avoid losing all of his money, rather
than betting a fixed amount, he prefers to always bet a fixed percentage q of his money.
Let r ∈ {r+, r−} be the results of the bet. If the gambler wins the bet, he receives r+ times
the amount he has bet, r+ q x(t) and if he loses the bet, he loses r− times the amount that
he has bet, i.e. r− q x(t).
Thus, the evolution of the gambler’s budget over time t can be represented as follows:
x(t+ 1) = x(t)(1 + r q). (2.1)
Assume that the lottery yields the following two results r+ = 1 and r− = −1, i.e. the
gambler wins or loses only the amount he is betting. And assume that the gambler wins
the bet with a probability p, and loses it with a probability (1 − p). Solving the previous
difference equation using the iterative method [Elaydi, 1996], we find that:
x(t) = (1 + r q)tx(0), (2.2)
where x(0) corresponds to the initial budget of the gambler.
Thus, if the gambler always bets 75% of his budget, i.e. q = 0.75 and has a lucky hand
and always wins, i.e. p = 1, then the dynamics of the gambler’s budget can be expressed
as follows:
x(t) = (1.75)t x(0). (2.3)
On the other hand, if the gambler always loses the bet, the following difference equation
describes the time it takes for the gambler to go bankrupt:
x(t) = (0.25)t x(0). (2.4)
Thus, we are interested in the following question: what percentage of his money should
the gambler bet in order to maximize his long-term capital growth? If the gambler always
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decides to bet the same fraction, q, of his capital, then whenever he loses a bet with
probability (1− p), he multiplies his capital by (1− r− q), and when he wins, he multiplies
his capital by (1 + r+ q). Thus, the average value of the logarithm of his capital after a bet
is:
〈log x〉 = (1− p) log (1 + r− q) + p log (1 + r+ q). (2.5)
By solving ∂q 〈log x〉 = 0 for q it can be shown that the q for which 〈log x〉 is maximum is:
q = p(r
− − r+)− r−
r− r+
. (2.6)
If both lottery’s results are positive, then Eq. (2.6) cannot be used, as it can be seen that
for unrealistic positive outcomes, the portion to invest has to be the maximum, i.e. q = 1.
For fair betting, p = 0.5, Eq. (2.6) can be simplified to:
q = r
− + r+
−2 r−r+ . (2.7)
For example, if the probability of winning the lottery is p = 0.5 and the results of the bet
are r+ = 2 if he wins the bet and r− = −1 if he loses the bet, then the optimal fraction of
money to bet is q = 0.25, or 25% of his money. However, consider again the case in which
the results of the bet are r+ = 1 if the gambler wins the bet and r− = −1 if he loses the bet,
i.e. a symmetrical bet or an actuarially fair lottery. For an optimal investment, q < 0 and
assuming for the moment that it is not feasible to bet a negative portion of budget, then the
optimal fraction to bet is zero percent of the money, i.e q = 0. Refer to the Appendix 10.2
for more details about the case in which q < 0. This would mean that a gambler is willing
to pay money so as to avoid participating in the lottery.
Fig. 2.1 shows the optimal fraction of money q calculated using Eq. (2.7), that a gambler
should bet in an actuarially fair lottery offering r+ and r− with equal probability but with
different resulting amount. It’s clear that the optimal fraction increases according to the
positive result of the lottery r+.
Interestingly, even thought both events r− = −1, r+ = 1 are equally probable, the best
thing to do in such scenario is not to bet. This can be explained by means of the arithmetic
and geometric mean of a series of random values. Recalling Eq. (2.3) and Eq. (2.4), the
arithmetic mean of the two possible values 1.75 and 0.25 is exactly 1.0, and this would
mean that the budget of the gambler should remain stable. However, the change in budget
in Eq. (2.2) is expressed not as the sum of random values (1 + r q), but as the product of
them, and therefore the geometric mean must be used in this case, this corresponds to the
product of these two values, i.e. 0.4375. Thus, the geometric mean of the multiplicative
process corresponds to:
〈λ(t)〉geom =
t∏
i=1
(1 + r q) = (0.4375)t/2, (2.8)
and it can be seen that the gambler will eventually go bankrupt over the course of time if
he decides to bet.
For the sake of clarity, the evolution of the budget is shown for the first time steps for a
gambler with initial budget x(0) = 10 who bets the fraction q = 0.5 in an equally probable
lottery with resulting amounts: r− = −1 and r+ = 1. All possible budgets after betting
twice in this lottery are: x(2) = {2.5, 7.5, 7.5, 22.5}, see Fig. 2.2. If we use the arithmetic
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Figure 2.1.: Gambler’s fraction of money, q, that leads to maximum gains, Eq. (2.7), in a
actuarially fair lottery, i.e two equally probable results r+ and r−, but with
different resulting amounts.
mean, we may find that 〈x(2)〉 = 10, which corresponds to the initial budget of the gambler,
however, if we use the geometric mean we find that 〈x(2)〉geom = 7.5, which is the gambler’s
most probable budget value in this lottery.
Figure 2.2.: Possible budget after betting twice in an equally probable lottery with resulting
amounts: r− = −1 and r+ = 1.
So far, some simple betting dynamics have been introduced and the problem of bankruptcy
has been discussed when the gambler iteratively bets a fixed fraction of the budget in a
lottery. In the next Section, the investment model used in this thesis is presented.
2.2. The Investment Model
Previously, a simple wealth model for a gambler was presented. In this section, the invest-
ment model is introduced.
The basic ingredient of the investment model is an agent characterized by three individual
variables: (i) budget x(t), which is a measure of its “wealth” or “liquidity”, (ii) proportion
of investment q(t), i.e. the fraction of budget that the agent prefers to invest in a market
and (iii) external income a(t), which can be also seen as external sources available to the
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agent. Thus, agent’s wealth evolves over the course of time t as follows:
x(t+ 1) = x(t)
[
1 + r(t) q(t)
]
+ a(t). (2.9)
In this model, in time t, the agent invests a portion q(t)x(t) of its total budget. This
investment yields a gain or loss in the market, expressed by r(t), the return on investment,
RoI. Therefore, r = −1 would mean a total loss of the investment, but the gain, in principle,
is not bound to a maximum. Furthermore, we assume that the market, which acts as an
environment for the agent is not influenced by its investments. This means that instead of
modeling a real market dynamics for investments, in our model we assume rather simple
external dynamics for the RoI, r(t), i.e. the returns are exogenous. This means that, agent’s
decisions change only the course of its own budget and not the process that governs the
dynamics of the RoI, i.e. there is not feedback of the investment strategies on the market.
In other words, we do not consider the influence that the adjusted proportion of investment
has on the market return, i.e. the influence of q(t) on r(t). Fig. 2.3 illustrates the dynamics
of the model: r(t), the market return, influences the strategies agents use to adjust q(t), the
proportion of investment. This is a crucial assumption which makes our approach different
from other attempts to model a real market dynamics, e.g. in financial markets [LeBaron,
2001; Lux and Marchesi, 2002; Raberto et al., 2003].
Figure 2.3.: Dynamics of the market as indicated by the market return r(t) and the strategy
as defined by the invested budget q(t).
For simplicity, we assume for the moment that the agent invest independently in the
market, i.e. there is no direct interaction with other agents. In Chapter 9, different models
are presented in which interaction between agents is considered.
Furthermore, the individual agent behavior is expressed in terms of its proportion of
investment, q(t), which may change e.g. dependent on the agent’s previous experiences,
assumptions about the market dynamics or simply by trial and error. Note that Iglesias
et al. [2004] refer to the proportion of investment q(t) with the term risk-aversion factor, and
the authors consider an agent that invests part of its budget in different types of fluctuating
returns, saving the rest. Since q(t) always represents a portion of the total budget x, it is
bound to a maximum value, qmax, and a minimum value qmin, in the following range:
0 ≤ qmin ≤ q(t) ≤ qmax ≤ 1. (2.10)
In the rest of this chapter and in some sections of the following chapters we consider constant
parameter values for proportion of investment and income. Thus, for simplicity we may
sometimes refer to these parameters with constant values: q(t) = q and a(t) = a. Notice
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that Eq. 2.9 can be also formulated in terms of a quantity I(t) invested at time t:
I(t) = x(t) q(t) (2.11)
This leads to the following alternative formulation of the wealth dynamics:
x(t+ 1) = x(t) + r(t) I(t) + a(t) (2.12)
in which I(t) < x(t), meaning that an agent can invest only as much as it owns.
So far, the investment model has been introduced and now the dynamics of the wealth
that result using Eq. (2.9) are shown and discussed for the following cases:
1. for no income and fixed proportion of investment, i.e. a(t) = 0, q(t) = const.
2. for fixed investment amount, i.e. I(t) = I = const., q(t) = I/x(t).
3. for positive income and fixed proportion of investment, i.e. a(t) > 0. and q(t) = const.
In order to study the dynamics of the wealth, note that, for example, following Elaydi
[1996], if we assume that the returns, the proportions of investment and the incomes all are
constant, i.e. r = r(t), q = q(t) and a = a(t) respectively, then the following closed solution
can be found:
x(t) =
(1 + r q)tx(0) + a
[
(1+r q)t−1
(1+r q)−1
]
if (1 + r q) 6= 1
x(0) + a t if (1 + r q) = 1.
(2.13)
Thus, if the RoI is deterministic, i.e. r(t) = r, the agent can use the solution in Eq. (2.13)
to determine the budget at any time step. However, this task becomes more complicated
if we consider that the RoI, r(t), is obtained from a stochastic process, i.e. the RoI can be
drawn from known probability distributions, modeled using stochastic processes or taken
from real stock market data. This is shown in Fig. 2.4, where two simulations of the
same dynamic with the same parameters lead to different budget values, x(t), over the
course of time. For these simulations, the RoI were drawn from a Binomial distribution,
r(t) B{−1; 1} and we assumed both proportion of investment, q, and income, a, to be
constant. This implies that at every time step, the previous budget value is multiplied by
two possible values {1− q; 1 + q} and added to the external income a. It can be seen that
a particular simulation of the dynamics of x(t), using Eq. (2.9), does not provide clear
information about the dynamics of the agent’s wealth.
Following Haan et al. [1989], if we use the iterative method for difference equations, it
can be shown that the time-dependent process x(t) in Eq. (2.9) can be described as follows:
x(t) = x(0)
t−1∏
i=0
[1 + r(i)q(i)] + a(t)
1 + t−2∑
j=0
t−1∏
k=j+1
(1 + r(k)q(k))
 . (2.14)
The first term on the r.h.s. corresponds to a multiplicative process described by Eq. (2.2),
which can be solved for q(i) = q using the geometric mean, Eq. (2.8). However, the second
term on the r.h.s. is more difficult to handle even for constant values of q and a, because of
the sum of multiplication of random values. Refer to Appendix 10.2, for more information
regarding the analytical results for the equilibrium state of Eq. (2.9). A different approach
to investigate the dynamics of a model with random variables is to simulate the dynamics
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Figure 2.4.: Budget over the course of time for two independent simulations using Eq. (2.9).
Parameters: x(0) = 10, q = 0.1, a = 0.5, r(t) B−1; 1 and t = 103.
of the model and to investigate the distribution of the values of the process over the course
of time and for different parameter values. One method used by many researchers for these
purposes is the method of Monte Carlo simulations.
Monte Carlo (MC) simulations are computational methods used to simulate the behavior
of systems with random variables. They are also commonly used to compute the probability
distribution of a stochastic process. In most of our investigations, we use MC simulations
to obtain the probability distribution of a random process, in this case the budget of an
agent for a given time step Px(t). For clarity, the Monte Carlo algorithm used in this PhD
thesis to obtain the budget distribution of the agent is shown in Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1: Monte Carlo Algorithm to obtain the probability distribution of the
budget
Input: Initial budget x(0), proportion of investment q, income a, return on
ivnestment r(t), maximum number of time steps tmax and number of trials Na
Output: Probability distribution Px(t) of the budget x
Initialize the number of time steps t = 01
for t < tmax do2
foreach trial do3
Increase time step, t = t+ 14
Obtain the return on investment r(t)5
Update the budget x(t) using Eq. (2.9)6
end7
end8
Obtain the normalized histogram of the values of x(t) for all trials, i.e. Px(t)9
For case (i), Fig. 2.5 (left) shows the probability distribution of agent’s budget, Eq. (2.9),
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where the agent does not receive income, a(t) = 0, its proportion of investment is q = 0.1 and
the RoI is drawn from a Uniform distribution, r(t) ∼ U(−1, 1). For comparison an visibility
reasons, the distributions are shown in a log-linear plot. As discussed in Section 2.3.1, the
budget of the agent tends to zero over the course of time, because without external incomes
and actuarially fair returns, the dynamics of the wealth distribution mirror those of a
multiplicative random process with no repulsion from zero. This fact is also discussed in
[Navarro and Schweitzer, 2003], where we propose a model for coalition formation, where
agents realize common investment projects and their budget dynamics are modeled based
on a multiplicative stochastic process with no additive terms.
Figure 2.5.: Probability distribution of budget x following the dynamic in Eq. (2.9) for
different time steps t: a) 100, b) 500, c) 1000 and d) 2000, and for: (left) case
(i) a(t) = 0, q(t) = 0.1, and (right) case (ii) I = 1, a = 0. Further parameters:
x(0) = 10, and Na = 105.
For case (ii), if we assume that the agent always invests a fixed investment amount
I(t) = I, this means that the fraction of budget invested at every time step is not constant
and is calculated as q(t) = I/x(t). Fig. 2.5 (right) shows the probability distribution of
the agent’s budget for I = 1, i.e. q(t) = 1/x(t), r(t) ∼ U(−1, 1) and a = 0. For visibility
reasons, the range of probability values is different to those in Fig. 2.5 (left). However, note
that without income, the budget distribution of the agent tends towards zero with a large
probability, though not with a large probability as for case (i). Note that the tail of the
distribution in case (ii) becomes less heavy on the left over the course of time.
Note that if we increase the income by letting a = 0.1, Fig. 2.6 shows that p(x) has a
log-normal distribution that evolves to larger positive budget values over the course of time.
For case (iii), we consider a positive fixed income of a(t) = 0.1 and a fixed proportion
of investment q(t) = 0.1. Fig. 2.7 shows the evolution of the budget distribution over the
course of time. It can be seen that the probability distribution of the budget increases to
larger positive values. Interestingly, it can also be seen that the tail of the distribution
shifts to larger positive values over time.
Note that in the previous simulation experiments for the dynamic in Eq. 2.9 for random
RoI with equally probable positive and negative outcomes: case (i) results in an agent going
bankrupt in the long run, Fig. 2.5 (left); case (ii) is unrealistic because the agent is constraint
to invest always the same fixed amount of money whatever its budget, for example an agent
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Figure 2.6.: Probability distribution of the budget x following the dynamic in Eq. (2.9) case
(ii). For time steps t: a) 100, b) 500 c) 1000 and d) 2000. Further parameters:
x(0) = 10, I = 1, a = 0.1 and Na = 105.
investing always the amount I(t) = 1 even if its wealth is x(t) = 10000, Fig. 2.5 (right).
Note also that in the long run the distribution of wealth suggests an over-enrichment of
the agent which is mainly caused by the accumulation of incomes, see Fig. 2.6; case (iii)
is a more real case where an agent invests proportionally to its budget and the probability
distributions of the budget indicate that in the long run, the agent will probably neither go
bankrupt nor go rich, see Fig. 2.7.
2.3. Understanding the Dynamics of the Investment Model
In the previous section, the investment model was presented and it was shown that for some
cases, the wealth of an agent approaches zero or infinite positive values in the long run.
In this section, we try to gain more insight into this fact. Note that we refer to x as the
wealth of an agent, investor or gambler pursuing a bet or an investment, and these terms are
used interchangeably. The process x may also be interpreted as agent’s energy, resources,
expected life time, etc., and we are particularly interested in the ways in which this changes
over the course of time depending on the environment of the agent and its strategy of action.
In the literature, we found that the investment model proposed in the previous section is
related to the theory of multiplicative random processes and in the following we review
some of the main results in this area.
2.3.1. Multiplicative Random Processes
Assuming again case (i) in Section 2.2, i.e. Eq. 2.9 with no incomes, a(t) = 0, note that
the process x(t) increases or decreases in value over the course of time by means of a
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Figure 2.7.: Probability distribution of the budget x following dynamic in Eq. (2.9) (case
iii). For time steps t: a) 100, b) 500 c) 1000 and d) 2000. Further parameters:
x(0) = 10, q(t) = 0.1, a = 0.1 and Na = 105.
multiplicative random value λ(t) as follows:
x(t+ 1) = λ(t)x(t), (2.15)
where λ(t) corresponds to a non-negative stochastic coefficient with probability distribution
p(λ). In physical terms, this stochastic variable represents a dissipation onf x if λ(t) < 1 or
amplification of x if λ(t) > 1.
In terms of the initial value x(0), for fixed λ 6= 1, the solution to Eq. (2.15) is:
x(t) = λt x(0). (2.16)
By iteration, Eq. (2.15) takes the following form:
x(t+ 1) = x(0)
(
t∏
i=1
λ(i)
)
. (2.17)
Notice that if the logarithm is taken on both sides of Eq. (2.17), the logarithm of the
distribution of products in Eq.(2.17) for large t, can be approximated by the sum of t
random variables. That means the logarithm of the probability of the budget, log p(x),
follows a Gaussian distribution. In other words, the distribution of the product has a log-
normal distribution as shown by Redner [1990]. Moreover, Sornette and Cont [1997] express
the distribution of x as follows,
P (x) = 1√
2piD t
1
x
exp
(
− 12D t(log x− 〈log λ〉 t)
2
)
, (2.18)
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where:
〈log λ〉 =
∫ ∞
0
log λ p(λ)dλ (2.19)
D =
〈
(log λ)2
〉
− 〈log λ〉2 . (2.20)
Note that if 〈log λ〉 > 0, then x(t) → ∞, but if 〈log λ〉 < 0, then x(t) → 0. That means if
the random process λ is biased and approaches to infinity, then x(t) will be distributed by
Eq. 2.18, otherwise it will shrink to zero.
Assuming that the coefficient λ(t) is drawn randomly from a uniform distribution, λ(t) ∼
U(a, b), then the quantities 〈log λ〉, 〈(log λ2〉 and D can be calculated as follows:
〈log λ〉 =
∫ b
a
log λ p(λ)dλ (2.21)
= 1
b− a
∫ b
a
log λdλ = 1
b− a [λ log λ− λ]
b
a
= b log b− a log a− b+ a
b− a (2.22)〈
(log λ)2
〉
=
∫ b
a
(log λ)2 p(λ)dλ (2.23)
= 2 a log a− a log a
2 − 2 b log b+ b log b2 − 2 a+ 2 b
b− a (2.24)
D = (a− b)
2 − a b(log a− log b)2
(a− b)2 . (2.25)
These previous equations can be used to elucidate some of the dynamics of the stochastic
process x(t). For example, for λ(t) ∼ U(1, 2) it can be shown that 〈log λ〉 = 0.3862, which
means that the process has a drift to the right, i.e. to larger positive values. On the other
hand, if λ(t) ∼ U(0.5, 1.5) it can be shown that 〈log λ〉 = −0.04, which means a drift to the
left, i.e. to zero.
These previous theoretical results can be confirmed by comparing them with results that
can be obtained using computer simulations. For this, Monte Carlo simulations were used
to simulate the dynamics of Eq.(2.15) in order to obtain the probability distribution of the
process for different time steps. Fig. 2.8 shows the evolution of the probability distributions
for this multiplicative random process for both simulations and theoretical distributions of
Eq. (2.18). For these, two different λ are considered: (left) λ(t) ∼ U(1, 2) showing a drift to
+∞ values; and (right) λ(t) ∼ U(0.5, 1.5) showing a drift to −∞, i.e. for t→∞, x(t)→ 0.
Furthermore, Sornette and Cont [1997] show that the probability distribution of the
maximum value reached, p(xmax), also exhibits a power law distribution on the tail. This
is confirmed in Fig. 2.9 (left), where p(xmax) is shown for two different time steps: t =
{100, 104}. It is clear that both have approximately the same power law distribution on
the tail. This means that for large t, the distribution of the maximum values reached
in the process reaches a stationary distribution. This phenomenon is frequently referred
as an extreme form of temporally intermittent bursting, also called on-off intermittency
[Venkataramani et al., 1996].
The next section shows what would happen if an extra ingredient is added to this multi-
plicative stochastic model.
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Figure 2.8.: Probability distribution of x, Eq.(2.15), theoretical (bold), simulation (dashed)
results, for a) t = 3, b) t = 5 and c) t = 10. For (left) λ(t) ∼ U(1, 2), and
(right) λ(t) ∼ U(0.5, 1.5). Further parameters: x(0) = 1 and Na = 105 trials.
2.3.2. Multiplicative Random Process with Repulsion at the Origin
Imagine the following situations: (i) the government or other organization helps people by
preventing them for going bankrupt or (ii) an investor borrows money from friends or from
the bank in order to continue investing in, for example, the stock market. In other words,
the question now is the following: what if investors are not allowed to go bankrupt?
Levy and Solomon [1996] show that if the boundary constraint x(t) > xmin is added
to Eq. (2.15), and if x has a drift towards −∞ (i.e. 〈log λ〉 < 0), then there will be a
compensation between the negative drift, which leads x→ 0 and a repulsion off the barrier,
xmin > 0, which will cause x → +∞. This repeated back and forth motion leads x to be
not anymore distributed according to a log-normal, but according to a power law,
P (x) ∼ x−(1+µ), (2.26)
where the exponent µ is determined solving,∫ +∞
0
λµ p(λ) dλ = 1. (2.27)
The two ingredients needed to obtain power law distributions are then: (i) a barrier or
a boundary constraint that forces x(t) to remain larger than a minimum value xmin > 0
and (ii) the random process fulfills the condition 〈log λ〉 < 0, meaning that the stochastic
coefficient λ(t) has a drift towards the left. Thus, as the process starts to evolve over the
course of time, it follows a random walk with a tendency towards zero values, but it is
repelled from zero by the barrier at xmin, leading to a power-law distribution of the process.
Moreover, as described by Sornette and Cont [1997], x(t) reaches a steady-state distri-
bution for t → +∞ following a power-law in the tail. The exponent of the power law can
be calculated by solving Eq.(2.27). For example for λ(t) ∼ U(a, b), the exponent µ can be
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Figure 2.9.: Probability distribution of x, using Eq. (2.15) for: (left) maximum values
reached, xmax, using λ ∈ U(0.48, 1.48). Simulations performed for 2 differ-
ent number of time steps showing the same power law exponent µ ≈ 1.42:
(circles) t = 100 and (triangles) t = 104; (right) x with boundary constraint
xmin = 0.1 (Section 2.3.2) and λ(t) ∼ U(0.5, 1.5), for: a) t = 10, b) t = 50 and
c) t = 500. Further parameters as in Fig. 2.8.
found by solving: ∫ b
a
λµp(λ)dλ = 1 (2.28)∫ b
a
λµ
1
b− adλ = 1
1
b− a
[
λµ+1
µ+ 1
]b
a
= 1
bµ+1 − aµ+1
(b− a)(µ+ 1) = 1, (2.29)
where the exponent µ can be obtained using for example, the well known Newton-Rhapson
method for finding approximations of the roots of a real-valued function. Another way to
determine the exponent is by adjusting a straight line to the power law distribution in a
log-log plot, so that the slope of the line corresponds to the exponent of the power law.
To gain more insight into the dynamics, Monte Carlo simulations were performed at the
individual level and compared with theoretical values. Fig. 2.9 (right), shows the probability
distributions for different time steps a) t = 10, b) t = 50 and c) t = 500. It is clear that
when t = 10, the probability distribution still has a log-normal distribution, but as t→∞,
the distribution of the process converges to a distribution with a power-law on the tail,
Eq. (2.26) with exponent µ = 1. Interestingly, the steady state is reached relatively fast, in
this case after t = 500. In addition to the properties already mentioned, it is also of note
that the initial value of the process x(0) does not influence the exponent µ of the power law
distribution.
In summary, if the barrier x(t) > xmin is considered in the investment model, Eq. (2.9),
in the long run, investors will not go bankrupt.
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2.3.3. Multiplicative and Additive Random Process
In real situations, investors are immersed in an environment where their profits or losses
depend also on external factors, which can be seen as random factors. In this section,
we consider the case where besides the profits or losses due to the RoI, the investors are
influenced by external additive incomes. In terms of random processes, this scenario can be
modeled by a random multiplicative process with an additive term as follows:
x(t+ 1) = λ(t)x(t) + a(t), (2.30)
where a(t) can be a constant or stochastic term, that repels x(t) away from zero. Following
Elaydi [1996]. If we assume constant parameter values in Eq. (2.30), i.e. λ(t) = λ and
a(t) = a, the solution for this non-homogeneous multiplicative additive difference equation
is given by:
x(t) =
λtx(0) + a
[
λt−1
λ−1
]
if λ 6= 1
x(0) + a(t− 1) if λ = 1.
(2.31)
This solution has the disadvantage that it does not consider stochastic terms.
On the other hand, if we consider the stochastic term, we find two different kind of analysis
in the literature. Firstly, according to Vervaat [1979] three cases can be distinguished:
1. ∑nk=1 log |λk| → −∞ in distribution
2. log |λ| = 0 with probability 1
3. lim supP [∑nk=1 log |λk| > 0] > 0.
In case (1), there is a unique solution to the stationary equation and the probability
distribution is independent of the initial value. In cases (2) and (3), a special relationship
between λ and a is required in order to ensure convergence to a stationary distribution. If
a is constant, the stationary distribution for the first case is then given by the distribution
of the following infinite series:
T = a
∞∑
k=1
λ1 λ2...λk−1 = a
∞∑
k=1
k−1∏
j=1
λj . (2.32)
It can be seen that the formula for the moments of the limit distribution shows that the
mean, were it defined, should be:
〈x〉 = a1− 〈λ〉 , (2.33)
which diverges for 〈λ〉 = 1. However, recalling the dynamics of the investment model,
Eq. (2.9), it can be shown for λ = 1 + r q that if the returns are symmetrical, this yields
〈λ〉 = 1 and consequently a finite mean value cannot be expected.
Moreover, Kesten [1973] and Sornette [1998a] show that if λ(t) is a random process with
〈log λ〉 < 0 and if a(t) is an additive term that ensures x(t) will be pushed out from a zero
value, then the probability distribution of x has a power law on the tail of the form shown
in Eq.(2.26). The exponent µ can be determined by solving 〈λµ〉 = 1 as in Eq. (2.27), see
[Takayasu et al., 1997]. Note that there exists a similar behavior between a multiplicative
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process with a barrier and a multiplicative process with an additive term. In the latter
case, the additive term a(t) acts as the barrier term xmin producing a repulsion from zero.
Moreover, Takayasu et al. [1997] show a similar result found by taking the average over
the square of Eq.(2.30). Assuming that
〈
λ2
〉
and
〈
a2
〉
are constants and
〈
λ2
〉
< 1, the
authors find the following stationary solution:
〈
x2
〉
=
〈
a2
〉
1− 〈λ2〉 ; (2.34)
however, the authors refer to the thermal equilibrium case, for which it is required that
〈
x2
〉
be proportional to the temperature, which means that
〈
a2
〉
and
〈
λ2
〉
cannot be independent
(see fluctuation-dissipation theorem [Reichl, 1980]).
Sornette [1998a] shows that if the finite difference in Eq.(2.30) is rested and divided by
x(t) we obtain the following equation:
x(t+ 1)− x(t)
x(t) =
a(t)
x(t) + λ(t)− 1. (2.35)
If the finite difference x(t+1)−x(t)x(t) is approximated to
d log x
d t . And assuming that w = log x,
the following over-damped Langevin equation can be obtained:
dw
dt = a(t)e
−w − |υ|+ η(t), (2.36)
where:
υ = 〈λ〉 − 1 ' 〈log λ〉 (2.37)〈
η2
〉
=
〈
λ2
〉
− 〈λ〉2 . (2.38)
It can be seen that the first term on the right side produces a repulsion of x from zero,
whereas the second and third term correspond to the mean of the multiplicative process
and a purely fluctuating term respectively. In moving from the single stochastic realizations
of ω(t) to the probability density P (ω, t), it was shown by Sornette and Cont [1997] that
the following Fokker-Planck equation can be derived:
∂P (w, t)
∂t
= a(t) e−w P (w, t)− (〈log λ〉+ a(t) e−w) ∂P (w, t)
∂w
+
(〈
log (λ)2
〉
− 〈log λ〉2
) 1
2
∂2P (w, t)
∂w2
(2.39)
where the first term produces a decay on w, the second term indicates the drift of the
process and the third is a diffusion term. Note that this equation is different from the
original one first proposed by Sornette and Cont [1997] where the factor 2 in the diffusion
term was missing. Moreover, a generalization of these multiplicative random processes is
shown by Sornette [1998a], in which the authors show that the following dynamic also yields
to power law distributions:
x(t+ 1) = ef(x(t),λ(t),a(t)..)λ(t)x(t), (2.40)
where f(·)→ 0 for large x(t) and f(·)→∞ for x(t)→ 0.
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Consider now Eq.(2.15), if x(t) > xmin then f(·) = 0 and if x(t) < xmin then
f(·) = log
(
xmin
λ(t)x(t)
)
, (2.41)
whereas for Eq.(2.30),
f(·) = log
(
1 + a(t)
λ(t)x(t)
)
. (2.42)
To gain more insight into the dynamics of this model, see Fig. 2.10 (left) which shows the
results of Monte Carlo simulations against theoretical values for the probability distribution
of x for Eq.(2.30). Computer simulations were performed using λ(t) ∼ U(0.5, 1.5) for
the random multiplicative process. Compared with the theoretical value of the exponent
µ = 1.0, we observe that the process has a power law in the tail of the distribution. The
influence of the random multiplicative process is shown for two cases: a drift towards the
left using λ(t) ∼ U(0.48, 1.48) (circles); the theoretical value of the exponent is µ = 1.4673
and a drift towards the right using λ(t) ∼ U(0.52, 1.52) (triangles); the theoretical value of
the exponent in the tail of the distribution is µ = 0. We observe that the slope of the power
law increases if the drift towards the left increases and that the slope decreases if the drift
towards the right increases.
Figure 2.10.: (left) Probability distribution of x for Eq.(2.30) using Monte Carlo simu-
lations for Na = 105 trials. Simulations using λ(t) ∼ U(0.48, 1.48) (◦),
λ(t) ∼ U(0.5, 1.5) () and λ(t) ∼ U(0.52, 1.52) are comparable to the the-
oretical exponents of the power law distributions µ = 1.4673, µ = 1.0 and
µ = 0.5306 respectively. (right) Power law exponent value µ obtained for dif-
ferent multiplicative random processes with λ(t) ∼ U(0.5+4b, 1.5+4b) where
4b ∈ (−0.15, 0.5) for an incremental step of 4b of 0.01. Further parameters
(for both figures): a(t) ∼ U(0, 1) and x(0) = 1.
With regards to the influence of the random variable in the process, the following ques-
tions are of special interest: how much can we disturb the process by means of random
influence? Is there a boundary for randomness where the random influence becomes strong
enough to make considerable change in qualitative or quantitative behavior? To answer
these questions, the influence of the multiplicative and the additive random terms has been
analyzed.
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Fig. 2.10 (right) shows the theoretical results of the influence of the multiplicative term
or drift term λ(t) on the exponent µ of the power law distribution. The corresponding
exponents µ were obtained by finding the roots of Eq. (2.29). The graphic shows the
different exponents µ obtained for uniform increasing variations in the range of values for
the random variable λ(t) from λ(t) ∼ U(0.35, 1.35) to λ(t) ∼ U(0.75, 1.65). It can be seen
that the slope emerges when λ(t) ∼ U(0.36, 1.36) and then decays linearly as the drift
approaches to −∞.
Following Sornette and Cont [1997], a constant additive term instead of a stochastic
variable is assumed. Thus, for simplicity, instead of the stochastic additive term a(t) in
Eq.(2.30), a constant value a ∈ (0, 1) is assumed. Using the same multiplicative random
process, λ(t) ∼ U(0.5, 1.5), we observe that the resulting probability distribution of x is
roughly the same both when using a stochastic additive term a ∈ U(0, 1) and with a constant
additive term a(t) = 0.5; No significant difference between them is observed. The same was
observed for the exponent µ of the power law in the tail of the distributions, which remains
µ = 1 for both cases because it depends mainly on the multiplicative random process λ.
Moreover, Fig. 2.11 (left) shows the probability distributions of x using Eq. (2.30),
for three different additive values with the same multiplicative random process λ(t) ∼
U(0.5, 1.5). It is clear that the constant additive term a does not considerably change the
power law distribution in the tail.
Figure 2.11.: (left) Influence of the constant additive term a on the probability distribution
of x obtained from simulations. The power law on the tail of the distributions
has approximately the same exponent µ = 1. (right) Simulation results for
the non-linearly increment of xmp w.r.t. an increment in the constant additive
term a, for a = {0.01, 0.02, .., 1}. The dashed line corresponds to a linear fit to
the data points, Eq. (2.43). Further parameters: λ(t) ∼ U(0.5, 1.5), x(0) = 10
and Na = 105 trials.
However, note that the peaks of the distribution, which correspond to the most probable
value of x, denoted by xmp, are modified by the additive term. It is clear that as the additive
term decreases, a → 0, xmp also decreases, xmp → 0, whereas if a → ∞, then xmp → ∞.
Fig. 2.11 (right) shows the result of a number of simulations performed for different additive
terms. Interestingly, for a > 0.5, the value of xmp starts to disperse because as a increases,
x takes larger positive values, increasing the diversity of possible x values. Furthermore,
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these results were fitted to the following linear function:
xmp = 11.596± 0.148 a. (2.43)
It is clear that there exists an approximately linear relation between xmp and a.
2.3.4. Multiplicative Entry/Exit Random Process
In the previous random multiplicative models, a homogeneous scenario was considered for
which the probability distribution of the process x follows a power law distribution if the
stochastic multiplicative process has a drift towards zero and either a barrier or an additional
additive term which repels x from zero.
In this section, a heterogeneous scenario is considered that yields power law distribu-
tions. In the literature, these models are usually referred as multiplicative processes with
entry/exit dynamics (see [Blank and Solomon, 2000; Richiardi, 2004]).
Consider a multi-agent system of N agents, in which agent i possesses for example, a
budget described by the variable xi(t). Assume that initially xi(0) ≥ xmin, for xmin = const
and xmin > 0. The dynamics of xi(t) evolve over the course of time by,
xi(t) = λ(t)xi(t), (2.44)
where λ(t) is a stochastic process which determines how the budget of agent i changes at
every time step t. Each time that xi(t) < xmin the agent i is replaced by a new agent with
xi(t) ≥ xmin. Thus, in terms of wealth, if an agent i goes to bankrupt, i.e. agent’s budget
xi is less than a minimum value, xmin, it will be replaced by a new and more wealthy agent,
which starts with an initial budget x(0) > xmin. In other words, using these entry/exit
dynamics, the system gets rid of agents that perform poorly. Note again that for simplicity
we can think of xi as agent’s energy, wealth, expected life, resources, etc., and λ describes
the way in which these change over the course of time. Furthermore, the actions of agent i
may or may not affect λ, depending on the formulation of the problem.
To gain more insight into the dynamics, we performed some Monte Carlo simulations
for Eq. 2.44 to obtain the probability distribution of the budget of a number of agents.
Fig. 2.12 (left) shows the probability distribution of the budget for different xmin values. It
is clear that, as asserted by Blank and Solomon [2000], this model yields distributions with
a power law in the tail. For reference reasons, a power law with µ = 1 (dashed line) is also
plotted. We observe that the slope in the tail of the wealth distribution approximates the
expected theoretical value in Eq. (2.29). Thus, the probability distribution of the budget
also has a power law decay in the tail as in Eq. (2.26).
Fig. 2.12 (right) shows the probability distribution of the budget p(x) after t = 104 time
steps for N = 105 trials with an initial budget xi(0) = 1 and xmin = 10−10. A power law,
Eq. (2.26), with µ = 0 is represented with a dashed-line. Notice that in Eq. (2.29), if the
range of λ is symmetrical around the unit, i.e. b − a = 1, then Eq. (2.29) has only two
possible solutions: µ = 0 and µ = 1. This fact is shown in both plots in Fig. 2.12. It would
be interesting to investigate the critical value of xmin that leads to a change in the slope
of the power law shown in Fig. 2.12 in more detail, however, this is beyond the purposes
of this PhD thesis and therefore is left for further work. Now, observe in Fig. 2.12 (right),
that for x = 1 the probability p(X = 1) is larger than other probability values. This occurs
because if the budget of an agent is less than xmin, this agent is replaced by a new agent
with initial budget x(0) = 1, leading to a larger probable value in the distribution. This
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outlier-effect can be eliminated by allowing the agent that has been replaced to start with
an initial budget that is randomly drawn from a range of possible initial budget values.
Figure 2.12.: Probability distributions of the budget x using Eq. (2.44) for: (left) different
xmin values; (right) xmin = 10−10. Both plots present a power law in the tail
(dashed-lines) with µ = 1 and µ = 0 respectively (see Eq. (2.26)). Further
parameters: x(0) = 1, λ(t) ∼ U(0.5, 1.5) and Na = 105 trials.
It is also interesting to know the probability distribution of the number of agents that
are substituted during a simulation, p(Nsub). For this, Fig. 2.13 shows the histogram that
was obtained from the results of a number of simulations of the dynamics in Eq. (2.44) for
Na = 104 trials and for t = 1000 time steps. We can see that the number of substituted
agents during a simulation has a Gaussian probability distribution.
Finally, it would be interesting to investigate the influence of the different parameters on
the distribution of substituted agents, for example, for λ(t) drawn from different interval
values or different distributions. Moreover, it would be also interesting to find a relationship
between the initial budget x(0), the minimum budget value xmin and λ with respect to the
distribution ofNsub, however, these are beyond the purposes of this PhD thesis and therefore
are left for further work.
2.4. Summary
In this chapter, the investment model is presented; this model is based on a multiplicative
stochastic process with an additive term. This approach also presents a different point of
view for investment strategies, where the agent (the investor) interacts with its environment,
but does not modify his environment with its actions. In other words, the agent analyzes
its environment and tries to predict it, but its decisions only change the course of its own
properties. A review of multiplicative stochastic processes is also presented to provide more
insight into the dynamics of the investment model.
In the following chapters, different strategies for controlling the proportion of investment,
expressed by various forms of q(t), are presented and investigated for different kinds of RoI.
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Figure 2.13.: Probability distribution of number of substituted agents, Nsub, on a model
with entry/exit dynamics. Parameters: x(0) = 1, λ(t) ∼ U(0.5, 1.5), a(t) ∼
U(0, 1), t = 103 and Na = 103.
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3. Budget Evolution for Constant
Proportions of Investment
In this chapter the budget distribution and its evolution over time is analysed for different
fixed investments and different random returns.
3.1. Introduction
So far, Chapter 1, gave some motivation for the problem of finding proper investment strate-
gies. Chapter 2 presented the investment model, Equation (2.9), and different multiplicative
processes related to the investment model.
The main goal of this chapter is to investigate the dynamic of the budget of an agent for
different fixed proportions of investment, q(t) = q(0), as well as to investigate the influence
of other parameters like the external sources a and random returns drawn from different
probability distributions.
This means that over the course of time, the agent always invests the same initial pro-
portion of investment. We note that a typical scenario used to study investment strategies
is to allow an agent to choose between investing in a risk-free asset or in a risky asset (see
[Pratt, 1964; Tobin, 1958]). In our investment scenario, the agent invests a constant pro-
portion of the budget q in the risky asset while keeping the rest in a risk-free asset. Usually,
economists’ approach to the decision-making problem of investing in risky assets or risk-free
assets is addressed in terms of utility functions. For the sake of simplicity, in this chapter, we
start our investigations by considering fixed investments; however, in the Appendix 10.2 we
show the relationship between the utility of wealth and constant proportion of investment.
In Fig. 2.4, the results of two simulations of Eq. (2.9) were showed, which were run
independently with the same parameter values, leading to different dynamics of the budget
over the course of time. Thus, in order to find out more about the dynamics of the wealth of
an agent described by the stochastic process in Eq. (2.9), in this chapter, the influence of the
random RoI in the evolution of the wealth is analyzed using Monte Carlo simulations. For
the Monte Carlo simulations, Algorithm 1 in Section 2.2 is used to obtain the probability
distribution of the budget of a number of simulations or trials, Na, where each simulation
is a replication of the dynamic in Eq. (2.9) for the same initial parameter values. The
stochastic factor is given by the RoI which is at every time step drawn randomly from a
known probability distribution or obtained from a given random process. Actually, the
fixed investment strategy may be seen less as a strategy and more as an attitude towards
the risk of the investment, in which the investor neither looks at the previous returns nor
his budget; he only assumes a fixed proportion of investment value and uses it throughout
the whole simulation. However, we use the term “strategy” in an attempt to generalize the
range of possible approaches and methods an agent can use in order to decide how much
to invest. Moreover, this strategy serves as a reference strategy in Chapter 7, where it is
used to determine whether other more complex strategies are able to outperform this simple
strategy.
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Thus, in this chapter, we investigate the influence of different fixed proportions of in-
vestment and fixed incomes on the budget distribution and its evolution over the course of
time. In Section 3.2, we use simulations to analyze the dynamics of the budget for different
constant proportions of investment and different income values. Finally, in Section 3.3, we
show an analytical solution for the stationary probability distribution of the budget, which
corroborates the simulation results.
3.2. Simulation Experiments
In this section, computer simulations of Eq. (2.9) are presented for different distributions of
r(t). For our simulations, we assumed that the initial budget of the agent is x(0) = 10 and
that the proportion of investment and the income are kept constant during each simulation,
i.e. q(t) = q and a(t) = a.
Thus, to elucidate the dynamics of agent’s budget a number of computer simulations are
performed to gather the evolution of the probability distribution of the budget p(x, t) and
the average of the most probable budget value 〈xmp(t)〉. First, in order to determine the
distribution of the budget of an agent, the dynamic in Eq. (2.9) was simulated for a number
of time steps t, yielding x(t), i.e. the budget of the agent at time step t. Because of the
random RoI, we may need to repeat the previous experiment a number of trials Na, which
may lead to different values of x(t). After a large number of trials, the histogram of these
values eventually yields to the probability distribution of the budget p(x, t) for time step
t. We are also interested in the most probable budget value xmp(t) which, once we have
obtained the p(x, t), corresponds to the peak of the distribution. Because of the random
component in the model, we obtain a number Ns of distributions p(x, t) and afterwards, we
calculate the average of the distribution’s peaks to obtain 〈xmp(t)〉.
For almost all the computer experiments performed in this section, a number of Na =
104 independent trials of the dynamic in Eq. (2.9) were performed to obtain the budget
distribution and we obtained Ns = 10 budget distributions to find each 〈xmp(t)〉.
3.2.1. For Returns Drawn from a Binomial Distribution
In this section, we assume that the returns are drawn randomly from a binomial distribution
r(t) ∈ B{−1, 1}. Fig. 3.1 shows the distribution of the investor’s budget for different time
steps. The number of time steps needed to reach this stationary state depends on the
initial conditions, the distribution of r(t) and the additive constant a. For the conditions in
Fig. 3.1, the number of time steps needed to reach a stationary distribution was of t = 104
time steps. One can clearly see that the stationary distribution is characterized by a fat
tail described by a power-law distribution. This agrees with previous investigations [Levy
and Solomon, 1996; Sornette, 1998a] which were discussed in Section 2.3.
We have determined the scaling exponent µ of the power law, Eq. (2.26), from the sim-
ulation data, leading to µ ≈ 1. And recalling Eq. (2.27), it can be shown that for binary
returns r(t) ∈ B{−1, 1}, the exponent µ is found by solving:∑
λ={1−q,1+q}
λµ p(λ) = 1 (3.1)
(1− q)µ + (1 + q)µ = 2. (3.2)
Note that for q = 0.1 and, in fact, for any value of q ∈ [0, 1], there are two possible exponent
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Figure 3.1.: For binary stochastic return distribution r(t) ∈ B{−1, 1}, proportion of in-
vestment q(t) = 0.1 and income a = 0.5: (bold) Investor’s budget probability
distribution P (x, t) for different time steps. (dashed) Tail of stationary proba-
bility distribution Ps(x), Eq. (2.26). The data is binned in logarithmic intervals
of the same size. Further Parameters: initial budget x(0) = 10 and number of
trials Na = 104.
values: µ = 0 or µ = 1. This can be seen in Fig. 3.2, where the value of the left side in
Eq. (3.1) is plotted for different exponents. Note that for small or large q, the two possible
exponent values that satisfy Eq. 3.1 are the same. And from our simulation results, we
notice that the power law in the tail of both distributions approaches µ ≈ 1.
Now we performed some simulations so that we could observe the evolution of the most
probable budget value for different income and proportion of investment values. First, we
start with a fixed proportion of investment and vary the income values. Fig. 3.3 (left)
shows the evolution of the xmp for a constant proportion of investment q(t) = 0.1 and
different additive terms a = {0.1, 0.5, 1.0}. Notice that for simulations with small incomes,
the xmp reaches a stationary value faster than those simulations with larger income values.
According to visual impression, for large income values, the value of xmp reaches a stationary
value after t = 103 time steps. Thus, it is clear from these simulations that for binomial RoI,
the most probable budget value increases over the course of time, reaching a stationary state
after a number of time steps. This results from the compensation between the tendency
towards zero values (because of the multiplicative coefficient) and the tendency towards
infinity positive values (because of the additive term). Now, by fixing the incomes at
a = 0.5, we observe in Fig. 3.3 (right), the evolution of the xmp for three different proportion
of investment q = {0.1, 0.2, 0.5}. Note that for q ≥ 0.5, the stationary values of xmp are
less than the initial budget of x(0) = 10. As expected, the agent increases his chances of
receiving more profits on average if he decreases his proportion of investment because in
this case, the process needs more time steps in order to reach a stationary distribution,
which would allow the agent to accumulate more incomes during this time.
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Figure 3.2.: Left side value in Eq. (3.1) for different exponent values, µ.
3.2.2. For Returns Drawn from a Uniform Distribution
In this section, we assume that the returns are drawn randomly from a uniform distribution,
r(t) ∈ U(−1, 1). First, we investigate the evolution of the budget probability distribution
shown in Fig. 3.4 in a log-log plot. Note that as expected, the distribution shifts to larger
positive values over the course of time, however, notice that the probability distribution
does not change after a certain number of time steps; in other words, the process reaches
a stationary probability distribution over the course of time. Observe that the tail of the
distribution fits a power law Eq. (2.26) with µ ≈ 1. Recalling the multiplicative stochastic
models with additive term discussed in Section 2.3.3, in this case, we have a multiplicative
stochastic process like in Eq. (2.30) with a multiplicative coefficient λ(t) = 1 + r(t) q. For
a(t) = 0.1, q(t) = 0.1 and r(t) ∼ U(−1, 1), this turns out to be a multiplicative coefficient of
the form λ(t) ∼ U(0.9, 1.1). For these parameters, it can be shown that log λ = −0.001671,
which means the process has a pull towards zero. This, together with the repulsion from
zero given by the additive term which is larger than zero, yields a distribution with a power
law tail, Eq. (2.26). Furthermore, it can be shown that by solving Eq. (2.29) for λ, the
exponent of the power law in the tail is µ ∼ 1.
As shown above, we performed some simulations to observe the evolution of the xmp for
different income and proportion of investment values. Fig. 3.5 (left) shows the evolution of
the 〈xmp〉 for a constant proportion of investment q(t) = 0.1 and different additive terms
a = {0.1, 0.5, 0.9}. In the same manner as for binomial returns, the xmp increases over the
course of time until a stationary value is reached. However, according to visual impression,
in this case, it takes more time steps to reach a stationary value. Note that the values for
xmp reached are much larger than those gathered for binomial RoI, and interestingly, for
uniform RoI, the standard deviation increases more than for binomial RoI, maybe because
for uniform RoI, the range of possible returns is larger and leads to more fluctuations on
average. A visual impression indicates that for large income values, the value of 〈xmp〉
reaches a stationary value after t = 103 time steps.
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Figure 3.3.: Most probable budget value over the course of time, for binomial RoI, r(t) ∈
B{−1, 1}. For (left) constant proportion of investment q(t) = 0.1 and different
income values a, and (right) constant income a = 0.5 and different constant
proportion of investment values q. Further parameters: Na = 105, Ns = 10 and
x(0) = 10.
Now, assuming fixed incomes of a = 0.5, we observe in Fig. 3.5 (right) the evolution
of the 〈xmp〉 for three different proportion of investment values q = {0.1, 0.2, 0.5}. Note
again that for q ≥ 0.5, the stationary values of 〈xmp〉 are less than the initial budget of
x(0) = 10. For reference purposes we add in Fig. 3.5 the curve for q = 0, which means that
the agent only accumulates income. In other words, the agent does not receive a return,
note that the budget increases much more than when the agent takes a constant proportion
of investment. It seems that it is much better for the agent to avoid investing in this kind of
scenarios. This is true when the agent is dealing with random RoI; however, in Chapter 7
we deal with RoIs with periodicity where an agent forecasting the next return may have
larger profits than a simpler one that only accumulates income.
Now, before continuing our analysis for returns drawn from a Gaussian distribution, we
would first like to discuss what happen when returns are drawn from different ranges of
values independently of the type of distribution. Firstly, note that if we set an unsymmet-
rical range of values giving more weight to negative or positive values, this leads of course
to bankruptcy or richness respectively. Secondly, note that if the range of possible values
is kept symmetrical and the range is increased or decreased, this is the same as modifying
the proportion of investment value. This occurs because, as discussed previously, the value
of λ in Eq. (2.30) corresponds in the investment model to λ = 1 + q(t) r(t), and if the
proportion of investment is decreased, this means that the range of values of r(t) is also
decreased. For example, in our previous computer experiment, we assumed q = 0.1 and
r(t) ∼ U(−1, 1), which means λ ∼ U(0.9, 1.1). If the range of values for r(t) changes to
r(t) ∼ U(−0.5, 0.5), this would mean a λ ∼ U(0.95, 1.05). This previous range of values
for λ can be also achieved for r(t) ∼ U(−1, 1) and a proportion of investment of q = 0.05.
Thus, it can be seen that for an proportion of investment q = 0.1 and returns r drawn
from U(−0.1, 0.1), U(−2, 2) and U(−5, 5), the same range of values for λ can be obtained
if the returns are now drawn from U(−1, 1) and for the proportions of investment q = 0.01,
q = 0.2 and q = 0.5 respectively. The evolution of the 〈xmp〉 over the course of time for
these different returns is shown in Fig. 3.6.
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Figure 3.4.: For uniform stochastic return distributions r(t) = U(−1, 1), assuming q(t) =
0.1 and a = 0.5: (bold) Investor’s budget probability distribution P (x, t) for
different time steps. (dashed) Tail of stationary probability distribution Ps(x),
Eq. (2.26). The probabilities were estimated as in Fig. 3.1. Further parameters
as in Fig. 3.1.
Fig. 3.6 also shows that the number of time steps needed for the process to reach a sta-
tionary state increase if either the range of values or the proportion of investment decrease.
This occurs because of the weak influences of the random returns leading to more time steps
until the large accumulation of income (pulling the process to ∞) is compensated in the
long run by the investments in random returns (pulling the system to zero). Moreover, it
can be seen that the slope of the increasing value of xmp fits a power law, this is more clear
for r(t) ∼ U(−0.1, 0.1), where the power law increasing xmp goes from time step t = 30 to
t = 104. Note that it would be interesting to find an analytical description of the number
of time steps needed to reach a stationary xmp, however, this is left as further work.
3.2.3. For Returns Drawn from Gaussian Distributions
We assume now that returns are drawn randomly from a Gaussian distribution N(µ, σ)
with parameters: mean µ and standard deviation σ. Fig. 3.7 (left) shows the evolution of
the probability distribution of the budget for different time steps. In this case we assume
Gaussian returns r(t) ∼ N(µ, σ), where µ = 0 and σ = 0.1, and we observe that the
probability also reaches a stationary distribution after some time steps and presents a
power law distribution on the tail. However, if we compare this evolution of distributions
with those with binomial or uniform returns, we can see that for Gaussian returns it takes
more time steps. This can be expected because for σ = 0.1, the budget does not change
as much over the course of time as it does for returns drawn from uniform, U(−1, 1), or
binomial, B(−1, 1), distributions. This also means that a larger number of time steps would
be needed to find a stationary distribution with a power law in the tail. To gain more insight
into the number of time steps needed for the process to reach a stationary distribution, we
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Figure 3.5.: Most probable budget value over time for uniform RoI, r(t) ∈ U(−1, 1). (left)
Constant proportion of investment q(t) = 0.1 and different income values a.
(right) Constant income a = 0.5 and different constant proportion of investment
values q. Further Parameters as in Fig. 3.3.
investigated the evolution of the budget distribution. Fig. 3.7 (right) shows the evolution
of the probability distribution of the budget for q = 0.1 and a = 0.1 for different time steps
and the same return’s distribution r(t) ∼ N(0, 0.1). Note that we restricted the value of the
returns to be within the range r ∈ (−1, 1) in order to avoid unrealistic losses (r < −1, which
would mean having debts) and realistic (but undesired for our study) over-gains, because of
the violation of the pull and repulsion from zero in the dynamics of multiplicative stochastic
processes with an additive term discussed previously in Section 2.3.3.
It is clear that in order to obtain the most probable value, we cannot limit our simulation
to only t = 104 time steps because the process may not have reached a stationary distri-
bution yet. The latter problem can be solved by fixing a larger number of time steps for
the simulations, for example t = 105, however, in order to save computing time, we instead
decided to determine the number of time steps t needed for stationary distributions, using
the following statistical procedures: for the means and variance of the xmp, t-test and F-
test respectively, and for the evolution of the distribution the χ2-test. Algorithm 2 shows
the procedure used to numerically calculate the average most probable budget value 〈xmp〉
for constant income a and constant proportion of investment q values in more detail. For
further details regarding hypothesis testing strategies, refer to [Press et al., 1992] (pages
615-622) and [Cohen, 1998] (pages 117-130).
Thus, following Algorithm 2, Fig. 3.8 shows the evolution of the 〈xmp〉 over time for
Gaussian returns for: fixed proportion of investment q(t) = 0.1 and different a (left), and
fixed income a = 0.5 and different q (right). The simulations were performed until no
significant statistical differences were found between the average and variance of xmp and
the budget distributions. It can be seen that for larger incomes and smaller proportions of
investment, a larger number of time steps are needed to reach both stationary distributions
and stationary average values than for smaller incomes and larger investments. Interestingly,
the most probable values are larger than those obtained for returns drawn randomly from
binomial or uniform distributions. The reason for this is that the Gaussian returns lead
to smaller RoI fluctuations, this means less win/loss due to random returns, so the agent’s
wealth is due more to the accumulation of incomes.
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Figure 3.6.: Evolution of the most probable budget value over the course of time. Returns
drawn randomly from uniform distributions with different range of values. Fur-
ther parameters: Na = 105, Ns = 10, x(0) = 10, q(t) = 0.1 and a = 0.5.
3.2.4. For Returns Using ARCH/GARCH Process
So far, we have analyzed the evolution of the budget for returns on investment (RoI) drawn
randomly from binomial, uniform and Gaussian probability distributions. However, these
type of RoIs are not typically found in investment instruments in real life, so in order to
mirror reality more closely, we now consider another kind of RoI, which presents some
correlations over time like those that can be seen in financial time series.
The ARCH (Auto-Regressive Conditionally Heteroskedastic) process, first introduced by
Engle [1982], is a process that adds correlations over time. The simplest version of this
process is an ARCH(1) process, which is described as follows:
r(t) = (t)σ(t) (3.5)
where (t) ∼ i.i.d.N(0, 1) and the conditional variance, σ(t), is defined by,
σ(t)2 = α0 + α1 r(t− 1)2 (3.6)
where α0 > 0 and α1 ≥ 0
Another process used to generate artificial RoIs is the GARCH process [Bollerslev, 1986],
which is a generalization of the ARCH process. A GARCH (Generalized Auto-Regressive
Conditionally Heteroskedastic) process is a stochastic process with an autoregressive repre-
sentation of the conditional variance and a moving average part. These processes present
both distributions with fat tails and volatility clustering, two properties that are usually
observed in financial time series [Bera and Higgings, 1993; Mantegna and Stanley, 2000].
In these investigations, a GARCH(1,1) process is considered, which generates a random re-
turn r(t) based on the previous return r(t− 1) and the previous conditional variance value
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Figure 3.7.: Evolution of budget probability distribution over time for proportion of invest-
ment q = 0.1 and income a = 0.1. Returns drawn from a Gaussian stochastic
process with µ = 0 and σ = 0.1. Further parameters as in Fig. 3.1
σ(t− 1). Thus, the return r(t) is calculated at every time step t as follows:
r(t) = (t)σ(t), (3.7)
where (t) ∼ i.i.d.N(0, 1) and the conditional variance σ(t) is defined by
σ(t)2 = α0 + α1 r(t− 1)2 + β1 σ(t− 1)2, (3.8)
where α0 > 0, α1 ≥ 0, β1 ≥ 0. For more details on Auto-Regressive Conditionally Het-
eroskedastic processes, refer to Appendix 10.2.
Fig. 3.9 shows the realizations of ARCH(1) and GARCH(1,1) processes. Note that in
both processes there are some time steps in which there are large fluctuations in the returns
and others with relatively small changes; this property of the time series is called volatility
clustering. Note that when using these processes, the return may exceed the range [−1, 1],
as it was defined in Section 2.2. These values are not being considered in the dynamics of
the model, i.e. we have to truncate the process when simulating the investment dynamic
in Eq. (2.9).
Fig. 3.10 offers yet more insight into the dynamics of the investment model for different
type of return by showing the evolution of the budget probability distribution over time
for ARCH(1) and GARCH(1,1) processes. It can be seen that a stationary distribution
was reached after approximately t = 104 time steps. However, as it was done for Gaussian
returns, when performing simulations for the ARCH/GARCH processes, the value of the
returns was restricted to the range r ∈ (−1, 1). This was done in order to avoid unrealis-
tic losses and realistic over-gains which are undesirable in our study because they violate
the properties of pull and repulsion from zero for multiplicative processes with power law
distributions discussed in Section 2.3.3.
Now, using Algorithm 2 (Section 3.2.3), some simulations were performed in order to
57
3. Budget Evolution for Constant Proportions of Investment
Figure 3.8.: Most probable budget value over time, for Gaussian RoI, r(t) ∈ N(0, 0.1).
(left) Constant proportion of investment q(t) = 0.1 and different income values
of a. (right) Constant income a = 0.5 and different constant proportion of
investment values of q. For τ = 20000 sampling time steps and pv = 0.1.
Further Parameters as in Fig. 3.3
observe the evolution of the most probable budget value for different income and proportion
of investment values. Fig. 3.11 shows the evolution of the xmp over time for ARCH(1) returns
as in Fig. 3.9 (left), for different constant proportions of investment and different additive
terms. Visual impression would suggest that 〈xmp〉 reaches a stationary value faster than for
Gaussian RoI, but if we compare this with binomial or uniform RoI, a larger number of time
steps are needed to reach stationary values. Obviously, this depends on the parameters of
the processes and the range of values for the distribution. Note also that for these particular
parameter values, the 〈xmp〉 obtained for ARCH or GARCH returns is much larger than
the 〈xmp〉 gathered for binomial and uniform RoI. This is may be due to the property
of volatility clustering which yields from time to time small and large fluctuations in the
returns.
3.3. Analytic Solution
In Section 2.2, we started analyzing the dynamics of the investment model using basic
analytical tools, showing in Eq. (2.13) a solution for non-random returns and in Eq. (2.14)
a description of the time-dependent process for random returns. Note that there may be
different ways to treat the stochastic dynamics of Eq. (2.9) [Haan and Karandikar, 1989]. In
the following, an analysis of the dynamics using the Z-transform [Jury, 1973] is presented
and afterwards the analytical derivation of the stationary probability distribution of the
budget is obtained.
3.3.1. Solution Using Z-transform
For simplicity, we start the analytical analysis by treating the stochastic dynamics of
Eq. (2.30) directly [Navarro-Barrientos et al., 2008b]. For this case, assuming in Eq. (2.9)
a(t) = a, the following formal solution using the Z-transform [Jury, 1973] can be obtained.
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Figure 3.9.: Stochastic processes with correlation over time: (left) ARCH(1) for α0 = α1 =
0.1 and (right) GARCH(1,1) for α0 = α1 = β1 = 0.01.
Rewriting Eq. (2.30) as
a = x(t+ 1)− λx(t) (3.9)
the Z-transform leads to
a
∞∑
n=0
1
zn
= a z
z − 1 = z [X(z)− x(0)]− λX(z) (3.10)
where X(z) is given by
X(z) = x(0) z
z − λ + a
z
(z − 1)(z − λ) (3.11)
Now, using the inverse transform
X(z−1) =
[
x(0)− a1− λ
] 1
1− λz +
a
1− λ
1
1− z (3.12)
the solution for x(t) can be found as
x(t) = 1
t! ∂
t
zX
(1
z
)
(3.13)
= λt
[
x(0)− a1− λ
]
+ a1− λ (3.14)
= λt x(0) + a 1− λ
t
1− λ (3.15)
= λt x(0) + a
t−1∑
s=0
λs (3.16)
From this solution, we see that the decisive condition of λ for a well-defined solution reads:
|λ| < 1 (3.17)
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Figure 3.10.: Evolution of budget probability distribution over time for proportion of in-
vestment q = 0.1, and a = 0.5. Returns obtained from: (left) an ARCH(1)
process with α0 = α1 = 0.1 (see Fig. 3.9 (left)); and (right) a GARCH(1,1)
process with α0 = α1 = β1 = 0.01 (see Fig. 3.9 (right)). Further parameters
as in Fig. 3.1.
which, recalling Section 2.3.3, agrees with the determination of 〈log |λ|〉 < 0 by Kesten
[1973], which was obtained from the treatment of the probability distribution P (x).
3.3.2. Stationary Probability Distribution
As we noted in Section 2.3.3, different researchers have analyzed the probability distribution
of multiplicative additive processes of the form in Eq. (2.30). An interesting approach is the
one taken by Malcai et al. [2002], who take into account additional couplings between these
processes, extending the model towards a generalized Lotka-Volterra model of the form:
xi(t+ 1) = xi(t) [1 + λ(t)] + ax¯(t)− Cxi(t). (3.18)
Note that because of the additional couplings between different individual stochastic pro-
cesses, xi(t), the dynamics of this model are much complex than the dynamics for the
investment model proposed in this thesis, Eq. (2.9). Instead of a small, but constant in-
come a the term ax¯(t) considers a global coupling via the mean budget x¯(t) of all agents
(which may be related to general publicly funded services). Moreover, the third term Cxi(t)
describes direct interactions between different agents, as C is a function dependent on other
xj . These interactions may account for competition for limited resources and saturation
effects in the dynamics. Even if, after some approximations discussed by Malcai et al.
[2002], these additional influences are small, they may still affect the general solutions for
the underlying probability distributions. Moreover, to solve the dynamics of Eq. (3.18),
Richmond [2001] proposed a general framework of multiplicative processes of the form:
∆x(t) = η(t)G[x(t)] + F [x(t)] (3.19)
where η(t) is a stochastic variable. The author finds a steady state solution for Eq. (3.19)
of the form:
P (x) = 1Z exp [−ψ(x)− logG(x)] (3.20)
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Figure 3.11.: Most probable budget value over time, for RoI obtained from the processes:
(left) ARCH(1) with α0 = α1 = β1 = 0.1; and (right) GARCH(1,1) with
α0 = α1 = β1 = 0.01, both for a constant proportion of investment q(t) = 0.1
and different income values a. Further parameters see Fig. 3.3
where:
ψ(x) = − 1
D
∫ x
F/(G)2dx′ (3.21)
and Z is a normalization factor.
A different approach is to use the Fokker-Planck analytical approximation proposed by
Sornette and Cont [1997] for multiplicative additive random processes, Eq. (2.39. Navarro-
Barrientos et al. [2008b] shows a stationary solution for the investment model in Eq. (2.9)
based on the approximation of Sornette and Cont [1997], in the following, this derivation is
presented. For a(t) = a in Eq. (2.9) and the notation for the diffusion constant
Dx = 〈x2〉 − 〈x〉2, (3.22)
we find that in the stationary case:
0 = a e−wPs(w)−
(〈log λ〉+ a e−w) ∂wPs(w)
+ Dlog λ2 ∂
2
wPs(w)
= −∂w
[(〈log λ〉+ a e−w)Ps(w)− Dlog λ2 ∂wPs(w)
]
.
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This can be solved for a stationary solution as follows:
0 =
(〈log λ〉+ a e−w)Ps(w)− Dlog λ2 ∂wPs(w)
∂w logPs(w) =
2 〈log λ〉+ 2 a e−w
Dlog λ
logPs(w) = logN + 2 〈log λ〉w − 2 a e
−w
Dlog λ
Ps(w) = N exp
(
2 〈log λ〉w − 2 a e−w
Dlog λ
)
(3.23)
with normalization N .
The corresponding stationary probability distribution for w = log x is then recovered by
the chain rule as follows:
Ps(x) = Ps(w(x))
dw
dx
= N
x
exp
(〈log λ〉 log x− 2 ax
Dlog λ
)
= N x
2 〈logλ〉
Dlogλ
−1 exp
(
− 2 a
Dlog λ x
)
(3.24)
and the normalization can be calculated:
1 != N
∫ ∞
0
x
2 〈logλ〉
Dlogλ
−1 exp
(
− 2 a
Dlog λ x
)
dx
= N
∫ ∞
0
y
−
(
1+ 2 〈logλ〉
Dlogλ
)
exp
(
− 2 a y
Dlog λ
)
dx
= N
(
Dlog λ
2 a
)− 2 〈logλ〉
Dlogλ Γ
(
−2 〈log λ〉
Dlog λ
)
.
For simplicity, if we redefine
µ := −2 〈log λ〉
Dlog λ
, (3.25)
the stationary probability distribution of the budget x can be described by [Navarro-
Barrientos et al., 2008b]:
Ps(x) =
(
2 a
Dlogλ
)µ
Γ(µ) x
−(1+µ) exp
(
− 2 a
Dlog λ x
)
. (3.26)
Note, that the importance of 〈log λ〉 < 0 is mirrored here by the fact that the Gamma
function diverges for µ → 0. Also note that for large x, Eq. (3.26) can be reduced to the
power-law distribution, Eq. (2.26).
We have shown in Section 3.2.1 and in Section 3.2.2 for binomial and uniform distribu-
tions respectively, that the evolution of the budget distribution in our computer experiments
reaches a stationary distribution. Now, we compare the results from the computer simula-
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tions with the analytical solution given in Eq. (3.26). Figures 3.12 show that the stationary
distribution is characterized by a fat tail described by a power-law distribution. This agrees
with previous investigations [Levy and Solomon, 1996; Sornette, 1998a] and was already
discussed in Section 2.3.3. We have determined the scaling exponent µ of the power law in
Eq. (2.26) from the simulation data for different stochastic processes and it can be shown
that they agree with our analytical investigations.
Figure 3.12.: Budget stationary probability distribution Ps(x) (estimated from frequencies
after t = 104): (left) Binary stochastic return distribution r(t) = B{−1, 1}.
(right) Uniform stochastic return distributions r(t) = U(−1, 1). In both cases,
x(0) = 10, q(t) = 0.1 and a = 1. Data is binned in logarithmic intervals of the
same size. The dashed lines show the theoretical prediction of these curves by
Eq. (3.26).
Finally, note that Eq. (3.26) is a special form of the general solution
Ps(x) =
1
G2(x) exp
( 2
D
∫ x F (x′)
G2(x′)dx
′
)
(3.27)
obtained by Malcai et al. [2002]; Richmond [2001]. If we use F (x) = a and G(x) = x in
accordance with the stochastic process defined in Eq. (2.9), this would lead to the (non-
normalized) solution Ps(x) = x−2 exp(−2a/Dx). This is in agreement with Eq. (3.26)
because of µ ≈ 1 in our case. The solution discussed by Malcai et al. [2002] is, however,
different from ours because the authors consider F (x) = a(1 − x) and G(x) = x, which
eventually lead to the stationary distribution Ps(x) = x−2(1−a/D) exp(−2a/Dx) and con-
sequently to µ = 1 + (2a/D). Note that this is true only in the limit of a  D which
holds for the case discussed by Malcai et al. [2002] because of e.g. a ≈ D/4, however, this
is hardly satisfied in our model. Apart from these differences, the emergence of the stable
power-law distribution in Eq. (2.26) for large x has been discussed in [Blank and Solomon,
2000; Levy and Solomon, 1996; Richmond, 2001; Richmond and Solomon, 2001; Solomon
and Richmond, 2001a,b, 2002; Sornette, 1998a; Sornette and Cont, 1997].
In the following chapter, the properties of log λ are shown more in detail, which helps
us to understand the role that q plays in the evolution of log λ. The number of time steps
needed to reach stationary distributions is also discussed and it is shown that a scaling
function for the most probable budget value can be found for a constant proportion of
investment, fixed income and some properties of the returns.
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3.4. Summary and Extensions
In this chapter we learned the following:
If the agent decides to invest a fixed ratio of its budget, the distribution of the budget
converges over the course of time to a stationary distribution with a power law in the
tail. It is shown that the number of time steps needed for the process to converge may
vary depending on the type of returns. This chapter also presented a useful approach for
ensuring stationary distributions and stationary most probable budget xmp values based on
hypothesis testing methods.
Further work:
It would be interesting to find an analytical expression for the evolution of the probability
distribution of the budget p(x, t). This expression would also be useful for returns that do
not pull the process toward zero values and is especially useful for returns in the range r(t) ∈
(−∞,∞). It would be also interesting to analyze the dynamics of constant proportions of
investment and incomes for other types of returns, like those that can be drawn from
geometric Brownian motion. Finally, it would be useful to find an analytical expression to
determine the number of time steps needed for the distribution of the budget to reach a
stationary state.
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Algorithm 2: Calculation of the average most probable budget value 〈xmp〉
Input: Initial budget x(0), proportion of investment q, income a, return on
ivnestment r(t), maximum number of time steps tmax, number of time steps
for sampling τ , number of trials Na, number of distributions Ns and pv the
desired p value for the significance tests.
Output: Evolution of the 〈xmp〉 for a number of time steps t with sampling every τ
time steps.
Initialize Ns groups of simulations where each group is used to simulate Na = 1041
trials of the dynamic in Eq. (2.9).
Initialize the number of time steps t = 02
for t < tmax do3
Run the Ns ×Na trials for time step t = t+ 14
if t mod τ ≡ 0 then5
Obtain the budget distribution for each group of simulations, leading to Ns6
distributions.
Obtain the xmp of the Ns distributions and calculate and save 〈xmp〉 and7
V ar(xmp).
Using the Student’s t-test, measure the significance of the difference between8
the mean at the current time step t with the mean at time step t− τ , where the
null and alternative hypothesis are respectively:
H0 : 〈xmp(t)〉 = 〈xmp(t− τ)〉 (3.3)
H1 : 〈xmp(t)〉 6= 〈xmp(t− τ)〉 . (3.4)
Calculate the p value pvmeans.9
Using the F-test, test for equal variances of the most probable values,10
V ar(xmp(t′)) = V ar(xmp(t′ − τ)) and calculate the p value pvvars.
Using the χ2-test test for equal distributions of budgets p(x, t′) = p(x, t′ − τ).11
and calculate the p value pvdists
if the p values: pvmeans, pvvars and pvdists are all larger than pv then12
The null hypothesis cannot be rejected, store the evolution of the 〈xmp〉 and13
V ar(xmp) for every τ steps and exit loop.
end14
end15
end16
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4. Scaling of the Most Probable Budget
Value
This chapter investigates more in detail the influence of the stochastic factors on the evo-
lution of the budget and presents a scaling function for the most probable budget value.
4.1. Introduction
In the previous chapter, we investigated the influence of different fixed investment propor-
tions and fixed incomes on the budget distribution and its evolution over time. In this
chapter, in Section 4.2 the mean value of the profits resulting from the product between
the returns and the proportion of investment are investigated for different types of returns
(multiplicative coefficient in Equation (2.9)). Thus, in Section 4.3, using simulations, the
influence of the multiplicative coefficient in Equation (2.9) on the stationary most probable
budget value xmp is investigated and a scaling function for xmp is presented for the value
of the proportion of investment q, the income a and some properties of the returns. Fi-
nally, in Section 4.4, the simulation results are corroborated by obtainig the scaling function
analytically.
4.2. Analysis of the Mean Value of the Profits
In this section, we investigate the influence of the product of the returns and the proportion
of investment, i.e λ = 1+q r(t) in Equation (2.30), in the profits of the agent. We are partic-
ularly interested in those λ values that lead the process to a stationary state. This process
is presented in the following analytical and numerical calculation of 〈log λ〉 = ∫R log λp(λ)dλ
analytically and via simulations.
First, note that for binomial returns, rB = r ∼ B{−1; 1}, the value of 〈log λ〉 can be
calculated as follows:
〈log λ〉 = 12 [log(1− q) + log(1 + q)]
= 12 log (1− q)(1 + q)
= 12 log (1− q
2) (4.1)
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For uniform returns, rU = r ∼ U(−1, 1), we have:
〈log λ〉 = 12 q
∫ 1+q
1−q
log λdλ
= 12 q [(1 + q) log (1 + q)− (1 + q)− (1− q) log (1− q) + (1− q)]
= 12 q [log (1 + q) + q log (1 + q)− log (1− q) + q log (1− q)− 2 q]
= 12
[1
q
log
(1 + q
1− q
)
+ log
(
1− q2
)
− 2
]
= 12 log
(
1− q2
)
+ 12 q log
(1 + q
1− q
)
− 1 (4.2)
For these two types of returns, it can be seen that when q → 0 then 〈log λ〉 → 0, and when
q → 1 then 〈log λ〉 → −∞. Moreover, it can be shown that for q > 0, the profits for uniform
returns are equal or larger than for binomial returns, i.e. 〈log(1 + rB q)〉 ≤ 〈log(1− rU q)〉.
This can be seen in Eq. (4.2), where the second term 12 q log
(
1+q
1−q
)
≥ 1 for q ∈ (0, 1).
Now, for Gaussian returns, rN = r ∼ N(0, σ), we note that if the expected value of the
returns is zero, then a Taylor expansion up to the second order can be used, for this we
have:
〈log λ〉 =
∫
R
(
λ− 1− (λ− 1)2
)
p(λ)dλ
= −q
2σ2
2 (4.3)
For these type of returns, it is clear that as q increases, the value of 〈log(1 + r q)〉 also
increases. This is also tested by means of simulations. For this, the value of 〈log(1 + r q)〉
was calculated numerically for different fixed values of q and for r a randomly drawn from
the distributions: binomial B(−1, 1), uniform U(−1, 1) and Gaussian N(0, 0.1). Fig. 4.1
shows the value 100〈log λ〉 for different q and for different returns. Notice that each point
in the plot corresponds to the average value calculated for 104 values of log λ. The dashed
lines show the analytical results for binomial, uniform and Gaussian returns using Eq. (4.1)
and Eq. (4.2), and Eq. (4.3), respectively. For comparison, a change of scale in the y-axis
from 〈log λ〉 to 100〈log λ〉 was performed. It is clear that for all returns we consider in these
experiments 〈log λ〉 < 0, and it can be seen that for binomial and uniform returns, it can be
seen that as q increases the value of 〈log λ〉 decreases much more than for Gaussian returns.
Moreover, notice that for binomial returns, there is an inflection point at approximately
the same value in both y and x axes, i.e. for q = 0.5 it seems that 100〈log(1+rB q)〉 ≈ q.
This interesting fact can be proved analytically, assuming that g(q) = 〈log(1 + rB q)〉 and
f(q) = Ag(q), with A = 100. A necessary condition for q to be an inflection point is to show
that f ′′(q) = 0 as follows:
f(q) = Ag(q)
f ′(q) = Ag(q) logAg′(q)
f ′′(q) = f ′(q) logAg′(q) + f ′(q)g′′(q).
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Figure 4.1.: Calculation of 〈log λ〉 < 0 via simulations (symbols) and analytically (dashed-
lines), for returns drawn from binomial B(−1, 1), uniform U(−1, 1), and Gaus-
sian N(0, 0.1) distributions.
For the inflection point we have:
0 = f ′′(q)
0 = Ag(q) log2 (A)(g′(q))2 +Ag(q) log (A)g′′(q)
0 = log (A)(g′(q))2 + g′′(q).
Now, using Eq. 4.1 we have:
g(q) = 12 log(1− q
2)
g′(q) = −q1− q2
g′′(q) = −1− q
2
(1− q2)2 .
Finally, the value of q at the inflection point can be found as follows:
0 = log (A)( −q1− q2 )
2 − (1 + q
2)
(1− q2)2
0 = log (A)q2 − q2 − 1
q =
√
1
log(A)− 1;
for A = 100 this leads to q ≈ 0.526. It is possible that this inflection point q ≈ 0.5 is related
to the fact that the returns can be r = −1 or r = +1, therefore showing a tendency to a
much larger pull to zero if q > 0.5 and vice versa.
Finally, note that for Gaussian returns, the values of 〈log λ〉 in Fig. 4.1 are nearer to zero
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values than for binomial and uniform returns. This is the reason for the larger number of
time steps needed to reach a stationary value of 〈xmp〉 for Gaussian returns in Fig. 3.8 with
respect to the number of time steps needed for binomial returns in Fig. 3.3 and uniform
returns in Fig. 3.5.
4.3. Simulation Experiments
In this section, the relationship between the agent’s most probable budget xmp is inves-
tigated for different constant proportion of investment q and different income values a.
We start our discussion by presenting the results from a number of computer simulations
performed to find a scaling function for xmp given the parameters q, a and the RoI. Af-
terwards, in Section 4.4 the analytical solution that corroborates the simulation results is
shown. Recalling Fig. 3.3 for binomial returns and Fig. 3.5 for uniform returns, note that
these results suggest the presence of a scaling function between the most probable value
xmp and the parameters characterizing the stochastic dynamics Eq. (2.9). This scaling is
investigated numerically following the same approach as in Section 3.2, where Algorithm 2
(Section 3.2.3) was used to obtain the 〈xmp〉 for different constant values of q and a. For
the scaling, the values of q and a were gradually increased for each simulation in order to
cover the whole range of values. We assumed the following parameters for the simulations:
initial budget x(0) = 10, number of trials for the agent’s dynamics Na = 104, number of
trials for the simulation Ns = 20, and a pvalue for stationary distributions of pv = 0.1.
4.3.1. For Binomial and Uniform Returns
First, we analyze the case where returns are drawn from a binomial distribution B{−1, 1}
and a uniform distribution U(−1, 1). Fig. 4.2 shows the 〈xmp〉 for binomial and uniform
returns. The results plotted against the variable a/q2 clearly show a straight line, which
allows for the scaling:
xmp = c · a
q2
. (4.4)
Note that this equation is of special interest for any agent investing in random environments
as it describes the most probable budget value that can be obtained in the long-run given
the constant income a, the constant proportion of investment q and the coefficient c, which
depends on some properties of the returns. Thus, using an implementation of the nonlinear
least-squares Levenberg-Marquardt algorithm, the resulting 〈xmp〉 values from the simula-
tions were fitted to the scaling function Eq. 4.4, leading to the empirical coefficient values
of c = 0.961± 0.006 for binomial returns, r(t) ∼ B−1, 1 and c = 3.149± 0.014 for uniform
returns r(t) ∼ U(−1, 1).
4.3.2. For Returns with Broader Distributions
If returns are drawn from a Gaussian distribution, note first that the Gaussian distribution
is defined for R, which means that returns may be less than -1 leading to debts and greater
than 1 leading to an over-enrichment. If we consider only returns in the range r(t) ∈ [−1, 1],
then we need to take into account that the underlying stochastic process for r(t) may
frequently lead to values outside the interval (−1,+1), which must then to be discarded.
This is also the case for returns based on the ARCH/GARCH processes.
In order to deal with broader distributions for the RoI, there are two options:
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Figure 4.2.: Most probable budget value vs. scaled variable a/q2 for the binary stochastic
process r(t) ∈ {−1, 1} (o) and for the uniform stochastic process r(t) ∈ U(−1, 1)
(4). Each set was plotted by varying a and q over the range of [0.1, 0.9] in 0.1
increments, giving a total of 81 data points per combination. The value of the
slope found for the numerical simulations is c = 0.961 ± 0.006 for the binary
stochastic process and c = 3.149 ± 0.014 for the uniform stochastic process.
Further parameters: x(0) = 10, Na = 104, Ns = 20, and pv = 0.1.
(i) The “outliers” or returns outside the interval [−1, 1] are taken into account. For
positive returns, this only indicates an over-enrichment of the agent, however, for
negative returns this results in a particular situation in which the agent is either
bankrupt or owes money. If we consider that the agent may go bankrupt, this leads
to the replacement of the agent, in which case a different investment scenario has to
be used, perhaps one based on Entry/Exit multiplicative models (see Section 2.3.4).
(ii) If we consider an agent that owes money (has a negative budget value, x(t) < 0), then
it can be seen that the dynamics in Eq. (2.9) lead to unreal situations in which negative
returns result in gains and positive returns in losses. For example, consider an agent
with x(t) = −10, q = 0.1 and a(t) = 0, i.e. the agent must borrow I(t) = 1 to perform
an investment. If the return in the next step is positive with r(t+ 1) = 1, then from
the dynamic of the investment model Eq. (2.9), we have x(t+ 1) = −10(1.1) = −11,
which does not make sense. The same happens in the case of a negative return: for
r(t + 1) = −1, we have x(t + 1) = −10(0.9) = −9, which is incorrect because for a
negative return, the debt should actually increase to x(t+ 1) = 11. Thus, a different
way to handle an agent owing money using the dynamics in Eq. (2.9), would be to
consider an proportion of investment with the range q ∈ [−1, 1]. In this case, an agent
with q = −0.1 would mean an agent with debts that decides to borrow an amount of
money equivalent to 10% of its debts. Thus, assuming again an agent with x(t) = −10
and q = −0.1, for positive return r(t + 1) = 1, we have x(t + 1) = −10(0.9) = −9,
i.e. the debt decreases as the agent wins money using borrowed money. On the other
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hand, for negative returns r(t+ 1) = −1, we have x(t+ 1) = −10(1.1) = −11, i.e. the
agent loses the borrowed money and its debt increases.
(iii) We consider only the truncated versions of the distributions. For example the Trun-
cated Gaussian distribution (see [Johnson et al., 1994, p. 156] and [Robert, 1995]):
pTN (r) =
φ
(
r−µ
σ
)
σ
(
Φ
(
b−µ
σ
)
− Φ
(
a−µ
σ
)) (4.5)
where µ and σ are the mean and standard deviation of the returns, respectively, a
and b are the lower and upper truncation points, respectively and φ(·) and Φ(·) are
the probability density and cumulative distribution functions for the standard normal
distribution, respectively.
Fig. 4.3 shows the most probable budget xmp scaled by a/q2, Eq. (4.4), for truncated
Gaussian distributed returns r(t) = TN(µ, σ), Eq. (4.5), with µ = 0 and different σ.
Figure 4.3.: Most probable budget value vs. scaled variable a/q2 for truncated Gaussian
distributed returns: (left) r(t) ∈ TN(0, 0.1), the value found for the slope
of the numerical simulations in this process was c = 102.17 ± 0.701, and the
analytical result 1/
〈
r2
〉
= c = 100 Eq. (4.8); (right) r(t) ∈ TN(0, 0.5), with
c = 4.86 ± 0.03 and the analyical result c = 5.1. Further parameters as in
Fig. 4.2.
For truncated ARCH or GARCH distributions, the situations are more complicated be-
cause to our knowledge, no closed formulas are available for the long-run variance of trun-
cated ARCH/GARCH processes (here we refer to the literature [Bera and Higgings, 1993;
Bollerslev, 1986; Engle, 1982; Nelson and Cao, 1992]). However, for comparison, in Fig. 4.4,
we show the scaling obtained for ARCH and GARCH process with parameters resulting in
small return values, where the outliers can be neglected (see Fig. 3.9).
4.4. Analytical Solution
In order to calculate the most probable value of the process, xmp, which corresponds to the
peaks of the distribution in Eq. (3.26), we proceed by deriving Eq. (3.26) and equalizing it
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Figure 4.4.: Most probable budget value vs. scaled variable a/q2 for (left) an ARCH(1)
process (α0 = α1 = 0.1), with the slope c = 9.089 ± 0.029 and (right) a
GARCH(1,1) process (α0 = α1 = β1 = 0.01), with the slope c = 95.17± 0.588.
Further parameters as in Fig. 4.2.
to zero as follows [Navarro-Barrientos et al., 2008b]:
0 != ∂xPs(x)
= −1 + µ
x
Ps(x) +
a
Dlog λ x2
Ps(x)
= Ps(x)
x2Dlog λ
[−Dlog λ(1 + µ)x+ a] .
Using the definition of µ in Eq. (3.25), we determine that the most probable budget can be
described by:
xmp =
a
Dlog λ − 〈log λ〉 . (4.6)
In our case, for 〈λ〉 = 1, we have 〈log λ〉 ≈ 0, and to the first order, this yields:
Dlog λ =
〈
log2 λ
〉
− 〈log λ〉2
=
〈
log2(1 + q r)
〉
− 〈log(1 + q r)〉2
≈ q2
(〈
r2
〉
− 〈r〉2
)
= q2Dr
〈r〉=0= q2
〈
r2
〉
. (4.7)
Thus, a first approximation yields the following equation for the calculation of the most
probable budget value xmp given proportion of investment q, income a and returns
〈
r2
〉
values:
xmp ≈ a
q2 〈r2〉 . (4.8)
The term
〈
r2
〉
in this equation corresponds to the term c in Eq. (4.4). This is shown in the
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following where we analyse the resulting theoretical xmp for different kind of returns.
If we assume that returns r(t) are randomly drawn from the binomial distribution
B{−1; 1}, this yields: 〈
r2
〉
= 1 (4.9)
⇒ xmp = a
q2
. (4.10)
If the returns are randomly drawn from the uniform distribution U(−1, 1):
〈
r2
〉
= 12
∫ 1
−1
r2 dr (4.11)
= 13 (4.12)
⇒ xmp = 3 a
q2
. (4.13)
Note that these theoretical results agree with the empirical results shown in Fig. 4.2 for
the scaling coefficient in Eq. (4.4), with c = 1 for binomial and c = 3 for uniform returns,
respectively.
Now, if the returns are randomly drawn from the Gaussian distribution N(0, 0.1):〈
r2
〉
= σ2 = 0.01. (4.14)
However, as mentioned in Section 4.3.2, we need to consider truncated distributions in order
to avoid bankrupcy or over-enrichment.
It can be shown that for returns drawn from a truncated normal distribution, i.e. returns
in the range r(t) ∈ (−1,+1), the second moment of the returns is given by:
〈
r2
〉
= σ2 − σ
√
2
pi
exp
{
− 12σ2
}
erf
{
1√
2σ
} . (4.15)
To elucidate the difference between discarding and truncating returns drawn from broader
distributions in Fig. 4.5 (left), we show the value of
〈
r2
〉
for r drawn from a Gaussian
distribution discarding returns outside the range [−1, 1]. Note that for σ > 0.7, r2 starts to
decrease in value, a fact which does not corresponds to the expected increase of the variance
if the standard deviation also increases. On the other hand, Fig. 4.5 (right) shows the value
of
〈
r2
〉
for r drawn from a Truncated Gaussian for the range [−1, 1], Eq. (4.5). Note that
when using the Truncated Gaussian for the calculation of
〈
r2
〉
, the variance increases with
respect to σ, as expected. Moreover, note that the theoretical coefficient for c in Eq. (4.4)
for returns drawn from a Truncated Gaussian distribution TN(0, 0.5) is c = 0.5, which
agrees with the simulation results shown in Fig. 4.3.
If the returns are drawn from an ARCH(1)-process, the long-run variance of the ARCH(1)-
process is known to follow the formula, see [Mantegna and Stanley, 2000, p.78]:
σ2 = α01− α1 . (4.16)
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Figure 4.5.:
〈
r2
〉
for different σ values, where r is drawn from: (left) Gaussian distribution
constrained to the range [−1, 1] and (right) Truncated Gaussian distribution
Eq. (4.5).
We find that with α0 = α1 = 0.1: 〈
r2
〉
= σ2 = 0.111 (4.17)
⇒ xmp = 9 a
q2
, (4.18)
which agrees with the simulation results obtained in Fig. 4.4 (left).
Finally, for returns drawn from a GARCH(1,1) process, notice that the GARCH process
is also defined on R and has zero mean, 〈r〉 = 0. The long-run variance of a GARCH(1,1)-
process is known to follow the following formula [Nelson and Cao, 1992]:
σ2 = α01− α1 − β1 . (4.19)
For the case with α0 = α1 = β1 = 0.01, we have σ2 = 0.010204, which means that:
⇒ xmp = 98 a
q2
, (4.20)
which agrees with the simulation results obtained in Fig. 4.4 (right).
4.5. Summary and extensions
From this chapter we learned the following:
It was shown that the number of time steps needed for the process to converge may vary
depending on the type of returns.
We also review our approach to ensure stationary distributions and stationary most prob-
able budget xmp values based on hypothesis testing methods. A scaling function for the
most probable budget xmp was found (Eq. (4.8)). Using this function, an agent is able
to calculate the xmp given the external sources or income a, the desired proportion of in-
vestment q and the type of stochastic returns r. Interestingly, if returns are drawn from
distributions with zero mean and that are covariance-stationary, the most probable budget
value xmp can be determined by means of calculating the variance of the returns for any
fixed income and fixed proportion of investment values. Finally, we compared the theoreti-
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cal scaling function with the scaling function fitted to computer experiments, leading to an
agreement for returns with a pull to zero.
Note:
The agent can use the scaling function in Eq. (4.8) not only to determine the most
probable budget value given the properties of the retuns, the proportion of investment and
the incomes, but also to know the consequences in terms of most probable budget for any
changes in these parameters. For example, given a1 and q1 parameter values for income and
risk, respectively, if one of these values changes and if the agent wants to achieve the same
most probable budget value, then the proper change in the parameter values is calculated
as follows. Assuming the new parameter values are a2 and q2, if, for example, the income
of an agent has changed from a1 at time step t to a2, the agent may like to change its
proportion of investment to
q2 =
√
q21
a2
a1
, (4.21)
in order to mantain the same xmp. In the same manner, if the agent decides to change the
proportion of investment, then in order to gather the same xmp, the new income a2 needs
to be:
a2 = q22
a1
q21
. (4.22)
Furthermore, assume that the external income of the agent has changed at time step
t by a ratio Ra so that the new income is a2 = Ra a1. The agent may be willing to
increase/decrease the proportion of investment accordingly to this increment/decrement
on the external incomes to q2 =
√
Ra q1 in order to receive the same xmp that it was
receiving before. Note that these relations are true for returns that lead to stationary
budget distributions.
Further work:
It would be interesting to find a scaling function for other type or returns, like those that
can be drawn from simple and geometric Brownian motion and different ARCH/GARCH
processes like: exponential GARCH (EGARCH), in which the model is based on a loga-
rithmic expression of the conditional variability [Nelson, 1991] and the Threshold ARCH
(TARCH,) which is an asymetric model based on the assumption that unexpected changes
in the returns have different effects on the conditional variance [Zakoian, 1994]. Finally,
following [da Silva et al., 2005], it might be also interesting to analyse the persistance in the
model by measuring the chance of keeping a positive balance relative to the initial amount
invested. Similarly to the scaling law function found for most probable budget value in
our investment model, the budget persistance may be described by a scaling function for
different q and a values.
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Real Returns
This chapter analyses the dynamics of the budget for fixed investment strategies in returns
from stock market data.
5.1. Introduction
So far, we have considered returns on investment either drawn randomly from different
known probability distributions or generated using a stochastic process with correlations
in time. The main goal of this chapter is to investigate the evolution of the budget of the
agent for different fixed proportions of investment and the influence of the external sources
for real returns.
In Chapter 3 and in Chapter 4, we analyzed the budget evolution and the budget scaling
for a fixed constant proportion of investment and fixed incomes for random returns drawn
from binomial, uniform and Gaussian distributions and also for returns modeled by random
processes like the ARCH and GARCH processes. Now, in this chapter we investigate
the influence of different fixed proportion of investment and fixed incomes on the budget
distribution, its evolution over time and the scaling function for the budget for real returns
from stock market data. This chapter is organized as follows: in Section 5.2, we present
the data that we gather from the stock market to model the real returns on investment.
In Section 5.3, by means of simulations, we analyze the dynamics of the budget over time
for different constant proportions of investment and different income values. Afterwards, in
Section 5.3.2, a scaling function for the most probable budget is discussed.
5.2. Properties of the Real Returns
For the real returns data from approximately 6686 stocks from the US stock market was
collected for the daily closing prices with range dates varying between 08/04/1994 to
16/04/2004. Consider the following scenario: an agent buys a number of stocks s at day
t− τ at the price p(t− τ), keeps the stocks for a given period of time τ ≥ 1 and sells them
at day t at the price of p(t). In the literature, several approaches to calculate the stock
price change rate can be found (see [Mantegna and Stanley, 2000, p.37]). For simplicity,
we assume the following calculation for the return on investment, which provides a direct
percentage of gain or loss:
r(t) = p(t)− p(t− τ)
p(t− τ) . (5.1)
This means that for t − τ time steps the agent holds a number of shares s(t) of a given
stock, i.e. the agent has bought the number of shares s(t) at time step t − τ for the price
p(t − τ) and may be willing to sell them at time t for the price p(t). For simplicity, the
agent receives returns from buying and selling an amount of stock only, i.e. it is not taken
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into account that the corporation gives a share of net income in the form of dividends to
the agent.
Thus, in terms of the proportion of investment q(t), this means that at time step t, the
agent owns the following amount s(t) of shares of a given stock [Anufriev and Bottazzi,
2006]:
s(t) = x(t) q(t)
p(t) . (5.2)
For example, assume an agent with budget x(0) = 100 and an proportion of investment of
q = 0.1. This means that the agent decides to invest 10% of its budget, i.e. invests the
amount I(0) = 10. In terms of buy-sell actions, if τ = 1, i.e. daily RoI, and the price
of stock share is p(0) = 1, by investing I(0) = 10 the agent is actually buying 10 shares
of stock at time t = 0, which means that the agent owns s(0) = 10 shares. Now, if the
price of the stock for the next time step increases to p(1) = 2 and the agent decides to sell
all its shares using Eq. (5.1), this would yield a return of r(1) = 1 for the agent, and its
wealth would increase to x(1) = 120. However, if we assume that the agent has a constant
proportion of investment, this means that actually the agent is not selling all the shares,
but only a part of them. Thus, for this case, the agent needs to invest I(1) = 12, which
for this approach, yields the following two possible actions for the agent: (i) to sell 4 shares
only and to keep the rest s(2) = 6 shares and (ii) to sell all shares and invest I(1) = 12 by
buying shares from other stocks. Note that both buy and sell orders that are placed in the
market are always fulfilled and have a fixed price, i.e. the agent is able to buy and sell at
time t as many shares as it wishes at the price of p(t).
Before we start analyzing the dynamics of the investment model for real returns when
using constant proportions of investment, we first need to define how to treat the approxi-
mately 12 × 106 returns that we have already obtained from the prices of the stocks. The
following approaches could be used:
1. All the returns are saved in an array and for every time step t, a return is uniformly
randomly drawn from this array. This is the equivalent of finding the distribution of
the returns and drawing randomly at each time step a return from this distribution.
Obviously, using this approach means that returns have no correlations in time and
that there are also no correlations between stocks. Moreover, it may be interpreted
as a method in which an agent randomly chooses when and where to invest its money
and holds the stock for only one time step τ = 1 in Eq. (5.1). In other words, at every
time step, the agent sells shares from stock i and buys shares from stock j, where i
and j are not necessary different.
2. A more realistic approach would be to consider returns with correlations in time. This
can be achieved by assuming that the agent randomly chooses a stock, buys the stock
at time step t′ at the price of p(t′) and holds the stock for τ time steps. Later on, at
time step t = t′ + τ the agent sells the stock at price p(t) receiving its corresponding
RoI.
For simplicity, the former approach is considered for the simulations, i.e. daily returns
with no correlations in time, which means that the agent holds the stock for only one time
step.
Firstly, we need to illustrate the basic features of the RoI for our data from the US stock
market. Fig. 5.1 (left) shows the evolution of the distribution of the returns over time in
a semi-logarithmic scaled plot. For this, the daily returns were calculated and saved in
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an array. Afterwards, the returns were drawn randomly uniformly from the array with all
possible returns, not accounting for time correlations or types of stock (the agent randomly
chooses when and where to invest its money). Note in Fig. 5.1 (left) that if more returns
are drawn from the array, the distribution of the returns becomes thinner, which may be
described with a Lévy stable distribution ( see [Mantegna and Stanley, 1994] and [Mantegna
and Stanley, 2000] (chapter 8 and 9)). A visual impression indicates that the distribution
of the returns in Fig. 5.1 (left) is symmetrical and centered at zero; however, for larger t, it
seems that positive values are more probable than negative values. For this, Fig. 5.1 (right)
shows the evolution of the average value of the returns over time. Note that, the interval
of data for the real returns that were gathered leads on average to larger positive than
negative return values with 〈r〉 ≈ 0.0009. This is in agreement with some investigations
where a typically small positive mean value of returns is reported for some international
stock markets [Bertram, 2004; Gorski et al., 2002; McMillan, 2005].
Figure 5.1.: Evolution over time of real returns, Eq. (5.1): (left) distribution and (right)
average value. For returns drawn randomly from data from the US stock mar-
ket, Eq. (5.1), with τ = 1 and with range dates varying between 08/04/1994 to
16/04/2004. Further parameters as in Fig. 3.1
As we discussed in Section 2.3.3, one of the factors responsible for stable power law
distributions is the presence of a pull to zero values. As you can see, if 〈r〉 > 0, this means
that there is no pull to zero values and that the distributions of the budget will go to +∞
values over time, i.e. continual shifting of the distribution to larger positive values. This
is shown in Fig. 5.2 where the distribution of the budget does not converge to a stationary
state distribution.
Based on these results, we notice that we can enforce the pull to zero values if we include
transaction costs in the calculation of the returns; this also presents a more realistic scenario.
By transaction costs, we mean the costs of buying and selling shares of a stock. It is well
known that these costs can vary depending on the market and the number of shares that
are bought or sold. However, in most of the cases, the transaction costs charged when the
agent bought or sold shares based on a fixed percentage, commonly from 0.5 to 1 percent
of the market value.
For simplicity, the percentage transaction costs are described by a fixed ratio k from
the price of the share in the market. In order to include the transaction costs k in the
calculation of the returns in Eq. (5.1), for the sake of clarity, let us first consider them in
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Figure 5.2.: Evolution of the budget probability distribution over time for proportion of
investment q = 0.1 and income a = 0.5 for real returns as specified in Fig. 5.1.
Further parameters as in Fig. 3.1
the investment model given by Eq. (2.9). For this, note that a transaction cost has to be
considered for each buy and sell action performed over time. For τ = 1 and in accordance
with Eq. (5.2), the number of shares s(t) that the agent owns at time t can be described
by:
s(t) = q(t)x(t)
p(t)(1 + k) . (5.3)
It can be shown that by including transaction costs, described as a percentage k of the
price of the stock, and using both the alternative description for the investment model
described in Eq. (2.12) and the number of shares owned by the agent shown in Eq. (5.3),
the investment dynamics can be now described by:
x(t+ 1) = x(t)− q(t)x(t) + s(t) p(t+ 1) (1− k) + a(t). (5.4)
Note that the second term corresponds to the money paid for buying s(t) shares at time
step t and the second term corresponds to the amount that will be received for selling s(t)
shares at time t + 1 for the price of p(t + 1) plus transactions costs. After doing some
algebra, it can be shown that the investment dynamics can be described by:
x(t+ 1) = x(t)
[
1 + q(t)
(
p(t+ 1) (1− k)
p(t) (1 + k) − 1
)]
+ a(t). (5.5)
Rewriting Eq. (5.5), it can be shown that the dynamics can be expressed using Eq. (2.9)
with returns described now by:
r(t) = p(t+ 1) (1− k)− p(t) (1 + k)
p(t) (1 + k) . (5.6)
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For the sake of clarity, consider the following example: assume an agent with budget
x(0) = 100, constant proportion of investment q = 0.1 and fixed income a = 1. This means
that the agent is willing to invest I(0) = 10 initially. If the price of a share of stock i
is pi(0) = 1 and the transactions costs represent 1% of the price, i.e. k = 0.1, the agent
buys s(0) = 9.09 shares. For simplicity, we avoid rounding the amount s(t) to an integer
number of shares, in other words, we assume that the agent can also buy a fraction of a
share (maybe an agent buys a share together with other agents). Thus, at time step t = 1,
if the price of the share of stock i is now pi(1) = 2, and if the agent sells all its shares, then
the budget of the agent at time step t = 1 would be x(1) = 106.36. As it was previously
noted, we assume for simplicity that the agent sells shares from stock i and buys shares
from stock j at every time step. This means that in our example, at time step t = 1, the
agent with budget x(1) = 106.36 is willing to invest I(1) = 10.63 and repeats the whole
process by again choosing a stock, in this case stock j, and buying s(1) shares to the price
pj(1).
Now, as discussed above we need to determine which percentage transaction costs are
more suitable to fulfill the condition of a pull to zero needed to obtain power law distribu-
tions of the budget. For this, Fig. 5.3 (left) shows the average return for different percentage
transaction costs and Fig. 5.3 (right) shows the average return value over time for the per-
centage transaction costs k = 0.00046. It can be seen that this latter leads to the desired
property 〈r〉 ≈ 0, which fulfills the pull to zero (see Section 2.3).
Figure 5.3.: Average return value: (left) for different percentage transaction costs k, returns
obtained after t = 105 time steps; and (right) for the percentage transaction
costs k = 0.00046, evolution over time. Simulations for N = 100 trials.
5.3. Simulation Experiments
Here, we present stochastic computer simulations of Eq. (2.9) for different distributions of
r(t). Initially, x(0) = 10 holds for the agent’s budget, q(t) = q and a(t) = a are kept
constant during each simulation. The distributions were realized for Na = 104 trials.
As in previous chapters, in order to elucidate the dynamics of the budget, the evolution
of the probability distribution of the budget p(x, t) over time and the average of the most
probable budget value 〈xmp(t)〉 are investigated by means of computer simulations.
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5.3.1. Budget Evolution
A graphical visualization of the evolution of the budget distribution assuming transaction
costs can be seen in Fig. 5.4. For the simulations, we assumed a fixed income of a = 0.5 and
a fixed proportion of investment of q = 0.1. Note that the distribution reaches a stationary
state after approximately t = 105 time steps.
Figure 5.4.: Evolution of the budget probability distribution over time for proportion of
investment q = 0.1 and income a = 0.5. For returns from the US stock market
Eq. (5.6) with percentage transaction costs k = 0.00046. Further parameters
as in Fig. 3.1.
Again, we note that in order to obtain the average most probable budget value 〈xmp〉
for different income and proportion of investment values, we need to determine the number
of time steps ts needed to find stationary distributions. For this, we used Algorithm 2
(Section 3.2.3) and we show in Fig. 5.5 the evolution of the xmp over time for RoI with
transaction costs k = 0.00046, Eq. (5.6). Fig. 5.5 shows the evolution of xmp for (left)
constant proportion of investment and different income values, and (right) constant income
and different proportion of investment values.
For all different environments treated in this section, we show that for small proportion
of investment values, the distribution of the budget needs larger number of time steps to
reach a stationary state. The reason for this is probably that the pull to zero condition
needed for power law distributions in the dynamic of multiplicative stochastic process with
an additive term is not strong enough.
5.3.2. Budget Scaling for Proportion Of Investment and Income
In Chapter 4, it was shown that the most probable budget value xmp can be described
by the scaling function in Eq. (4.4), which describes xmp for the proportion of investment,
incomes and the second moment of the returns. In Chapter 4, computer experiments and
analytical solutions for the scaling function were presented and discussed for returns drawn
from known distributions and stochastic processes with correlation in time. In this section,
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Figure 5.5.: Most probable budget value for RoI from the stock market, Eq. (5.6), with per-
centage transaction costs k = 0.00046. For constant proportion of investment
q(t) = 0.1 and different income values a. Further parameters as in Fig. 3.3.
we investigate this scaling function for real returns. For this we use data from the stock
market, introduced in Section 5.2. Consider Eq. (5.6) for the calculation of the returns and
percentage transaction costs k = 0.0046. Fig. 5.6 shows the scaling function of xmp for
different q and a values.
In Section 4.2, it was mentioned the fact that the number of time steps needed to reach
stationary distributions may depend on the properties of the returns. Algorithm 2 (Sec-
tion 3.2.3) presented a way to deal with this problem. This problem may be more acute for
real returns specially for small q and large a because of the weak pull to zero values as seen
in Fig. 5.6, where some simulation results do not fit a straight line very well. For clarity,
we investigated the number of time steps t that were needed to reach stationary budget
distributions for real returns, Eq. (5.6), with transaction costs k = 0.0046 for different q and
a values. The resulting number of time steps is shown in Fig. 5.7. As we noted previously,
it is clear that the number of time steps needed to reach an stationary state is much larger
for small values of q; also observe that a does not have a clear influence on the number of
time steps needed for convergence.
The previous results show that the number of time steps ts needed to reach a stationary
distribution depends much more on the value of q and the distribution of the returns r
than on the income a. A more exact determination of the number of time steps needed for
the process to converge to stationary distributions may be obtained following the analytical
approximation proposed by [Sornette and Cont, 1997] for large but finite t: x(t) ≈ √D t
for D as in Eq. (2.20). However, as previously mentioned, for practical purposes, in our
investigations we use Algorithm 2 (Section 3.2.3) to determine the point at which the
process has converged to a stationary distribution.
Finally, Fig. 5.8 shows the evolution of the
〈
r2
〉
of the returns over time. Note that
this value leads to an experimental value of
〈
r2
〉 ≈ 0.001675, which means a coefficient of
1/
〈
r2
〉
= c = 597.01 for the scaling function in Eq. (4.4), which agrees with the scaling
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Figure 5.6.: Most probable budget value vs. scaled variable a/q2 for real returns with trans-
actions costs k = 0.00046 Eq. (5.6). The value found for the slope of the
numerical simulations was c = 599.692± 1.001.
found in the simulations of the dynamics shown in Fig. 5.6.
5.4. Summary and Extensions
From this chapter we learned the following:
For real returns from the stock market with transaction costs, if the agent decides to
invest a fixed percentage of its budget, we find that the distribution of its budget converges
over time to a stationary distribution with a power law in the tail. However, this is true only
for a fixed range of transaction costs values that are below the standard transaction costs in
real life. It was also shown that the number of time steps needed for the process to converge
to stationary distributions variates depending on the investment percentage of the agent.
This result implies that for sufficiently low transaction costs, the budget distribution of the
agent may reach a stationary state or it may shift to larger positive values over the course
of time. Although these results do not mirror reality because normally the transaction costs
are much higher, these results provide some insight into the dynamics of the investment
model for real returns and help to realize the importance of the properties of pull and
repulsion from zero in the dynamics of multiplicative stochastic processes, in this case for
real data from the stock market.
Further work:
It would be interesting to find a theoretical scaling function that agrees with returns that
do not pull the process to zero values, i.e. for costs different from those considered in this
chapter or no percentage transaction costs. In this chapter it was considered that the agent
randomly chooses when and where to invest its money, holding the stock for only one time
step. As noted in Section 5.2, this approach means that returns have no correlations in time
and that there are also no correlations between stocks. It would be interesting to extend
this approach constraining the agent to invest according to the time line of the stock prices.
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Figure 5.7.: Number of time steps t needed to reach stationary budget distributions for real
returns, Eq. (5.6), with transaction costs k = 0.0046 for different proportions of
investment q, different incomes a. Further parameters: pv = 0.1 in Algorithm 2
(Section 3.2.3).
Finally, it would be also interesting to consider not only daily returns, but short and long
term investment scenarios as well.
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Figure 5.8.: For real returns with transactions costs k = 0.00046, Eq. (5.6), the average of
the squared returns over time converges to the value
〈
r2
〉 ≈ 0.0017. Average
over N = 104 trials.
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6. Investment Strategies for Stationary Noisy
Periodic Environments
This chapter presents different agent strategies for an artificial investment scenario where
the return on investment is characterized by a periodic function with different types and
levels of noise. Two behaviors for the agent are considered: cautious behavior in which the
agent chooses an investment proportional to the expected return and a daring behavior in
which the agent chooses to perform large investments if the expected return is positive. In
addition to these different strategies, the agent may have different capabilities to predict the
future returns depending on its internal complexity.
6.1. Introduction
In the previous chapters we analyzed the dynamics of the investment model Eq. (2.9) for
different constant proportions of investment and constant incomes. In our approach an
agent was assigned a fixed investment proportion value for all time steps, i.e. the agent was
not able to change or update its proportion of investment. Now in this chapter we assume
that the agent is able to change the proportion of investment over time. The manner in
which the agent changes this may depend on different assumptions that the agent may make
about the dynamics of the environment.
Recall that one of the main goals of this PhD thesis is to investigate the extent to
which internal complexity of agents influences their overall performance. For this, Fig. 1.2
depicted in a schematic diagram the three different types of agents that are of interest in
this PhD thesis: reactive agent, experience-based agent and machine-learning-based agent.
The dynamics for a reactive agent in random environments was studied in Chapters 3 and 4.
Now, in this chapter, some strategies for experienced and machine-learning based agents are
presented and in the following chapter, their performance is analyzed for periodic returns.
But first, some approaches found in the literature that deal with the problem of finding a
proper investment strategy in an uncertain environment are presented.
To find a proper method to control the proportion of investment is a complex and difficult
task since most investment environments are uncertain and present fluctuations. For exam-
ple, choosing to avoid investing may lead to losing big opportunities to win large amounts
of money. On the other hand, choosing to invest large amounts of money may lead to situ-
ations where the chances of losing the complete budget are high. Thus, the task of finding
a good strategy that controls the proportions of investment balancing between these two
extrema is by far not trivial. In economics for example, this problem usually concerns the
behavior that an investor should follow in order to maximize profits within an uncertain
environment. To this end, researchers usually investigate the relationship between methods
for optimization under uncertainty, the different preferences of an investor and the amount
of information available from the environment. It is also important to mention that the
golden rule of any economic endeavor is to try to maximize the profits or at least to minimize
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the losses as much as possible [LeCorre and Mischke, 2005]. Maybe one of the most impor-
tant papers regarding the problem of maximization of profits in an uncertain environment
is the seminal paper of Kelly [1956] where the author assumes a gambler performing some
bets, in terms of a fraction of his capital, on a given random process. Kelly shows that by
knowing the probability of winning and speculating the result of the bets in advance, the
gambler can maximize the exponential rate of his wealth, Eq. (2.6). However, this approach
makes sense for bets with a higher rate of winning than losing, because if we consider a fair
bet with equal probability to win or to lose, then according to Kelly it is better not to bet
at all.
On the other hand, many researchers have considered machine learning methods to find
good investment strategies in different type of stochastic environments, some contributions
have been already mentioned in Section 1.2.1. From these contributions, it is important
to note some of their disadvantages. For example, neural networks have been one of the
preferred methods of many researchers. However, [Zell, 1995, p. 137] noted that the use of
simple feed-forward neural networks for the prediction of time series have the disadvantage
that only fixed window input sizes can be considered. In practice, the usual approach is
to train neural networks with different topologies, however, fast training algorithms are
needed to cover a large number of different topologies [Castiglione, 2004]. In the area of
reinforcement learning, to our knowledge a direct application of algorithms like Sarsa and
Qlearning (see [Sutton and Barto, 1998]) for investment strategies in uncertain scenarios has
not been proposed yet. In this chapter we investigate in Section 6.6.1 a simple strategy based
on reinforcement learning which is called “Iterative Update Rule” for the sake of simplicity.
In the area of evolutionary computation the method that is often used by many researchers is
genetic programming, however, its performance depends on the mathematical operations and
mathematical functions considered and once an optimal strategy is found, it may be difficult
to understand why does it work (see [Schulenburg and Ross, 2001]). The performance
of reinforcement learning and genetic programming approaches for trading in the foreign
exchange market has been investigated by [Dempster et al., 2001], in which the authors show
that genetic programming outperforms the other strategies. From these different approaches
used for prediction and finding good investment strategies, we note that there are not many
approaches for investment strategies based on the standard generational genetic algorithm.
Furthermore, note that some researches have investigated the use of standard generational
genetic algorithms in changing environments [Branke, 1999; Grefenstette, 1992]. Because of
this, in this PhD thesis, an approach based on standard generational genetic algorithms for
the problem of investment optimization is proposed and its performance is compared with
the performance of other investment strategies for different scenarios. For this, a typical
scenario to study investment strategies is to let an agent choose between investing in a risk-
free asset or in a risky asset (see [Arrow, 1965; Pratt, 1964; Tobin, 1958]). This approach is
usually extended to more complex models where agents interact with each other by means of
selling and buying goods. Examples for this are those contributions where an artificial stock
market is simulated in which some of the stylized facts present in real markets are observed,
see [Farmer, 2001; LeBaron, 2000; Lux and Marchesi, 2002; Raberto et al., 2003]. Some
other researchers have compared the performance of different strategies in these type of
scenarios. For example the investigations done by [Farmer et al., 2005; Gode and Sunder,
1993] where zero-intelligence agents and rational agents are compared. However, before
investigating the performance of investment strategies in these more complex scenarios, it
is necessary to understand their dynamics and to investigate their performance in a simpler
scenario like the one presented in Section 2.2.
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Thus, in this chapter and the following chapter, the following research question is ad-
dressed: to what extent is it valuable or recommendable to have an agent with complex
learning mechanisms instead of a reactive agent for stylized exogenous returns? To answer
this question, in this chapter, the different investment strategies and different agent’s at-
titudes are presented. Afterwards, in Chapter 7 the performance of these strategies and
attitudes is investigated in an simple investment scenario with noisy periodic returns.
This chapter is organized as follows. Firstly, Section 6.2, presents the investment sce-
nario, i.e. the properties and abilities of an agent acting/investing in this environment.
Secondly, in Section 6.4 the strategies used as a reference for the performance comparison
are described. Finally, Section 6.5 and Section 6.6 show technical analysis and machine
learning approaches for finding proper investment strategies.
6.2. Investment Scenario
As a necessary step to study more complex scenarios, we are interested in an initial study
of the performance of different agent architectures/investment strategies in the investment
scenario presented in Section 2.2. In this simple scenario, we consider a representative agent
model for learning from the interaction with different type of time series. As explained
in Section 2.2, this means that, in this approach, the agent invests independently in the
market, i.e. there is no interaction or communication with other agents. Also, agents do not
generate feedback with their investments on the market. In other words, the environment
of the agents is not influenced by their investments.
In Chapters 3 and 4, fixed external incomes a(t) = a were considered for the agent,
Eq. (2.9). It was shown in Sections 2.3.1 and 2.3.2 that in the presence of random returns,
an absence of these external incomes lead the agent to a bankrupt state. However, if the
agent now has some methods to forecast the next return and the returns are somehow
predictable, then the agent does not need external incomes to avoid bankruptcy. Thus, for
the sake of simplicity, we assume no external incomes for the investment model:
x(t+ 1) = x(t)
[
1 + r(t) q(t)
]
, (6.1)
where, for completeness, x(t) represents the budget of the agent, the market is expressed
by r(t), the return on investment, RoI and the agent has to choose between investing in a
risk-free asset or in a risky asset by means of the proportion of investment variable q(t). In
other words, based on the previous received returns the agent may have a preference to keep
cash (liquidity preference) or to invest in the market (speculative preference). Moreover,
the behavior of the agent towards risk is assumed to be a risk-neutral behavior, i.e. the
agent estimates only the expected return and based on this estimation, decides to increase
or decrease its proportion of investment over time. Note that, in this chapter, we do
not construct and investigate a market model; rather, our focus lies on investigating the
characteristics of good and bad strategies, from the point of view that the agent gathers
previous returns to perform some forecasting. Thus, the challenge for the agents is twofold:
first, agents have to predict r(t) as accurately as possible, and second, they have to adjust
q(t) to the proper values as quickly as possible. Thus, to determine the most appropriate
investment by an agent at a particular time, methods from technical analysis are considered,
as well as a selection of other methods of varying complexity from various fields.
As explained before, we are interested in how the market dynamics, r(t), affect the
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different investment strategies of the agent, q(t). It is very important to realize that the
market dynamics – while affecting each agent’s q(t) – are not completely known to the
agents. This means that at time t each agent only receives the actual value of the Return
on Investment (RoI) and adjusts its proportion of investment accordingly, without having
a complete knowledge about the dynamics of r(t). The agent may, of course, have some
bounded memory about past RoI that could be used for predictions of future RoI. However,
the agent has to gather information about the ups and downs of the RoI and to draw its
own conclusions from this information by itself. Therefore, the investment strategy that
better guesses about the dynamics of r(t) will of course perform better in the environment.
6.3. The Periodic Return on Investment
In these investigations, periodic returns on investment (RoI) are assumed, the dynamics of
which are controlled mainly by a periodicity and some noise as follows [Navarro-Barrientos
et al., 2008a]:
r(t) = A sin(w t+ ξ1) + ξ2, (6.2)
where the amplitude A of the sinusoidal function depends on the amplitude noise level
σ2 ∈ (0, 1), with A = 1−σ2; the frequency w depends on the periodicity T (in Section 8.4.1
a non-fixed periodicity is considered); the phase ξ1 is a random number drawn from a
Uniform distribution ξ1 ∈ piU(−σ1, σ1) with σ1 ∈ (0, 1) and ξ2 corresponds to a random
number drawn from a Uniform distribution ξ2 ∈ U(−σ2, σ2). Thus, σ1 and σ2 account
for the fluctuations in the market dynamics, on the phase and the amplitude of the RoI,
respectively. Note that the noise parameter σ1,2 gives us a way of controlling the noise in the
RoI, thereby allowing us to evaluate the various strategies for different scenarios, ranging
from a completely clear signal with no noise at all (for σ1,2 = 0) to a noise-only signal (for
σ1,2 = 1). This makes it possible for us to determine how well multiple strategies perform
for different types and levels of noise and what impact the type and level of noise has on a
single strategy.
Fig. 6.1 shows an example of these two kind of RoI for different noise levels σ1 and σ2.
In order to interpret some of the results obtained in the next chapter, it is useful to
understand some properties of the periodic returns. An important feature of the returns
is the probability distribution, which is shown in Fig. 6.2. It can be observed that the
distribution of the returns for fluctuations on the phase does not change as the level of
noise is increased, whereas for fluctuations on the amplitude there is a notable change as
the level of noise is increased. More precisely, for the probability distributions of r(t) with
phase noise, we see that there is a higher probability of values close to −1 and 1, and a lower
probability of values close to 0. Note that this is the same distribution that is found for a
sine wave with no noise at all. Thus, for phase noise, the value of σ1 has no effect on the
distribution of the returns. For the probability distributions of r(t) with amplitude noise, we
observe a probability distribution which is a combination of the probability distribution of
a sine wave without noise (caused by the sine wave) and a uniform probability distribution
(caused by the noise). For higher levels of noise, the convolution of probability distributions
more closely resembles the uniform distribution, and for lower levels of noise, the convolution
of probability distributions more closely resembles the sine wave distribution. Thus, for
amplitude noise, the value of σ2 is crucial and different values lead to different distributions.
Two properties that are also of particular interest are the absolute average value of the
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Figure 6.1.: Periodic RoI r(t), Eq. 6.2, for: (left) no amplitude fluctuations, σ2 = 0, and
two different noise on the phase levels: (top) σ1 = 0.1 and (bottom) σ1 = 0.5;
(right) no phase fluctuations, σ1 = 0, and two different amplitude noise levels:
(top) σ2 = 0.1 and (bottom) σ2 = 0.5. Further parameters: T = 100.
return and the correlation between the sign of two consecutive returns.
The average absolute RoI is of importance because its known from multiplicative stochas-
tic processes [Navarro-Barrientos et al., 2008b; Sornette and Cont, 1997], that for a constant
investment q(t) = q0, the better-performing constant strategies are the ones that invest the
least possible amount. Since q(t) is multiplied with r(t) in Eq. (6.1), the change in average
absolute value of r(t) has an impact similar to the change in q(t) seen in the multiplica-
tive stochastic processes, see Fig. 3.6. This leads to changes in performance that are not
necessarily related with the performance of agents, and should be taken into account when
interpreting the results.
Analytically, the average absolute value of the returns, 〈|r(t)|〉, can be calculated as
follows:
〈|r(t)|〉 = 1
T
∫ T
0
r(t)dt = 2
T
∫ T/2
0
r(t)dt. (6.3)
For returns with no noise σ1 = 0 and σ2 = 0, the average absolute value of the RoI can
be calculated as follows:
〈|r(t)|〉 = 1
pi
∫ pi
0
sin(u)du ; u = 2pi
T
t (6.4)
= 2
pi
. (6.5)
For returns with noise, the average absolute value of r(t) can be calculated by computing
the following for a large number of trials N :
〈|r(t)|〉 = 1
N T
N∑
i=0
T∑
j=1
|r(j)| . (6.6)
Fig. 6.3 shows the numerical calculation of the average absolute value of the RoI for
different amplitude and phase noise levels.
Since the distribution of the RoI is independent of the noise level σ1 for phase noise, it
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Figure 6.2.: Distribution of the RoI, r(t), Eq. 6.2, for: (left) phase fluctuations σ1 =
{0.1, 0.5, 0.9} and σ2 = 0 and (right) amplitude fluctuations σ2 = {0.1, 0.5, 0.9}
and σ1 = 0. Further parameters: T = 100.
is expected that the average absolute RoI is constant with respect to σ1 in the RoI. This
can be seen in Fig. 6.3 (left). On the other hand, as expected from the distribution of the
RoI, for the noise level σ2 for amplitude noise the average absolute RoI varies with respect
to σ2. This can be seen in Fig. 6.3 (right). Roughly, the average absolute value of the RoI
with amplitude noise decreases for σ2 < 0.6 and it increases for σ2 ≥ 0.6. This is consistent
with the observations for the probability distributions: there, for σ2 = 0.5, the values are
concentrated around r(t) = 0, leading to smaller 〈|r(t)|〉, and for σ2 = 0.1 and σ2 = 0.9,
the values are less concentrated around r(t) = 0, leading to larger 〈|r(t)|〉.
The correlation between the sign of two consecutive returns shows whether it is possible
to draw conclusions from the sign of r(t) based on the sign of r(t+ 1). In the same manner,
numerical calculations were performed to obtain the distribution of the correlations of the
RoI with respect to two consecutive returns r(t)r(t + 1). These are shown in Fig. 6.4 for
both types of noise. We can clearly see that for low levels of noise, there is bigger correlation
between consecutive values. As the noise increases, this correlation diminishes until finally,
for high levels of noise, the returns are completely uncorrelated.
Most of the algorithms studied are sensitive to correlations in consecutive RoI with the
same sign. We notice that between the returns with phase noise and amplitude noise,
correlations do not vary exactly in the same manner as noise. In particular, it can be seen
that for σ1,2 = 0.5, the amplitude noise still has more correlation than the phase noise. This
difference can account for some discrepancies seen between the performance of the agents
for the two types of market return functions.
Finally, it is true that returns modeled with a noisy sine wave are not realistic, however,
the author believes that they are relevant for any scenario with time series, in which the
agent has to choose when and how much to invest.
In the following sections, we specify different strategies for controlling proportion of invest-
ment in periodic environments. Afterwards, we compare the performance of these strategies
by means of computer simulations. As we mentioned earlier, our primary goal is not to find
an optimal strategy for these unrealistic RoIs, but to investigate and analyze the cases in
which some strategies perform better than others. Thus, the stylized returns presented
in this section are to be considered as a test-bed scenario for different type of investment
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Figure 6.3.: Average absolute value of the RoI, r(t), Eq. 6.2 for: (left) phase fluctuations σ1
and no amplitude fluctuations, i.e. σ2 = 0 and (right) amplitude fluctuations
σ2 and no phase fluctuations, i.e. σ1 = 0. Further parameters: T = 100.
strategies.
6.4. Reference Strategies
In order to compare different strategies, we need a point of reference against which the per-
formance of each strategy can be measured. For this, we present in this section two strategies
that attempt to ease our comparison with other more complex strategies. These refer-
ence strategies represent two simple behaviors for an agent; the first one, called Constant-
Investment-Proportion (CP), assumes a simple constant minimal proportion of investment,
whereas the second one, called Ramp-Rectangle (RR), increases/decreases the proportion of
investment accordingly to the periodicity of the returns. In our approach, the CP strategy
represents the agent with zero knowledge whereas the RR strategy represents the agent
with complete knowledge of the environment. Note also that in our comparison for the
internal complexity of an agent, both reference strategies are considered to be part of a
reactive agent, as depicted in Fig. 1.2.
6.4.1. Constant Proportion of Investment
The simplest strategy for an agent is to take a constant proportion of investment for every
time step. For simplicity we call this strategy CP:
q(t) = qmin = const. (6.7)
Since the value of q(t) is always fixed, this is not really a “strategy” and it plays a role in
physics-inspired investment models [Navarro-Barrientos et al., 2008b; Solomon and Rich-
mond, 2001b; Sornette and Cont, 1997; Takayasu et al., 1997]. Finally, note that this
reference strategy requires no knowledge of the dynamics of the RoI.
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Figure 6.4.: Distribution of the correlations of the RoI over time r(t) Eq. 6.2, for: (left)
different phase fluctuations σ1 with σ2 = 0 and (right) different amplitude
fluctuations σ2 with σ1 = 0. Further parameters: T = 100.
6.4.2. Ramp-Rectangle Strategy
In this section, the case for an agent knowing the dynamics of the periodic returns is
considered. Basically, if the agent knows the periodicity T of the returns, then for returns
with noise, i.e. σ1 6= 0 or σ2 6= 0, different regions can be observed for which different
conclusions can be drawn about the sign of the return. Fig 6.5 (left) shows these regions
for some amplitude noise, where in some regions the sign of r(t) is certain to be positive or
negative, whereas in other regions the sign of r(t) is uncertain. Based on these regions of
certainty and uncertainty, the ramp-rectangle (RR) strategy is proposed to represent the
desired behavior of an agent with complete knowledge of the environment.
The ramp-rectangle (RR) strategy is a function mapping RoI that are uncertain to in-
crease/decrease the proportions of investment and RoI that are certainly positive or negative
to a maximal or minimal proportion of investment, respectively. The corresponding strategy
is expressed as follows:
q(t+ 1) =

(
qmax−qmin
h1
)
tˆ+ qmin if tˆ ∈ (0, h1)
qmax if tˆ ∈ [h1, h2](
qmax−qmin
h2−h3
)
(tˆ− h2) + qmax if tˆ ∈ (h2, h3)
qmin if tˆ ∈ [h3, h4].
(6.8)
In this function, h1 (h3) sets the transition from an increasing (decreasing) ramp function
to a rectangle function and h2(h4) sets the transition from a rectangle function to a decreas-
ing (increasing) ramp function. Moreover, for each time step t, the congruence tˆ ≡ t mod h4
is used, which maps each time step t ∈ (0,∞) to a time step in the ramp-rectangle function,
tˆ ∈ (0, h4). Fig. 6.5 (right) shows this strategy graphically for a RoI with periodicity T = h4
and no noise.
Furthermore, we assume that the differences between time steps when an agent increases
and decreases its proportion of investment values are symmetric. This means that the time
difference 4h between when the ramp function starts and stops to increase or decrease can
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Figure 6.5.: Intervals of certainty and uncertainty: (left) shows r(t) with noise and the
different intervals for which different conclusions can be drawn about the sign
of the return, where regions 2 and 5 are regions in which the sign of r(t) is certain
to be positive or negative, respectively, the rest are regions in which the sign
of r(t) is uncertain and (right) shows r(t) without noise and the corresponding
q(t) of the RR strategy.
be expressed as follows:
4h = h1 = h3 − h2, (6.9)
Thus, for the RR strategy, different behaviors for the agent may be proposed. For exam-
ple, the strategy could be defined in such a way that the proportion of investment should
increase only for the time steps where returns are certain to be positive and not for the
whole positive period of the returns. For returns with amplitude noise, this would mean
that the agent wants to avoid any loses and takes always into account the worst possible
outcomes which, in terms of the returns, can be expressed as follows:
rw(t) = (1− σ2) sin
(2pi
T
t
)
− σ2. (6.10)
It can be shown that by solving rw(t) = 0 for t, the time step intervals in a cycle for which
the returns are certain to be positive is:
[ε, (T/2)− ε] , (6.11)
where:
ε = − T2pi arcsin
(
σ2
σ2 − 1
)
. (6.12)
This interval corresponds to region 2 in Fig. 6.5 (left), where large investments should be
performed as the returns are certain to be positive.
It is important to notice that this reference strategy assumes that the agent knows
the periodicity and the noise of the returns in advance.
A more daring behavior would be if the agent takes only the periodicity into account
and forgets about the noise and the ramp-function, i.e. 4h = 1 in Eq. 6.9, in which case
the agent uses a Square Wave (SW) strategy. We are particularly interested in this case
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in which it is implied that an agent invests qmax for time steps tˆ ∈ (0, T/2) and invests
qmin for time steps tˆ ∈ [T/2, T ]. For the sake of completeness, this strategy is expressed as
follows:
q(t) =
{
qmax t mod T < T/2
qmin otherwise.
(6.13)
Note that this reference strategy assumes that the agent knows the periodicity of
the returns in advance.
6.5. Strategies based on Technical Analysis
For the investment strategies presented in this section, we assume that a strategy consists
of two components: a prediction component and an action component. For these strategies,
the prediction component predicts a variable in the system – in this case, the next value of
r(t) – and the action component defines an action based on the prediction of the variable.
In this case, it defines the appropriate value for q(t).
For the strategies presented in this section, we assume that the adjustment of the pro-
portion of investment is based on “technical analysis” (see [Brooks, 2002; Stock, 1993]).
Technical analysis tries to deduce information about the dynamics of, for example, stock
market prices by looking at trends (averages, variances, higher order moments) of the values
over a period of time. This assumes that an agent has a bounded memory of size M to
record previous prices or RoIs; this information is then processed in different ways in order
to predict the next value. In our approach we do not consider prices but returns which are
more appropriate for our investment model expressed in terms of returns on investment.
In the following, we consider two strategies from the field of technical analysis: the first
strategy calculates the moving averages (MA) on previous RoI, while the second strategy
uses moving least squares (MLS) on previous RoI r(t) over a fixed period of time M . Both
of them can be regarded as “zero-intelligence” strategies, as agents do not do any reasoning
or learning. Note also that in our comparison for the internal complexity of an agent, these
types of strategies are mean to be part of the internal architecture of an experience-based
agent, depicted in Fig. 1.2.
6.5.1. Moving Averages
The moving averages technique estimates the next r(t) as the average of the previous M
values of r(t):
rˆMA(t) =
1
M
t−1∑
n=t−M
r(n). (6.14)
6.5.2. Moving Least Squares
The moving least squares technique fits a function to the data of the previous M values of
r(t) to estimate the next r(t). In our case, we choose this function to be a linear trend-line,
which is found by minimizing the distance to the data points of r(t). Based on the previous
M values of r(t), the squared estimation error r is defined as:
r(t) =
1
M
t∑
n=t−M+1
[r(n)− rˆMLS(n)]2 (6.15)
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where rˆ(t) is the predicted RoI based on the linear regression trend-line, defined as:
rˆMLS(t′) = m(t) t′ + b(t) for t−M ≤ t′ ≤ t. (6.16)
Now, the best fitting values m and b are obtained by minimizing the squared error
estimation, Eq. (6.15). From ∂r/∂m = 0 and ∂r/∂b = 0, we get:
m(t) =
M
t∑
n=t−M+1
n r(n) −
(
t∑
n=t−M+1
n
)(
t∑
n=t−M+1
r(n)
)
M
t∑
n=t−M+1
n2 −
(
t∑
n=t−M+1
n
)2 (6.17)
b(t) = 1
M
 t∑
n=t−M+1
r(n)−m(t)
t∑
n=t−M+1
n
 (6.18)
Fig. 6.6 shows the values estimated for r(t) when using MA and MLS for a sample scenario
over 100 time steps and with parameters: M = 20 and σ1 = 0.5. It can be observed
that the strategy MLS estimates r(t) more precisely than MA. For MA, the values of the
estimation have a ’lag’ as compared to the actual r(t) which may cause the actual r(t) to be
underestimated/overestimated for increasing/decreasing r(t). For MLS, the values of the
estimation do not present a ’lag’ when compared to the actual r(t) – this is not surprising
as the curve of the estimation is fitted to minimize the distance between the values of the
estimation and the actual r(t).
Figure 6.6.: Moving averages (MA, solid line) and moving least squares (MLS, long-dashed
line, shown for t = 20, 40, 60, 80, 100) for the time series of a periodic return on
investment r(t) (dot points with short-dashed line) with some noise. Parame-
ters: M = 20, ξ = N(0, 0.5).
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6.5.3. Daring and Cautious behaviors
The strategies MA and MLS use different approaches to estimate the next r(t). However
the corresponding adjustment of the proportion of investment must still be defined. For
this, we consider two possibilities: a daring (RS) and a cautious (RA) approach.
For a daring approach, the value of qRS(t) is defined as follows for rˆ(t) ∈ {rˆMA(t),
rˆMLS(t)}, i.e. for rˆ(t) being an MA or MLS estimate of r(t):
qRS(t) =
{
qmin rˆ(t) ≤ 0
qmax rˆ(t) > 0
(6.19)
where qmin, qmax ∈ [0, 1] and qmin < qmax. In other words, the agent invest the percentage
qmin of its budget if the next value of r(t) is predicted to be negative or zero, and the agent
invests the percentage qmin of its budget if the next value of r(t) is predicted to be positive.
For a cautious approach, the value of qRA(t) is defined as follows for rˆ(t) ∈ {rˆMA(t),
rˆMLS(t)}, i.e. for rˆ(t) being an MA or MLS estimate of r(t):
qRA(t) =

qmin rˆ(t) ≤ qmin
rˆ(t) qmin < rˆ(t) < qmax
qmax rˆ(t) ≥ qmax
(6.20)
where qmin, qmax ∈ [0, 1] and qmin < qmax. Here, qRA(t) is set to the predicted r(t) (with ap-
propriate adjustments to ensure that qRA(t) = qmin whenever rˆ(t) ≤ qmin and qRA(t) = qmax
whenever rˆ(t) ≥ qmax) – the agent only invests a fraction of the budget which corresponds
in size to the expected return.
Note that in terms of economic theory and in particular in terms of risk theory, the
behavior of the agent is risk-neutral in the sense that the agent estimates only the expected
return rˆ(t) and does not consider risk measures such as the volatility. Thus, this approach
is based on the estimation of r(t), and given this estimation, the agent makes the decision
to increase or decrease the proportion of investment. Hence, for the purposes of this thesis,
the two terms ’daring’ and ’cautious’ denote only the investment preference of the agent in
terms of expected return. See more details of this approach with respect to utility of wealth
in the Appendix 10.2.
6.6. Strategies based on Machine Learning
In the previous sections, we presented two reference strategies for reactive agents and two
strategies based on technical analysis methods for experience-based agents. Now, in this
section, we present other types of strategies which are based on methods taken from the field
of machine learning. We consider two different approaches: one based on an incremental
update rule (IUR), which is a form of reinforcement learning, and the other based on a
genetic algorithm (GA), which is a form of evolutionary learning. Note also that in our
comparison of the internal complexity of an agent, these types of strategies are mean to be
used by machine learning-based agents with an internal architecture as depicted in Fig. 1.2.
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6.6.1. Incremental Update Rule
The following machine learning approach is based on the incremental update rule, an ap-
plication of reinforcement learning. The idea of reinforcement learning is that an agent
continuously uses a reward signal to adjust its own performance. In our scenario, the re-
turn is the reward signal; at each step, the agent computes the error between the predicted
and the actual value of the return and uses this error to adjust the estimation of the fol-
lowing return. The general incremental update rule from reinforcement learning is defined
as follows [Sutton and Barto, 1998]:
NewEst ← OldEst + StepSize[Target −OldEst ] (6.21)
where OldEst and NewEst are the old and new estimates for the quantity of interest. So,
Target − OldEst gives us the error of the current estimation, which is weighted by the
factor StepSize. Thus, a new estimate NewEst is computed by taking the old estimate
and adjusting it by the error of the current estimate, leading to a NewEst that is updated
at each time step. Applying Eq. (6.21) to our model, we find the following instance of the
incremental update rule:
rˆIUR(t+ 1) = rˆIUR(t) + γ
[
r(t)− rˆIUR(t)
]
(6.22)
Consequently, OldEst and NewEst are the old and new estimates for the return rˆIUR(t)
and rˆIUR(t+1) respectively. Furthermore, r(t)− rˆIUR(t) is the error of the current estimate.
Because of its recursive definition, the incremental update rule considers an infinite history
of returns – of course, the weight of a value depends on its age and its impact fades over
time. For simplicity, we chose rˆIUR(0) = 0 as the initial value of rˆIUR(t).
Note that different values of γ lead to different performance for the algorithm; in other
words, for small γ, the adjustment of the estimate will be small and for large γ, the adjust-
ment of the estimate will be large. This is investigated in Section 7.2.3, where we discuss
the γ values that yield maximal gains in more detail.
Finally, as in Section 6.5.3, we must specify the corresponding adjustment of the pro-
portion of investment given a particular estimate for the next return. For the purpose
of comparison, we again define a daring and a cautious approach for the MA and MLS
strategies as in Eq. 6.19 and 6.20:
In the daring approach, qRS(t) is defined as follows for rˆIUR(t):
qRS(t) =
{
qmin rˆIUR(t) ≤ 0
qmax rˆIUR(t) > 0
(6.23)
and in the cautious approach, qRA(t) is defined as follows for rˆIUR(t):
qRA(t) =

qmin rˆIUR(t) ≤ qmin
rˆIUR(t) qmin < rˆIUR(t) < qmax
qmax rˆIUR(t) ≥ qmax.
(6.24)
For both definitions, qmin, qmax ∈ [0, 1] and qmin < qmax.
It is important to note that reinforcement learning and the incremental update rule are not
identical; rather, reinforcement learning describes a group of machine learning approaches
and the incremental update rule is one instance of these approaches.
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It is well known that people make decisions based on changes from a certain reference
point, that people react differently when decision-making for profits and for losses and
that people perceive losses to be twice as large as profits [Edwards, 1996; Kahneman and
Tversky, 1979, 1992; Takahashi and Terano, 2003]. Although these concepts are not explicity
considered here, a different representation of γ in Eq. (6.22) could be used to study some
aspects of the Prospect Theory of decision-making.
6.6.2. Genetic Algorithm
In this section we present an investment strategy based on a Genetic Algorithm (GA).
Genetic algorithms (GA) are a technique from the field of artificial intelligence which is
mainly used to find approximate solutions to optimization problems. Genetic algorithms
belong to the class of evolutionary algorithms that are based on the principle of modeling
solutions to a problem by means of a population of chromosomes where each chromosome
represents a candidate solution to the problem and where the population gradually evolves
to better solutions via operators like selection, crossover and mutation.
In the following, a description of the genetic algorithm for controlling the proportion of
investment is presented [Navarro-Barrientos et al., 2008a]. Let j = 1, ..., C be a chromosome
from a population of chromosomes of size C. Each chromosome j is an array of genes gjk
(k = 0, ..., G − 1) where the values of the genes are real numbers (see [Michalewiçz, 1999,
chap. 5] for drawbacks when using binary representation in genetic algorithms). In our
model, each chromosome j represents a set of possible strategies of an agent, so the gjk
refers to possible proportion of investment values.
In the beginning, each gjk is assigned a random value: gjk ∈ (qmin, qmax). Each chromo-
some j is then evaluated by a fitness function, fj(τ), which is defined as follows:
fj(τ) =
G−1∑
k=0
r(t) gjk ; k ≡ t mod G. (6.25)
In our model, the fitness is determined by the gain/loss that each strategy gjk yields de-
pending on the RoI r(t). Since the fitness of a chromosome must to be maximized, negative
r(t) lead to very small values of gjk, i.e. a low proportion of investment, whereas positive
r(t) lead to larger values of gjk. This lets us consider the product of r(t)gjk as a performance
measure of a chromosome in accordance with the budget dynamics of Eq. (6.1).
The values of gjk are always multiplied by different r(t) values i.e. depending on t. For
the chromosome, we define a further time scale τ in terms of generations. A generation is
completed after each gjk is multiplied by an RoI from consecutive time steps t. This means
that the index k refers to a particular time t in the following manner: k ≡ t mod G, which
means k = tˆ ∈ {1, G}, with t = tˆ+ τG, τ = 0, 1, 2, ....
After time τ , the population of chromosomes is replaced by a new population of better
fitting chromosomes with the same population size C. This new population is selected
from the previous population in the following manner: after calculating the fitness of each
chromosome according to Eq. (6.25), we find the best chromosomes from the old population
by applying elitist and tournament selection of size two:
• Elitist selection considers the best percentage s of the population which is found
by ranking the chromosomes according to their fitness. The best chromosomes are
directly transferred to the new population.
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• Tournament selection is done by randomly choosing two pairs of two chromosomes
from the old population and then selecting from each pair the one with the higher
fitness. These two chromosomes are not simply transfered to the new population, but
undergo a transformation based on the genetic operators crossover and mutation, as
follows: the single-point crossover operator finds the cross point, or cut point, in the
two chromosomes beyond which the genetic material from two parents is exchanged
to form two new chromosomes. This cut point is the integer part of a random number
drawn from a uniform distribution pc ∈ U(1, G).
After the crossover, a mutation operator is applied to each gene of the newly formed
chromosomes. With a given mutation probability pm ∈ U(0, 1), a gene is to be mutated by
replacing its value with a random number from a uniform distribution U(qmin, qmax). After
the cycle of selection, crossover and mutation is completed, we arrive at a new population
of chromosomes that consists of a percentage of the best fitted chromosomes from the old
population plus a number of new chromosomes that ensure further possibilities for the
evolution of the set of strategies.
Given the optimized population of chromosomes representing a set of possible strategies,
the agent still needs to update its actual proportion of investment q(t). This is done as
follows: at time t = τ , the agent takes the set of strategies gjk from the chromosome j with
the highest fitness in the previous generation. Given G = T , this means that the agent
for each time step of the upcoming cyclic change chooses the appropriate proportion of
investment by computing the following:
qGA(t) = gjk with j = arg (maxj=1,...,C fj) ; k ≡ t mod G. (6.26)
In the following section we will adjust the respective parameters of each of these strategies
so that they lead to maximal gains. This is crucial if we want to compare the performance
of these different investment strategies – because a fair comparison can be only assured if
the strategies are performing at their best.
6.7. Summary
In this chapter, different investment strategies were presented that can be applied by agents
in an investment market scenario with periodic returns and different types and levels of
noise. Note that for the strategies presented in this chapter, three different levels of infor-
mation available for the agent were considered: no knowledge (CP strategy), partial knowl-
edge (MA, MLS, IUR and GA strategies) and complete knowledge (RR and SW strategies).
For simplicity, according to the level of available information, different type of investment
strategies have been chosen from simple approaches like constant proportion of investment,
technical analysis and evolutionary approaches. In this PhD thesis, a risk-neutral approach
is considered for the strategies; however, note that in economics, the risk-averse and risk-
seeking approaches are more revised and the decision to increase or decrease the amount of
investment depends on the variance of the returns. For further details, see some contribu-
tions on behavior towards risk [Arrow, 1965; Hens and Schenk-Hoppé, 2006; Hnilica, 2002;
Pratt, 1964; Tobin, 1958].
On the other hand, note that different investment strategies may also be proposed based
on different types of available information. For example, it is usually assumed that there
exist two types of investors in the stock market:
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• Fundamentalist - consider the fundamental values of a company and believe that all
market moves are driven by basic changes within the industry or world conditions.
• Technicians - also called chartists, use technical tools to predict the movement of
prices.
In this chapter, the methods of Moving Averages Section 6.5.1 and Moving Least Squares
Section 6.5.2, were considered to find the tendency of the returns. However, other more
complex methods using Moving Averages are used to find the tendency of the returns. For
example, if we consider Moving Averages with different window sizes, whenever a Moving
Average is traversed, this may indicate a change in the tendency. Chartists also use different
types of market patterns that predict changes in the tendency of the prices, for example the
use of support and resistance lines. When the price reaches the support(resistance) bound-
ary, the market (which may be understood like the will of thousand of investors) considers
that the price is too low/high and more investors may be willing to start buying/selling
their stocks. Moreover, there are also different figures which are used by chartists to predict
asset prices, for example the double-peak and double-valley figures are two typical patterns
for predicting changes in tendency. Another example is the pattern head-and-shoulders
pattern which anticipates a decay of the asset price. Extra information like volume is also
useful for chartists. Here, a decay in volume together with a decay in the price confirms
the decaying tendency.
Finally, it would be also interesting to include investment strategies based on Value Func-
tions from Prospect Theory [Kahneman and Tversky, 1979], which are based, as mentioned
earlier, on the fact that people tend to perceive losses to be twice as large as profits (see
[Edwards, 1996; Kahneman and Tversky, 1992; Takahashi and Terano, 2003]). However,
all these different approaches that we briefly mentioned are beyond the scope of this thesis
and are left for further work.
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Noisy Periodic Environments
This chapter compares the performance of different agent strategies. The performance is
measured by the average budget growth obtained after a certain number of time steps. Results
are presented for extensive computer simulations, in which it is shown that for exogenous
returns with periodicity: (i) a daring behavior outperforms the cautious behavior, and (ii) the
genetic algorithm is able to find the optimal investment strategy by itself, thus outperforming
the other strategies considered.
7.1. Introduction
In the previous chapter, different investment strategies for noisy periodic environments were
presented. Now, in this chapter, the performance of the different strategies is compared and
analyzed.
This chapter is organized as follows. Firstly, Section 7.2 shows the optimal parameter
adjustment for the strategies presented in the previous chapter. And secondly, in Section 7.3
the performance of the strategies for different types and levels of noise is compared and
analyzed.
7.2. Parameter Tuning
In the previous chapter, different strategies were presented. These strategies can be used
by an agent to adjust its investment proportion q(t), i.e. to determine two important tasks:
when and how much money to invest in the market. As mentioned earlier, the main goal
in this chapter is to compare the performance of these strategies in a periodic environment.
However, in order to make this comparison meaningful, we have to ensure that we have
adjusted the different parameters of the strategies properly. Only if the strategies perform
at their optimum, can they really be compared. Thus, in this section, we deal with the
problem of finding the parameter values that lead to maximal gains for each strategy.
Furthermore, in order to find which are the optimal parameter values for each strategy,
we need to define what we mean by strategy optimality. For this, we choose to measure
the performance of agents as the average of their budget growth over a certain number of
time steps. The optimal strategy is the strategy that performs better than all the other
strategies, i.e. the strategy that, on average, leads to the greatest budget growth.
More precisely, we assume that a strategy is optimal in a given time interval, {tstart, tend},
if it leads to the maximum total budget during that interval, where a large value is chosen
for tend, e.g. tend = 104 time steps in most of the experiments, to avoid intermediate effects.
The starting value tstart has to be chosen in such a way that each agent has enough time to
gather the information necessary for the proper calibration of the algorithm that it applies.
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Therefore, we have set tstart = T in order to ensure that the agent will have gathered at
least a cycle of the RoI.
When evaluating the strategies, we have to consider that their performance is also in-
fluenced by stochastic effects because of the RoI, Eq. (6.2). This means that we have to
average the simulation over a large number of trials Na = 103 where each trial simulates
an agent acting independently with the same set of strategy parameters. More specifically,
the performance of an agent in a single trial corresponds to the average budget at the end
of each RoI’s period, T ; afterwards, an average is taken over a number of trials to diminish
noise effects. Mathematically this can be expressed as follows:
〈x〉 = 1
Na
Na∑
i=1
1
I
I∑
k=0
x(k T ) ; I = tend − tstart
T
. (7.1)
For convenience, in Eq. (7.1), the total budget has been normalized by the number of
cycles or periods of the RoI, I. This is done for the following three reasons. In the first
place, for a constant investment action and a return function with no noise, this average
value will have zero standard deviation. In contrast, if we take the average growth over
all of the time steps, there will be a non-zero standard deviation associated with the sine
wave. Secondly, if the agent’s strategy is able to forecast the next RoI correctly, then
the agent’s budget may reach very high values in a very short time. This can be seen
in the dynamics of Eq. (6.1), where the budget can be doubled at each time step if an
appropriate q(t) and r(t) are provided. In the computer simulations this would lead to
numerical overflows. Therefore, we have chosen to reinitialize the budget after each cycle
of the RoI, i.e. x(k T ) = x(0) ; k = 1, 1, .., I, (which applies to all simulations, to ensure
comparison). Thirdly, if returns have noise on the phase and the performance is measured
at the end of each cycle, it can be shown that the initial phase value does not modify the
average budget obtained at the end of a cycle (see Appendix 10.2).
Thus, the procedure that we apply to find the optimal parameters is straightforward: we
compare the performance – averaged over 103 periods – of each of the algorithms for a range
of possible parameters and then choose the optimal one.
Moreover, we first consider the case where the agent adjusts its proportion of investment
according to a cautious behavior, RA (for simplicity also called risk-avoiding behavior), and
we assume that the agent receives RoI with no phase noise σ1 = 0 for different amplitude
noise levels σ2.
7.2.1. For Reference Strategies
For the reference strategy CP, Eq. (6.7), there is no need to optimize any parameters
because as it was shown in Section 3.2, small constant proportion of investments lead to
larger profits in scenarios with random returns. Thus, an agent using the strategy CP has
the minimum allowed constant proportion of investment q = qmin = 0.1. For the reference
strategy RR, Eq. (6.8), however, we note that we are required to find the best4h, Eq. (6.9),
for every noise level. Recalling Fig. 6.5 (right), the interval for which returns are certain to
be positive can be obtained by calculating ε for the given noise levels and the periodicity of
the returns using Eq. 6.12. Fig.7.1 (left) shows, for returns with periodicity T = 100 and
different amplitude noise σ2 the ε values obtained using Eq. 6.11. This is used to determine
the interval in which returns are certain to be positive. For example, for σ2 = 0.1 and no
noise on the phase σ1 = 0, it can be seen that ε = 1.77 leads to the interval tˆ ∈ [2, 48],
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in which returns are certain to be positive. Note that, for σ1 + σ2 ≥ 0.5, this leads to an
ε ≥ T/4, which means that there is no interval in which returns are certain to be positive.
Figure 7.1.: For returns with periodicity T = 100 and different amplitude noise levels σ2:
(left) different ε values, Eq. (6.12), used to find the interval where returns are
certain to be positive; and (right) average budget obtained using strategy RR,
Eq. (6.8) for different 4h values, used to determine the proper q(t), Eq. (6.9).
Now, in order to elucidate the performance of these previous approaches for the strategies
RR, Eq. (6.8), and SW, Eq. (6.13), consider an agent with initial budget x(0) = 10, the
wealth dynamics as described in Eq. (6.1) and the following parameters for both strategies:
qmin = 0.1 and qmax = 1.0.
If the agent uses strategy SW, we find that for returns with no noise, r(t) = sin(2pit/T ),
T = 100 and that after t = 100 time steps the budget of the agent would be x(100) = 6.746×
109. Now, assuming that returns have some amplitude noise, σ2 = 0.1, and periodicity
T = 100, it can be seen that after t = 100 time steps, in the worst case, Eq. (6.10), the
strategy SW leads to the budget x(100) = 1.489× 109.
On the other hand, if the agent uses the strategy RR and maps the time difference 4h
with the intervals where returns are certain to be positive, Eq. (6.11), as follows:
4h = ε, (7.2)
then, it can be shown that for T = 100 and σ = 0.1, returns are certain to be positive for
time steps in the range [2, 48] and at the end of a cycle, this strategy would lead to a budget
of x(100) = 1.226× 109. Note that the latter is less than the budget that can be obtained
using the strategy SW for the same scenario. Furthermore, for σ2 = 0.5, if (despite the
noise) the agent decides to use the strategy SW, this leads after t = 100 time steps to the
budget x(100) = 1.373 × 106. It can be shown that for an agent using the strategy RR
and deciding to invest all its budget in the intervals [2, 48], [10, 40], [24, 26]}, these lead to
the budgets x(100) = {1.23 × 106, 116015, 13.41}, respectively. This means that even for
returns with large levels of noise, from these examples we may think that the best strategy
is to increase the proportion of investment once the returns are more likely to be positive
than negative (SW strategy) and not only for the returns that are certain to be positive
(RR strategy using Eq. (7.2)). These statement is corroborated in Fig. 7.1 (right), where
we show the average budget obtained from some simulations of the dynamics for different
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4h values and different amplitude noise levels. Thus, based on visual impression, we now
find by means of simulations that the best parameter value for the strategy RR is 4h = 1,
i.e. the strategy SW, Eq. (6.13). Curiously, even for large noise levels, if the agent wants to
increase his profits it is much better to increase/decrease the proportion of investment than
slowly. Recalling that the goal of the agents in our simulations is to maximize the budget
and not to minimize the loss, then it may be clear that even with large fluctuations it is
better for the agents to bet for a win than for a loss.
Note that for the reasons presented previously, we include the strategy SW and exclude
the strategy RR from our performance comparison in Section 7.3.
7.2.2. For Strategies Based on Technical Analysis
The main parameter in the two investment strategies presented in Section 6.5 is the memory
size M . This parameter plays an important role on the estimation of returns, for example
if the memory is large, there would be cases for which the probability that current returns
are positive is large, but given that there are still negative returns in the memory of the
agent, the agent may estimate a negative return yielding a decrease in the proportion of
investment. On the other hand, it may occur that current returns are negative, but given
the large memory, the agent is still accounting for previous positive returns, which may
lead the agent to estimate a positive return and to increase the proportion of investment;
consequently the agent may turn a loss. In other words, a large memory is not always
advantageous because the agent may still remember positive returns even if the current
cycle has large negative returns and vice versa.
For Strategy Using Moving Averages
We begin our analysis by showing the proportion of investment for an agent using the MA
strategy, see Eq. (6.14), for different memory size values. Fig. 7.2 (left, bottom) shows the
evolution of the proportion of investment q(t) for different M values for returns with no
noise Fig. 7.2 (left, top).
Figure 7.2.: (above) Periodic returns with T = 100 and no noise and (bottom) proportion of
investment values, both using (left) MA and (right) MLS strategies for different
memory size M .
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It is clear, that for small memory sizes, the correspondence between proportion of invest-
ment values and return is much better than for large memory sizes, for which the lag is also
large. It is also important to note that the amplitude of the proportion of investment value
decreases if the memory is large. However, if returns have noise, performing an average
with a large memory may help to account for the fluctuations in the returns and to allow
agents to avoid investing too much when estimations are negative.
Thus, in order to find the proper memory size M , we first assumed RoIs with different
amplitude fluctuations, σ2 = 0.1, 0.3, 0.5, 0.7, and no phase fluctuations, σ1 = 0. After-
wards, using the Monte Carlo Simulation approach in Eq. (7.1), some experiments for an
agent using a moving average strategy were performed for different memory size values and
for different noise values.
Fig. 7.3 (left) shows the average of the budget of the agent using strategy MA for different
memory size values and for different amplitude noise level σ2. It is clear that the performance
is much better for smaller memory sizes than for larger memory sizes. Thus, based on visual
impression, a proper memory size value for the strategy MA is M = 2.
Furthermore, for the scenario with no amplitude noise, σ2 = 0 and different phase fluc-
tuations, the best memory size value was M = 5.
For Strategy Using Moving Least Squares
As for theMA strategy, Fig. 7.2 (right, bottom) shows the different proportion of investment
values using strategy MLS, see Eq. (6.14), for different memory size values. As expected,
for small memory size values, both strategies MLS and MA behave almost the same. Also
note that for both strategies, the larger the memory size, the larger the lag over time.
However, we note that for some memory size values, the intervals with maximal proportion
of investment values using MLS are larger than for the MA strategy, which may lead to
higher profits for small noise levels. This occurs because for positive increasing returns,
large memory sizes may lead to return estimates much larger than rˆ = 1, due to the fact
that the proportion of investment is constrained to be in the range q ∈ (0, 1), see Eq. (6.20).
This saturation effect on q values occurs for large memory sizes, see Fig. 7.2 (right, bottom).
Again, we investigate the best memory size value that should be used for this strategy,
using Eq. (7.1). Fig. 7.3 (right) shows the average of the agent’s budget for different memory
size values and for different amplitude noise levels σ2.
Based on visual impression, the memory size of M ≈ 37, leads to the highest profits
when using the strategy MLS. It can be seen that the strategy MLS leads to higher profits
than the MA strategy. This occurs because of the saturation effect discussed previously,
see Fig. 7.2 (right, bottom).
Also for the scenario with no amplitude noise, σ2 = 0 and different phase fluctuations,
it was found empirically that M ≈ 37 was the best memory size value. Furthermore,
some experiments were performed for different periodicity T and no noise and it was found
experimentally that when using the strategyMLS, the relationship between the best memory
size M and the periodicity T are proportional; M/T ≈ 0.37. This is shown in Fig. 7.4 for
returns with different T with no amplitude and no phase noise.
Moreover, if no noise is assumed, the problem is analytically tractable. For this, we note
that for a periodic return as in Eq. (6.2) with parameters A = 1 and σ1 = σ2 = 0, the MLS
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Figure 7.3.: Average of the agent’s budget for strategies: (left) MA and (right) MLS ; for
different memory sizes and different amplitude noise levels. Parameters: T =
100, σ1 = 0, t = 104, Na = 103.
strategy estimates the next return rˆ(t+ 1) as follows:
rˆ(t+ 1) = sin (ω t)− sin (ω (t−M))
ω t− ω (t−M) (7.3)
= M + 1
M
[sin (ω t)− sin (ω (t−M))] , (7.4)
where ω = 2piT . Now, by calculating the average profits 〈r q〉 for the positive cycle of the
returns for q as in Eq. (6.20), we find:
〈r q〉 =
∫ T/2
0
r(t) q(t)dt (7.5)
= M + 1
M
∫ T/2
0
[sin (ω t) (sin (ω t)− sin (ω (t−M)))] dt (7.6)
= T (M + 1− cos (ωM))4M . (7.7)
Fig. 7.4 (right) shows the resulting memory size values for Eq. 7.5. Note that the memory
size that leads to maximum profits can be found by derivation of 〈r q〉 w.r.t M , which leads
to:
∂M 〈r(t) q(t)〉 =
−T sin (ω2 M)2 + piM sin (ωM)
2M2 . (7.8)
The memory size, M?, that maximizes the profits can be calculated by solving
∂M 〈r(t) q(t)〉 = 0 for M , which using Taylor series to the 6th order for the sinusoidal
functions leads to the following expression [Navarro-Barrientos, 2008b]:
M? =
√
3
2
pi
T. (7.9)
Consequently, for T = 100, the theoretical optimal memory size isM? ≈ 38, which is pretty
near to the previous empirical result shown in Fig. 7.3 (right). Interestingly, the proportion
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Figure 7.4.: For strategy MLS, both plots show for different memory size M and no noise:
(left) agent’s budget for returns with different periodicity T and (right) analyt-
ical calculation of the average of profits. Note that the largest 〈x〉 and 〈r q〉 is
reached for the memory size values as in Eq. (7.9).
M/T ≈ 0.37 was found by means of computer simulations (see Fig. 7.4 (left)), in which
it can be seen that the best memory sizes in the simulations pretty well approximate the
proportion M/T =
√
3
2/pi = 0.389 found analytically.
7.2.3. For Machine Learning Approaches
For Strategy using Incremental Update Rule
The strategy IUR, Eq. (6.24), has only one parameter, the step size γ. Fig. 7.5 (left, bottom)
shows the evolution of the investment propensity values q(t) for different γ values and for
returns with no noise Fig. 7.5 (left, top). Note that for smaller γ values, there is a lag of
the q(t) values w.r.t the positive returns. Fig. 7.5 (right) shows the average of the agent’s
budget using this strategy vs. different γ values, for different amplitude noise level σ2. In
order to make a fair comparison between strategies, no strategies can include information
about noise or periodicity to change their parameter values. Because of this, we conclude
that a proper step size value for this strategy is of γ = 0.5.
GA Configuration
For the parameter tuning of the GA, first note that in the case of a periodically changing
environment, Eq. (6.2), the optimal performance for the GA is obtained if the length of
the chromosomes G is chosen to be equal to the periodicity T . Then, each gene matches
with one of the returns values on the seasonal cycle, which allows the GA to converge to
an optimal set of strategies more quickly.
The parameter values for which a GA finds a solution in less time most often depends on
the optimization problem. Usually, when trying to configure meta-heuristic algorithms like
the GA, one chooses a number of initial solutions which do not require too much computer
time and memory consumption. Moreover, one usually chooses a large probability of re-
combination, a smaller probability for random mutations and a moderate elitism percentage
[Goldberg, 1989; Michalewiçz, 1999]. For example, Fig. 7.6 plots the values of the RoI r(t)
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Figure 7.5.: For strategy IUR, Eq. (6.24): (left-top) RoI of the form Eq. 6.2 with T = 100
and (left-bottom) proportion of investment values q(t); (right) average of the
agent’s budget for different step size γ and different amplitude noise levels.
Parameters: as in Fig. 7.2.
and the corresponding proportion of investments q(t) as chosen by the GA over time for
different noises and for different time steps tn. The parameter values chosen for the GA for
these simulations were: number of chromosomes C = 100, probability of crossover pc = 0.8,
probability of mutation pm = 0.1 and percentage of elitism s = 0.3. From the graph, it is
visible that the behavior of the GA resembles the Ramp-Rectangle strategy presented in
Section 6.4.2 and for the reader with a background in signal processing techniques, these
strategies may resemble to those figures obtained when using matched filters for signal
recovery (see [Turing, 1960] for further details).
It is well known that the configuration of most meta-heuristic algorithms requires both
complex experimental designs and high computational effort. For this, the program
+CARPS (Multi-agent System for Configuring Algorithms in Real Problem Solving) [Mon-
ett, 2004a,b; Monett-Diaz, 2004] was used to find the best parameters for the GA. This
application uses autonomous, distributed, cooperative agents that search for solutions to a
configuration problem, thereby fine-tuning the meta-heuristic’s parameters.
This approach was used to configure the GA for periodic returns with T = 100, σ2 = 0
and different levels of noise on the amplitude: σ2 = {0.1, 0.3, 0.5, 0.7}. In this process,
four GA parameters were optimized: the population size C, the crossover probability
pc, the mutation probability pm and the elitism size s. Their intervals of definition,
in which the most acceptable GA configurations should be found, were set as follows:
C ∈ {50, 100, 200, 500, 1000}, pc ∈ [0.0, 1.0], pm ∈ [0.0, 1.0], and s ∈ [0.0, 0.5], respectively.
The agents in +CARPS apply a Random Restart Hill-Climbing approach and they ex-
change their current best solutions to the problem in the process. Furthermore, the eval-
uation of the GA with a particular configuration is repeated five times in order to cope
with its stochastic nature. Table 7.1 presents the best configurations obtained for the GA
according to their fitness using the periodic returns previously mentioned. Notice that the
fitness of a configuration, F (Cfgi) for i = {1, 2, 3}, corresponds to the inverse value of the
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(a) (b)
(c) (d)
Figure 7.6.: Values of the return r(t) and the proportion of investment q(t) as chosen by
the GA for RoI with different types of noise and for different times during the
simulation: (a) amplitude noise, σ1 = 0, σ2 = 0.5, tn ≈ 10, 000, (b) amplitude
noise, σ1 = 0, σ2 = 0.5, tn ≈ 100, 000, (c) phase noise, σ1 = 0.5, σ2 = 0,
tn ≈ 10, 000, (d) phase noise, σ1 = 0.5, σ2 = 0, tn ≈ 100, 000.
sum of fitness values of the chromosomes with the highest fitness in each generation fj(τ):
F (Cfgi) =
[
τ∑
m=0
maxj=1,...,C fj(m)
]−1
(7.10)
Configuration Cfg3 was used to configure the GA during the simulations performed for
the periodic returns. It can be observed in Table 7.1 that the following is desired for better
performance of the evolution-based strategy : large individual population, high crossover
probability, low mutation probability and moderate elitism size.
7.2.4. For Daring Behavior
The same approach was used to find the optimal parameters values for strategies using a
daring behavior (RS) Eq. (6.23) for different amplitude noise levels. For example Fig. 7.7
shows the most proper memory size values for strategies MA and MLS. Note that for the
MA strategy as well as for RA behavior, the memory size remains small. However, for
the MLS strategy and recalling our simulation results and derivation for RA, we note that
the best memory size for a RS behavior differs from the previous, which in this case is
M ≈ 25. Based on visual impression, both MA and MLS strategies, like the RA behavior,
when used with a RS behavior, lead to fewer fluctuations in the budget. Furthermore, some
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Table 7.1.: Best obtained GA configurations when using +CARPS for no phase noise, σ1 =
0, and different amplitude noise level σ2.
Noise level σ2 = 0.1 σ2 = 0.3 σ2 = 0.5
Number of chromosomes C = 1000 C = 500 C = 1000
Probability of crossover pc = 0.830 pc = 0.951 pc = 0.70
Probability of mutation pm = 0.0324 pm = 0.062 pm = 0.010
Percentage of elitism s = 0.0333 s = 0.432 s = 0.030
Fitness F (Cfg1) = 0.05276 F (Cfg2) = 0.05436 F (Cfg3) = 0.05340
other experiments were performed for the MLS strategy with a RS behavior for different
periodicities T and different noise levels. From these experiments it can be seen that the
best memory size is:
M? ≈ T/4. (7.11)
Figure 7.7.: Average of budget for strategies: (left) MA and (right) MLS for different mem-
ory sizes and different amplitude noise levels. Parameters: as in Fig. 7.2.
A number of simulations for the strategy IUR were also performed to find the best
parameter values when a RS behavior is assumed. The results obtained lead to similar
optimal parameter values as for RA behavior, as it can be seen in Fig. 7.8 for different
amplitude noise levels. From an engineers’ approach, the optimal γ value for the IUR
strategy with RS behavior is considered to be the same as for the RA behavior, i.e. γ = 0.5.
7.3. Comparison of Results
In this section, the performance of all investment strategies presented in the previous chapter
for RoI with periodicity are compared for different types and levels of noise. For the
comparison, a set of agents is considered each one using one of the following strategies:
Constant Proportion Of Investment CP Eq. (6.7), Square-Wave SW Eq. (6.13) (a particular
case of the strategy Ramp-Rectangle RR Eq. (6.8) with 4h = 1), Moving Average MA
Eq. (6.14), Moving Least Squares MLS Eq. (6.17), Iterative Update Rule IUR Eq. (6.22)
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Figure 7.8.: Average of agent’s budget for strategy IUR, Eq. (6.23), for different step size γ
and for different amplitude noise levels. Parameters: as in Fig. 7.2.
and Genetic Algorithm GA Eq. (6.26).
7.3.1. Assumptions and Simulation Parameters
For the comparison, the following two important assumptions are considered: first, all
agents receive the same RoI at a particular time, i.e. the fact that some agents win or lose
more than others is influenced only by their different strategies for determining the correct
proportion of investment value; second, all agents use the optimal parameter values of their
respective strategies.
A number of N = 100 trials of the same experiment are performed. For each trial, a
RoI with the same parameter values is considered. At the end of each cycle of the RoI, the
average of the budget in the 100 trials is calculated. This is done for a large number of time
steps, i.e. t = 105. Two different experiments are considered. In the first experiment, the
level of the amplitude noise σ2 is varied and the noise on the phase level is fixed to σ1 = 0.
In the second experiment, the level of the phase noise σ1 is varied and the amplitude noise is
fixed to σ2 = 0. Finally, these two experiments are performed for both daring and cautious
behaviors for the prediction of the RoI. This gives us four variants of the simulations.
7.3.2. Simulation Results and Interpretation
Fig. 7.9 shows the result of these simulations by plotting the average budget resulting from
the different strategies against the noise level for each of the four variants of the simulations.
The following results can be seen from these graphs [Navarro-Barrientos et al., 2008a]:
• For all variants of the simulations, the CP strategy is the worst strategy and the SW
strategy is the best strategy. This is not surprising – the CP strategy always puts
a constant proportion of the budget at stake which yields a win when the return is
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Figure 7.9.: Average budget over N = 100 trials, for agents using strategies CP, MA, MLS,
GA, IUR and SW, over t = 105 time steps. Agents use optimal parameter values
for RoI with periodicity T = 100 and different noise levels: (top-left) different
amplitude noise levels σ2 ∈ (0, 1) and no noise on the phase σ1 = 0 with an
RS (daring) behavior; (top-right) different phase noise levels σ1 ∈ (0, 1) and no
amplitude noise σ2 = 0 with an RS (daring) behavior; (bottom-left) different
noise on amplitude levels σ2 ∈ (0, 1), and no phase noise σ1 = 0 with an RA
(cautious) behavior and (bottom-right) different phase noise levels σ1 ∈ (0, 1)
and no amplitude noise σ2 = 0 with an RA (cautious) behavior.
positive, but a loss when the return is negative even though 〈1 + r(t)q(t)〉 = 1. This
leads to a loss in budget over time, as is well known for multiplicative stochastic
processes, see Section 3.2. Moreover, the SW strategy has complete knowledge about
the periodicity of the return, so it can always invest the appropriate amount.
• For all strategies, the average budget decreases with increasing noise. This is expected:
with increasing noise, the accuracy of the predictions made by the agents decreases,
and thus they cannot necessarily chose the appropriate proportion of investment in
the action.
• There are no significant cross-overs of the performance of different strategies. In
general, this implies that if a strategy s1 performs better than a strategy s2 for a
given noise level σa (either on the phase or on the amplitude), s1 can be expected
to perform better than s2 for a different noise level σb. Consequently, the choice of
strategy is independent of the noise in the return – a good strategy is a good strategy
for all noise levels and a bad strategy is a bad strategy for all noise levels. However,
for low noise levels, the GA is slightly outperformed by the other strategies – this
is due to the intrinsic stochastic nature of the algorithm. For the same reason, this
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algorithm performs better for high noise levels.
• From the range of strategies employed, the simple strategies (MA, MLS, IUR) were
almost always outperformed by the complex one (GA). However, some researchers
have shown that this needs not necessarily be the case for more complex scenarios like
in artificial exchange markets [Farmer, 2001; Farmer et al., 2005].
• The GA approaches the optimal strategy. Considering that the GA does not have an
a priori behavior, it is interesting to realize that it discovers the optimal strategy –
investing the maximum when, at a particular time t in the period, the probability of
winning is higher than losing and vice versa – on its own.
• For low levels of noise, the daring behavior clearly outperforms the cautious behavior:
always investing the maximum when a positive return is expected and investing the
minimum when a negative return is expected outperforms investing a quantity pro-
portional to the expected return. This may seem counter-intuitive. Even though the
best strategy is to still invest the maximum when there is a slightly larger probability
that r(t) > 0 than that r(t) ≤ 0. All strategies except for the GA fail to predict the
exact probabilities of r(t) > 0 and r(t) ≤ 0 with enough accuracy to determine how
to properly invest. Since the GA does not exhibit the prediction-action behavior, it
is better than the other strategies.
• For phase noise, the average budget obtained is roughly comparable than for amplitude
noise, although the differences between strategies are greater for phase noise than for
noise on the amplitude.
7.4. Summary
In this chapter, we have compared the performance of different investment strategies that
can be applied by agents in an investment market scenario with periodic returns and dif-
ferent types and levels of noise. For each strategy, the parameter values that lead to larger
average budget values were found by means of simulations. The performance of these
strategies – the respective average budget growth over a certain number of time steps – was
compared and the results were analyzed.
Probably, the most interesting fact in this study is that, while it seems intuitive to invest
an amount proportional to the expected return, this is not the approach which yields the
greatest budget growth over time. On the contrary, a “gambling” approach of always
investing the whole budget as soon as the probability of a positive return is greater than
the probability of a negative, results in a greater budget growth over time. Surprisingly,
the genetic algorithm discovers this strategy and for these reasons, it is also the algorithm
which best approximates the optimal strategy.
Finally, we note also that beside +CARPS, different methods could be used for the meta-
heuristics used for the Genetic Algorithm, for example the use of ant colonies, see [Dorigo
and Caro, 1999].
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8. Adaptive Investment Strategies for
Changing Periodic Environments
This chapter presents an adaptive investment strategy based on a genetic algorithm for cyclic
changing environments and compares its performance in an environment characterized by
returns with changing periodicities.
8.1. Introduction
The main goal of the previous chapter was to show how the complexity of the agent,
the memory size and the available information influence the performance of the agent for
different types and levels of noise in stationary periodic environments. The performance of
the different types of strategies was based on the total budget obtained by the agent after
a number of time steps. In the last chapter, it was assumed that all strategies knew the
periodicity of the returns. In this chapter, these previous investigations are extended to
find the best investment strategy for returns with changing periodicity, i.e. non-stationary
periodic environments.
It was shown in Section 7.3 that the GA strategy presented in Section 6.6.2 outperformed
the other strategies. In this chapter, the complexity of the strategy GA is extended by al-
lowing the chromosomes to have a different length and considering more complex cross-over
and mutation operators so that the algorithm may find the best investment strategies for
the current periodicity and noise level of the returns. In other words, in this chapter, an
adaptive investment strategy based on a Genetic Algorithm for changing periodic environ-
ments is presented, which for simplicity is called GACE (Genetic Algorithm for Changing
Environments).
For the testbed scenario, the investment model described in Eq. (6.1) is used to model an
agent which decides at every time step the proportion of wealth to invest in a risky asset,
keeping the rest of the budget in a risk-free asset. Every investment is evaluated in the
market via a stylized return on investment function (RoI), which is modeled by a stochastic
process with unknown periodicities and different levels of noise. Like before, two refer-
ence strategies are considered; these represent the case of agents with zero-knowledge and
complete-knowledge of the dynamics of the returns (see Section 6.4). From the strategies
based on technical analysis methods presented in Section 6.5, it was shown in Section 7.3
that the investment strategy based on Moving Least Squares (MLS) performed better than
the other technical strategies. Because of this, in this chapter, only the MLS strategy is
considered.
The structure of this chapter is as follows: Section 8.2 presents some background on adap-
tive investment strategies for changing environments and Section 8.3 presents the adaptive
investment strategy called GACE that extends the strategy based on a Genetic Algorithm
presented in Section 6.6.2. In Section 8.4 we present the results obtained for different
computer experiments. In order to understand the way in which GACE adapts to its en-
vironment, the computer experiments are performed in a controlled scenario where the
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dynamics of the environment are known. For that reason, it is assumed that the risky asset
is modeled by a stochastic process with changing periodicity and different levels of noise,
i.e. stylized exogenous returns, presented in Section 8.4.1. The experiments to account
for the performance of the investment strategies are divided into two sections. First, in
Section 8.4.2, the performance of GACE for returns with fixed periodicity is revisited and
investigated in more detail and in Section 8.4.3, the performance of the different strategies
is compared for returns with changing periodicity.
8.2. Background
Many researchers have used different machine learning methods to find good investment
strategies in different type of stochastic environments. For example, Magdon-Ismail et al.
[2001] used neural networks to find patterns from financial time series, where the main goal
is to find changes in volatility. Moreover, Geibel and Wysotzki [2005] proposed the use
of a risk-sensitive reinforcement learning algorithm to find the best policy for controlling
under constraints. The authors applied this approach to control a feed tank with stochastic
inflows. Other techniques from machine learning that are frequently used for investment
decision problems are those based on evolutionary computation. For example, those using
genetic programming and genetic algorithms for portfolio management, inducing rules for
bankruptcy prediction and assigning credit scoring [Dawid, 1999]. Some investment strate-
gies based on genetic programming techniques usually lead to profitable trading strategies,
however, they usually find strategies which are difficult to understand and sometimes they
cannot be funded [Jiang and Szeto, 2003; Neely et al., 1997; Schulenburg and Ross, 1999,
2001]. Even though investment strategies that are based on genetic algorithms may be
also difficult to abstract and to explain, we believe that they are more natural and un-
derstandable than those using genetic programming techniques [Drake and Marks, 2002].
However, many of these approaches are applied to environments that are stationary; this
means that some of them cannot be directly applied to changing environments. There are
some researchers who have investigated the use of genetic algorithms in changing environ-
ments [Branke, 1999; Grefenstette, 1992]. However, to our knowledge, standard genetic
algorithms have not been applied specifically to the problem of controlling the proportion
of investment in investment environments with changing periodicities.
The investigations in this chapter may also draw interest in the research area of pattern
recognition of time series. In particular, for the cases in which there is no prior knowledge
of the existence of a periodic signal or of its characteristics, see [Alvarez et al., 2001; Szpiro,
1997]. Note that with some changes on the proposed adaptive algorithm GACE, a useful
algorithm could be proposed for the detection and measurement of periodic signal in time
series.
8.3. Adaptive Investment Strategy
In this section, we present an adaptive investment strategy based on a Genetic Algorithm
for controlling proportions of investment in changing periodic environments. For simplicity,
we call this strategy Genetic Algorithm for Changing Environments (GACE).
In Section 6.6.2, a strategy based on a Genetic Algorithm (GA) was presented. This
strategy was able to find the best proportion of investment for returns with fixed periodicity.
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In this section, this approach is extended for returns with changing periodicity [Navarro-
Barrientos, 2007, 2008a,b].
8.3.1. Encoding Scheme
As, in Section 6.6.2, the GA is populated with chromosomes j = 1, ..., C, where each
chromosome j has an array of genes gjk where k = 0, ..., Gj − 1, and Gj is the length of
the chromosome j. Note that now, the chromosome has a variable length in comparison
with the specification of the chromosome with fixed length in Section 6.6.2. Thus, the
length of a chromosome is now assumed to be in the range Gj ∈ (1, Gmax), where Gmax is a
parameter that specifies the maximal allowed number of genes in a chromosome. As it was
noted previously, the values of the genes could be binary, but for programming reasons we
use real values [Michalewiçz, 1999]. Again, each chromosome j represents a set of possible
strategies of an agent, i.e. each gjk corresponds to an proportion of investment.
8.3.2. Fitness Evaluation
Each chromosome j is evaluated after a given number of time steps by a fitness function,
fj(τ), which is defined as follows:
fj(τ) =
Gj−1∑
k=0
r(t) gjk ; k ≡ t mod Gj , (8.1)
where τ is a further time scale in terms of generations. When a generation is completed,
the chromosomes’ population is replaced by a new population of better fitted chromosomes
with the same population size C.
As noted previously, every gjk is multiplied by a different value of r(t) over time. This is
done in accordance with the investment model, Eq. (6.1).
8.3.3. Selection of a New Population
If we assume that the chromosomes have a fixed length Gj = Gmax, as in Section 6.6.2,
then the most proper number of time steps, teval, that have to elapse in order to evaluate
all chromosomes’ genes is teval = Gmax. In other words, the number of time steps needed
to evaluate the population is equal to the fixed length of the chromosomes.
Moreover, it can be shown that the population converges faster towards optimal pro-
portions of investment if the length of the chromosomes is equal to the periodicity of the
returns, Gmax = T . However, this previous assumption corresponds to the ideal case where
the agent knows a priori the periodicity of the returns and sets the length of all chromo-
somes to the value of the periodicity. Hence, the agent selects a new population after all
genes of all chromosomes are evaluated. Now, if the chromosomes have different lengths
the following question may arise: After how many time steps teval should a new generation
of chromosomes be obtained? In the following, we propose different approaches to answer
this question.
Time steps for evaluation
Different approaches can be proposed to determine the number of time steps teval that
should elapse to select a new generation of chromosomes. As mentioned above, the simplest
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approach, called GMaximum, is to select a new population after a fixed number of time
steps teval = Gmax have elapsed, where Gmax is the maximal possible length of a chromo-
some. Note that in this approach, all genes of all chromosomes in the population are being
evaluated. However, some computer experiments showed that such an approach leads to
slow convergence of the population. A different approach is to choose the number of time
steps for evaluation according to the length of the best chromosome in the population. This
approach is called GBestSelected, and it can be expressed mathematically as follows:
teval = Gl ; l = arg maxj=1..,C fj(t′eval), (8.2)
where t′eval is the number of time steps that the population has been evaluated in the
current generation. Some computer experiments showed that this approach leads to a
faster convergence of the population than when using GMaximum; however, if the length of
the best chromosome in the previous generation happens to be very large, this would lead
to a larger number of time steps in which the agent would be using this strategy only. This
would be disadvantageous for the agent if the environment has changed and the current
strategy leads to loses instead of profits for the current returns. Computer simulations
showed that a better approach is to choose the number of time steps needed for evaluation
according to the length of the best chromosome at every time step t. This approach is
called GBestCurrent, and can be expressed mathematically as follows:
teval = Gl ; l = arg maxj=1,..,C fj(t). (8.3)
Note that the last two approaches GBestSelected and GBestCurrent have the disadvan-
tage that they do not assure that all genes of all chromosomes are being evaluated; however,
from our point of view, good chromosomes would lead to a higher level of fitness than bad
ones from the very beginning of the evaluation. By coincidence, it can happen that poorly
fitted chromosomes lead to large profits in the beginning; however, in the long run, only
the best chromosomes will survive. Unless otherwise indicated, we assume in the following
that the approach GBestCurrent is used for the evaluation of the population.
Elitist and Tournament Selection
Once the time has come to select a new population, the question is: how is a new population
determined? As we did before for the strategy GA, after calculating the fitness of each
chromosome according to Eq. (8.1), the best chromosomes are selected by applying elitist
and tournament selection of size two (see Section 6.6.2).
Crossover and Mutation Operators
Once two chromosomes have been selected by means of the tournament selection, a simple
crossover operator exchanges genetic information between the two chromosomes, whatever
their sizes, by finding the cross-point with respect to the size of the shortest chromosome.
This is done by randomly selecting the cross-point or cut-point cp from the shortest chro-
mosome and exchanging with probability p = 0.5, the genetic material above or beyond
this cross point in the shortest chromosome with its counterpart in the largest chromosome.
However, this would mean that those genes in the largest chromosome beyond the length
of the shortest chromosome would be disregarded.
The limitations of conventional crossover in GA with variable length has already been
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addressed by some authors [Harvey, 1992], where neural networks or hierarchical tree-
structures are used to determine which genes should be exchanged between the chromo-
somes. However, for the purpose of this chapter and for the sake of simplicity, we propose
a modification of the standard GA crossover operator that better suits our demands.
Thus, we propose the use of a crossover operator called Proportional Exchange Crossover
(PEC) operator, which basically shrinks or stretches the genetic information between the
pair of chromosomes proportionally to their length. Basically, the crossover operator PEC
randomly selects the range of genetic information to be exchanged between two chromo-
somes and shrinks/stretches the genetic information from the longest/shortest to the short-
est/longest chromosome, respectively.
Algorithm 3 shows the PEC algorithm for all pair of parent-chromosomes being selected
via tournament selection. Note that a chromosome j is saved in an array with indexes in
the range 0 to Gj − 1.
Algorithm 3: Proportional Exchange Crossover (PEC) operator
foreach pair of parent-chromosomes do1
determine the shorter and the larger parent-chromosomes pas and pal with sizes Gs2
and Gl respectively
select randomly the cross-point cps ∈ Z for the short parent-chromosome:3
cps ∼ U(0, Gs − 1)
find the cross-point cpl ∈ Z for the large parent-chromosome: cpl = Gl cpsGs4
determine the proportion R ∈ Z between the two sizes: R = cplcps5
create two arrays, chs and chl, for the short and large children-chromosomes6
with equal probability choose the side for the crossover operation7
if crossover on the left side then8
stretch the genetic material from pas to chl as follows:9
for m = 0 to cps − 1 do10
for n = 0 to R− 1 do11
chl[m ·R+ n]← stretch(pas,m,R)12
end13
end14
shrink the genetic material from pal to chs as follows:15
foreach m = 0 to cps − 1 do16
chs[m]← shrink(pal,m,R)17
end18
else19
stretch as in line 12 but for the range m = cps to Gs − 1.20
shrink as in line 17 but for the range m = cps to Gs − 1.21
end22
copy directly the rest genetic material from the parents to the children23
chromosomes.
end24
Note that different functions could be considered for the transformation of the genetic
material between chromosomes with different length. For simplicity, in our computer ex-
periments we consider a PEC operator based on averaging and copying the genetic material
of the parent-chromosomes. This means that in Algorithm 3, for the implementation of
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GACE: in line 12 the following function is considered:
stretch(pa,m,R) = pa[m]. (8.4)
This function simply copies the genes from the short parent-chromosome to the large child-
chromosome; furthermore, in line 17 the following function is considered:
shrink(pa,m,R) = 1
R
m+R∑
i=m
pa[i]. (8.5)
This function performs an average of the genetic material. A more interesting option for
these transformations could be based on the dynamic time warping algorithm [Sankoff and
Kruskall, 1983], which is usually used for calculating the similarity between two signals.
With some modifications, this algorithm could be used to stretch or shrink the genetic
material proportionally to the original material; however, this is far from the scope of this
chapter.
To illustrate how the PEC operator works, Fig. 8.1 shows a graphical representation of
PEC applied to the left side of the cross-point. In this example, the cross-point of the
shortest chromosome is cps = 3. Consequently, using line 4 in Algorithm 3, we find that
the cross-point for the largest chromosome corresponds to cpl = 6. In this example, the
genes to the left of the shorter “parent” chromosome are generalized into the larger “child”
chromosome and the genes to the right of the cross-point are directly copied into the shorter
“child” chromosome. The same occurs for the genes in the larger “parent-chromosome”
with the main difference being that the value of the genes to the left are averaged and
not generalized. In the same manner, the cross-points in the “parent” chromosomes are
determined if the right side of the crossover is selected.
Figure 8.1.: Example of the Proportional-sized Exchange Crossover (PEC) operator. With
probability p = 0.5 the left side of the cut point is selected for exchange.
Now, to make sure that diverse chromosome lengths are present in the population of
chromosomes, a mutation operator is introduced for the length of the chromosome Gj . For
this, a new length is drawn randomly and the genetic information of the chromosome is
proportionally scaled to the new length. In other words, this operator mutates the length of
the chromosome Gj with probability pl leading to a new enlarged or stretched chromosome.
The algorithm used for the mutation of the length of the chromosome is based on the same
principle as the PEC operator, shrinking or stretching the genetic material.
Thus, the combination of the PEC operator and the mutation in the chromosomes’ length
may help to determine the optimal proportions of investment and the periodicity (or pat-
terns) of the returns, respectively. After the crossover and length-mutation operators are
applied, the typical gene-mutation operator is applied. This means that with a given mu-
tation probability pm ∈ U(0, 1), a gene is to be mutated by replacing its value by a random
number from a uniform distribution U(qmin, qmax).
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In summary, given a population with C chromosomes, to obtain a new generation of
chromosomes, one needs to do the following:
1. Apply the elitist operator to select the best s percent of the population which are
directly included in the new population.
2. Apply the tournament selection operator to the current population to select two “well-
fitted” parents.
3. With probability pc, apply the PEC crossover operator to the two selected parent-
chromosomes leading to two new children-chromosomes.
4. With probability pl, apply the length-mutation operator to the two children chromo-
some in order to ensure length diversity in the new population.
5. With probability pm, apply the gene-mutation operator to the two children which are
then included in the new population.
6. Finally, repeat steps (2) to (5) until the new population has the same number of
chromosomes as the original population.
Strategy Selection and Initialization
Once a new population has been obtained, we need to answer the following question: how
does the agent update its actual proportion of investment q(t)?
For every new generation, the agent takes the set of strategies gjk from the chromosome
j with the largest fitness in the previous generation.
qi(t) = glk with l = arg maxj=1,...,C fj ; k ≡ t mod Gl (8.6)
For the initialization, each gjk is assigned a random value drawn from a uniform distri-
bution: gjk ∼ U(qmin, qmax). The length of the chromosomes can be set initially to a fixed
number of genes or it can be determined randomly. For the latter, each Gj is initialized
with an integer random value drawn from a uniform distribution U(1, Gmax), where Gmax
is the maximum permitted chromosome length.
8.4. Experimental Results
In this section, we systematically analyze the performance of the strategies presented pre-
viously. For this, in Section 8.4.1; the environment for the agent is presented. Afterwards,
we investigate the parameter tuning of the Genetic Algorithm. For this, the complexity of
the operators and the environment is increased systematically. Finally, we compare the per-
formance of the adaptive strategy against some of the strategies presented in the previous
chapter.
8.4.1. Artificial Returns
Recalling the artificially generated returns presented in Eq. 6.2, in this chapter we consider
returns with a non fixed periodicity T (t) and for simplicity, only amplitude fluctuations are
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assumed [Navarro-Barrientos, 2008b]:
r(t) = A sin
( 2pi
T (t) t
)
+ σ2ξ2, (8.7)
where the A is the amplitude of the periodic returns with A = (1 − σ2), σ2 ∈ (0, 1) is
the amplitude noise level and ξ2 corresponds to a random number drawn from a uniform
distribution ξ2 ∈ U(−1, 1). The periodicity of the returns has the following dynamic:
if t < t′ ⇒ T (t) = T (t− 1) (8.8)
else⇒
{
T (t) = T˜
t′ = t+ t˜,
(8.9)
where t′ determines the number of time steps that the current periodicity will be present
in the returns (initially t′ = 0); both T˜ and t˜ are random numbers drawn from the uniform
distributions U(0, Tmax) and U(0, tmax), respectively.
Thus, σ2 accounts for the fluctuations in the market dynamics on the amplitude of the
RoI, Tmax accounts for the largest possible periodicity and tmax accounts for the maximal
number of time steps a periodicity can elapse. Note that with respect to the artificial returns
considered in Section 6.3, for simplicity, only fluctuations on the amplitude are considered,
i.e. fluctuations on the phase are not considered. Fig. 8.2 shows an example of the RoI for
different noise level σ2.
Figure 8.2.: Periodic RoI, r(t), Eq. (8.7) for different amplitude fluctuations: (left) σ2 = 0.1,
and (right) σ2 = 0.5. Further parameters: Tmax = 100 and tmax = 1000.
8.4.2. Convergence for RoI with fixed periodicity
To investigate the convergence of the adaptive strategy proposed in Section 8.3, we start
with a simple scenario in which returns have a fixed periodicity. In Section 8.4.3 we consider
a more challenging scenario in which returns have a changing periodicity.
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Evolution of the Fitness
For the sake of completeness, we investigate the performance of the adaptive strategy for
fixed periodicity T (t) = T in Eq. (8.7) in more detail. We start our analysis of the conver-
gence of GACE by studying the evolution of the fitness of the whole population of strategies
and the fitness of the best strategy. For these computer experiments, the parameter values
in Table 7.1 are considered together with a zero probability of length mutation pl = 0 and
the initial length of the chromosomes is fixed at Gj = Gmax = T .
Fig. 8.3 (left) shows the evolution of the average fitness of the chromosomes in the popu-
lation for different mutation rates over the course of several generations. Moreover, Fig. 8.3
(right) shows the evolution of the average fitness of all chromosomes and the fitness of the
best fitted chromosome over the course of several generations for C = 1000 chromosomes.
Observe that the rate pm = 0.01 used for Fig. 8.3 (right) leads to larger average fitness in
the population than a higher or lower mutation rate as showed in Fig. 8.3 (left); however,
note that the fitness of the best chromosome when using pm = 0.001 is almost as good as for
pm = 0.01. Note that in Fig. 8.3 (right), for the first 100 generations the best chromosome
performs much better than all chromosomes on average; however, after 100 generations, we
can see that the performance of the population converges with the performance of the best
chromosome. Now, consider again Eq. (6.25) and replace gjk with q(t) and Gj with T . If
we consider returns for t = 100 time steps with periodicity T = 100 and no noise, it can be
shown that the strategy SW would lead to a fitness of f(τ) = 28.63. Note that this is not
much larger than the fitness obtained with GACE.
Figure 8.3.: Performance graphs for the GACE strategy over the course of multiple gener-
ations for C = 1000 chromosomes: (left) average fitness for different mutation
probabilities pm and (right) convergence of the population showing the aver-
age fitness for all chromosomes against the fitness of the best chromosome for
pm = 0.01. Further parameters: T = 100 and σ2 = 0.1.
Evolution of the Budget
Another way in which to account for the convergence of the adaptive strategy is to inves-
tigate the evolution of its performance over time together with the performance of other
strategies. In order to assure fair comparison between the strategies, as we did in Sec-
tion 7.2, we need to find the best parameter values for the strategies. For this, we consider
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both reference strategies CP (Eq. (6.7)) and SW (Eq. (6.13)) with parameters qmin = 0.1
and qmax = 1.0. For the strategy MLS (Eq. (6.19)), we assume again that the agent has
access to some information about the returns, i.e. the agent knows the periodicity T of
the returns. This means that the agent needs to determine the best memory size M based
on the known periodicity of the returns. For this, we assume an agent using the optimal
memory size presented in the previous chapter, Eq. (7.9). For the GACE strategy the
parameters in Table 7.1 are used and the initial length of the chromosomes are chosen at
random from a uniform distribution. However, this means that we need to define the range
of possible length values. For our implementation of the GA to work properly, the unknown
periodicity needs to be in the range of possible length values. For simplicity, in our experi-
ments, we let the range to be larger than the periodicity of the returns. However, we note
that this parameter could be determined by the GA itself if we include extra genes in the
chromosome to track for a proper range. Another possibility could be to determine this
parameter by means of statistical properties of the returns, like the autocorrelation function
or spectral density; however, both approaches are beyond the scope of this chapter and are
left for further work.
As it was done previously, a synthetic data set was generated for the returns. In these
experiments, it is assumed that the agent invests in returns with periodicity T (t) = 100 for
different noise levels. For the moment assume that the length of the chromosomes is fixed
to Gj = 100 and that a new generation of chromosomes is obtained after a number of time
steps teval = 100 have elapsed. For the computer experiments, we let the agent use one of
the strategies to invest during a number of t = 105 time steps. In order to account for the
randomness of the scenario, we perform the experiment for a number of N = 100 trials,
gathering the average budget obtained for each strategy at every 100 time steps.
Fig. 8.4 shows in a log-log plot the average budget 〈x〉 over the course of GACE’s gener-
ations τ for all strategies and for returns with different amplitude noise levels. As you can
see, except for the GACE strategy, all other strategies have a constant budget on average
over each generation. This occurs because the average of the budget was taken at every
ts = 100 time step. This corresponds to the periodicity of the returns T (t) = 100 and to
the time steps to evaluate the population of chromosomes teval = 100, as it was specified in
our experiment parameters.
Fig. 8.4 (left) shows that after 4, 70, and 300 generations, GACE outperforms the strate-
gies q = 0.1 and MLS, respectively. We note that GACE performs almost as well as the
SW strategy after 400 generations. Moreover, the budget increase of the agent using GACE
can be approximated by a power law for the first 100 generations; afterwards it increases
logarithmically.
Fig. 8.4 (right) shows that for large amplitude noise, it takes fewer generations for GACE
to outperform the strategy q = 0.1, but in general, more generations are needed for GACE
to outperform the other strategies. We find that the budget also increases according to a
power law for the first 100 generations and afterwards it increases logarithmically. We note
that it would be useful to provide a formulation to characterize the average budget over
the course of several generations that is obtained using the GACE strategy, however, this
is left for further work.
Note that in the beginning, the length of the chromosomes is drawn randomly, however,
the following question may arise: Do the chromosomes’ lengths evolve to map the periodicity
of the returns? To answer this question, we performed some computer experiments for an
agent using the GACE strategy for returns with fixed periodicity T (t) = 100 and different
noise levels. For these experiments, we assumed the parameter values specified in Table 7.1
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Figure 8.4.: Average budget, 〈x〉, obtained using different investment strategies over the
course of generations τ of the strategy GACE, for returns with periodicity
T = 100 and amplitude noise: (left) σ2 = 0.1 and (right) σ2 = 0.5.
for GACE, and we consider that the initial chromosomes’ length is drawn randomly from a
uniform distribution with range of values (1, Gmax), where Gmax = 500.
Fig. 8.5 shows the probability distribution of the length of the best fitted chromosomes
for different noise levels and for different generations τ = {5, 100}. It is clear that after
five generations, most of the chromosomes’ length have properly matched the periodicity
of the returns. Interestingly, chromosomes with lengths proportional to a multiple of the
periodicity are also frequent; however, the probability decreases for larger multiples of the
real periodicity, which is a consequence of the better adaptation of smaller chromosomes
which have found the best proportions of investment more quickly.
8.4.3. RoI with Changing Periodicity
In the previous section, we investigated the performance of the adaptive strategy in a
stationary environment. In this section, we tackle a non-stationary environment. As in
Section 7.2.3, in order to find the best parameters for the adaptive strategy GACE, we used
the software +CARPS (Multi-agent System for Configuring Algorithms in Real Problem
Solving) [Monett, 2004a].
The genetic algorithm was configured for periodic returns with Tmax = 100 and different
levels of noise: σ2 = 0.1 and σ2 = 0.5. In this process, the following parameters were
optimized: the population size C, the crossover probability pc, the mutation probability
pm, the elitism size s, and the probability of length mutation pl. The intervals of definition
for the parameter were: C ∈ {50, 100, 200, 500, 1000}, pc ∈ [0.0, 1.0], pm ∈ [0.0, 1.0], s ∈
[0.0, 0.5] and pl =∈ [0.0, 1.0]. The evaluation of the genetic algorithm was repeated five
times for each configuration. Thus, the best parameter values for GACE are shown in
Table 8.1.
Note that with respect to Table 7.1, for the parameter values in Table 8.1 the crossover
and mutation operators are less likely to occur when recombining two parents. However,
this is covered by a surprising large probability of mutation on the length of a chromosome.
Fig. 8.6 (top) shows the evolution of the average budget over time for an agent using the
GACE strategy to invest in returns with changing periodicity and different noise levels. For
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Figure 8.5.: Probability distribution of the length of the best fitted chromosomes for gener-
ations τ = {5, 100} for N = 50 trials. Returns with periodicity T (t) = 100 and
amplitude noise: (left) σ2 = 0.1 and (right) σ2 = 0.5.
the sake of clarity, Fig. 8.6 (bottom) includes the corresponding periodicities of the returns
for each time step.
In Section 7.2, we noted that in order to avoid overflows, we need to reinitialize the
budget of the agent after every cycle of the returns. Now for RoI with changing periodicity,
the budget of the agent is reinitialized to the initial budget every time the periodicity of
the returns changes. This is done in order to show the increase in average budget that is
achieved for a given periodicity of the RoI and not only for a cycle of the RoI as it was done
in the previous chapter.
From the dynamics of the returns, Eq. (8.7), it can be seen that a change of periodicity
is not performed exactly at the end of a period but at any time step. This is the reason for
large increases or decreases of budget each time the periodicity of the returns changes.
Performance Comparison
In this section, we investigate the performance of the adaptive strategy with respect to the
reference strategies for a non-stationary scenario. For this, we performed some computer
experiments for returns with changing periodicity and different noise level. As we did in
the previous sections we assumed for all strategies the parameter values qmin = 0.1 and
qmax = 1.0. Moreover, for the MLS strategy we used Eq. (7.9) to calculate the memory size
M . And for the GACE strategy we used the parameter values listed in Table 8.1 and the
length of a chromosome in the range Gj ∈ (1, Gmax), with Gmax = 200.
In Fig. 8.7 we show the evolution of budget (top) and the corresponding periodicity of
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Table 8.1.: GACE’s best parameter values for RoI with changing T .
Parameter Value
Number of chromosomes C = 1000
Probability of crossover pc = 0.5
Probability of gene mutation pm = 0.001
Percentage of elitism s = 0.3
Probability of length mutation pl = 0.5
Figure 8.6.: (top) Average budget over time for N = 50 trials for an agent using the GACE
strategy with parameter values as in Table 8.1 and the parameter valuesGmax =
200. (bottom) Periodicity of the returns over time, Eq. (8.7), with parameters:
Tmax = 100 and tmax = 104. Both for different amplitude noise: (left) σ2 = 0.1
and (right) σ2 = 0.5.
the returns Eq.(8.7) (bottom), both over time for the different investment strategies and
different noise levels. It is clear that the best strategy for both cases is the SW strategy,
followed by the MLS strategy; however, note that both strategies have total and partial
knowledge about the dynamics of the returns, respectively. As we mentioned previously,
the SW strategy, Eq. (6.13), knows the dynamics of the stylized returns. On the other
hand, the MLS strategy, Eq. (6.19), knows the periodicity T of the returns, which is used to
calculate the best memory size by means of Eq. (7.9). This previous knowledge gives some
advantage to these strategies over the GACE strategy, which only needs the specification of
Gmax. We note that the GACE strategy evolves quite quickly, yielding a set of investment
strategies with a clear tendency to lead to more gains than losses. This is shown for
long-lasting periodicities in particular, where ever increasing budget growth is observed.
Interestingly, the GACE strategy performs much better than the reference strategy CP and
performs on certain occasions as good as the MLS strategy, particularly for returns with
small noise.
8.5. Conclusions
In this chapter, we presented an adaptive investment strategy called Genetic Algorithm for
Changing Environments (GACE), which is a new approach based on evolution for the cor-
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Figure 8.7.: (top) Budget over time for different strategies, assuming qmin = 0.1 and qmax =
1.0 for all strategies. For MLS, Eq. (7.9) was used to calculate the memory size,
M , and for GACE, the parameters shown in Table 8.1. (bottom) Periodicity
of the returns over time, Eq. (8.7), with parameters: Tmax = 100, tmax = 104,
and amplitude noise: (left) σ2 = 0.1 and (right) σ2 = 0.5.
rect mapping of proportions of investment to patterns that may be present in the returns.
We analyzed the performance of GACE for different scenarios, and compared its perfor-
mance over time to other strategies that were used as a reference. We showed that after
a given number of time steps, the GACE strategy reaches a set of investment strategies
that can outperform simple strategies like those that invest always a constant proportion
of investment. We showed that even though the GACE strategy has no knowledge of the
dynamics of the returns, it may lead to large gains, performing as well as other strategies
with some knowledge. This is shown for long-lasting periodicities in particular, where ever
increasing budget growth was observed. This means that in the presence of long-lasting
periodicities, the longer the agent uses the adaptive strategy the larger the profits per cycle.
In this study, we used artificialy generated stylized returns, which are based on a sinusoidal
function; however, it can be shown that for other type of periodic functions, the GA would
eventually find the best strategy in the same way as for the sinusoidal function. Despite
the fact that the GACE strategy proposed in this chapter was mainly used to find a good
set of proportions of investment, it is important to note that this strategy can be applied to
other type of scenarios - for example, scenarios where the agent has to control other kind
of resources, like energy, time consumption, etc.
As mentioned in Section 8.1, most of the investment strategies based on machine learning
approaches are based on genetic programming techniques and neural networks and in this
chapter a new approach based on the standard genetic algorithm was presented. Moreover,
the standard genetic algorithm, when applied to non-stationary environments, is to our
knowledge, not yet worked out as it is done in this chapter. The same applies to the
extensions proposed in this paper for the genetic operators which allow the genetic algorithm
to track non-stationary returns. Another important contribution in this chapter is the use
of the investment scenario as a test-bed for different investment strategies and to investigate
the adaptability of strategies based on machine learning approaches.
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8.6. Further Work and Extensions
Further work includes analyzing of the performance of the GACE strategy for real returns
and comparing the performance of GACE with other similar approaches like Genetic Pro-
gramming techniques, Neural Networks, and Reinforcement Learning. It would also be
useful to extend this approach for optimal portfolio diversification, for which a large num-
ber of algorithms have been proposed which deal with the research areas of optimization,
stochastic simulation and decision theory.
Finally, we note that the proposed adaptive investment strategy may be interesting for
the research area of pattern recognition of time series. By making proper changes in the
fitness function, a useful algorithm could be obtained for the detection and measurement
of periodic signal in time series.
Some other extensions to the approach presented in this chapter are, for example, the use
of GAs for multi-modal functions, in which a number of GAs, also called building blocks,
act together to find multiple optimal solutions for a given problem. The main goal for this
approach is to find the condition of steady-state innovation [Goldberg, 2002]. For this, the
relationship between selection and innovation needs to be investigated in order to describe,
by means of a control map, those cases for which a steady-state innovation or a premature
convergence may be present.
8.6.1. Use of Fourier Techniques to Determine Periodicity Changes
Fourier Series of Square Wave
In Section 6.4.2, it was mentioned that the agent may use an investment strategy based on
a rectangle function, where the agent decides to invest given the sign of the last RoI, or
given some measure of the noise of the RoIs. Another possibility is to assume that the agent
decides to use an investment strategy described by the following square wave function:
qi(t) =
qmax for 0 ≤ t < Tˆ2qmin for Tˆ2 ≤ t < Tˆ (8.10)
where Tˆ is the estimated periodicity of the RoI. This square wave function can be expressed
also using Fourier series of the form:
qi(t) =
N∑
k=−N
ake
j(2pi/Tˆ )kt (8.11)
where the Fourier series coefficients, ak, can be calculated as follows [McClellan et al., 2003]:
ak =

1
jpik (qmax − qmin) k = ±1,±3,±5, ..
0 k = ±2,±4,±6, ..
1
2(qmax − qmin) k = 0
(8.12)
Use of FFT and Wavelet db4 to Determine RoI’s Periodicity
Finally, another possible extension would be to consider an investment strategy based on
the wavelet db4. In this approach, the agent uses the wavelet to determine when there is
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a change in the periodicity of the RoI and apply the Fast Fourier Transform to determine
the periodicity of the actual RoI.
For example, Fig. 8.8 (top) shows some periodic returns with 3 different periods over
time. Fig. 8.8 (middle) shows the transformed signal obtained using a wavelet db4. Note
that changes in the periodicity are detected by a peak in the signal. Fig. 8.8 (bottom)
shows the FFT transformation at t = 200. Note that the periodicities T = 12 and T = 86
are detected; however, a mechanism has to be introduced to reset the saved returns for the
FFT in order to consider only those returns after a change in the periodicity is detected.
Figure 8.8.: (top) Periodic returns with 3 different periods over time, (middle) wavelet db4
transformation, changes in periodicity are detected by a peak in the signal and
(bottom) FFT transformation magnitude vs. period obtained at t = 200.
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Networks
This chapter extends the investment model to include the formation of common investment
projects. Each project is conducted by an initiator who tries to convince other agents to
invest in his project. The decision of an agent to invest depends on the previous experi-
ence with the particular initiator. The dynamics of the budget and some properties of the
networks are investigated.
9.1. Introduction
In this chapter we investigate the formation of common investment networks between agents.
This topic is usually treated in the area of economic Multi-Agent Systems (MAS) which has
recently gained much attention under the label ACE – agent-based computational economics.
For example, ACE models have been proposed to study the relationship between market
structure and worker-employer interaction networks [Tesfatsion, 1998, 2001a]. Recently,
some models for the endogenous formation of trade networks have been also proposed (see
for example [Albin and Foley, 1992; Tesfatsion, 1997; Vriend, 1995]). A key concern in
these studies is the emergence of a trade network among a collection of buyers and sellers
who adaptively select their trade partners. Agents perform these selections by looking at
their past experiences with these partners. For example, Kirman and Vriend [2001] show an
ACE model of the wholesale fish market in Marseilles, where the authors try to understand
the buyer loyalty to sellers by means of repeated business. Interestingly, buyers learn to be
loyal as sellers learn to offer a higher payoff to loyal buyers.
Apart from studying the dynamics of payoff, loyalty and partner selection, the topology of
the networks emerging from simple models, MAS or from real systems has been also inves-
tigated by many researchers, see [Albert and Barabási, 2002; Battiston et al., 10; Bornholdt
and Schuster, 2002; Dorogovtsev and Mendes, 2003; Newman, 2003; Xulvi-Brunet, 2006].
For the purposes of this PhD thesis, we review in Section 9.4 some of the properties of the
networks that are commonly used to characterize their topology.
Thus, in this chapter, we propose an investment model where agents interact with each
other in order to establish investment projects. The following two research questions are
investigated in this chapter: how does the interaction between agents influence the evolution
of the budget as well as the trust reputation between the agents? How does the topology of
the networks is characterized and how does it evolve over time? To answer these questions,
we first present in Section 9.2 the model for the formation of common investment networks;
Section 9.3 presents some simulation results for the analysis of the evolution of budget,
trust and reputation between the agents; Section 9.4 investigates the formation of networks
for different parameter values in the model; and finally in Section 9.6 some extensions for
these investigations are proposed.
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9.2. The Model
Following the investment model presented in Eq. 2.9, consider now a multi-agent system of
N agents, where each agent posses a budget xk(t) that evolves over time given the following
dynamic [Navarro and Schweitzer, 2003]:
xk(t+ 1) = xk(t)
[
1 + rmk(t) qk(t)
]
+ a, (9.1)
where rmk(t) denotes the return on investment (RoI) that the agent k receives from its
investment qk(t) in project m. Note that qk(t) denotes a proportion of investment, i.e the
fraction or ratio of the whole budget of agent k. Note also that each agent starts with the
same initial budget x(0).
Now, in order to launch a particular investment project m at time t, a certain minimum
amount of money Ithr needs to be collected among the agents. The existence of the invest-
ment threshold Ithr is included here in order to enforce the interaction between agents, as
they need to collaborate until the following condition is reached:
Im(t) =
Nm∑
k
qk(t)xk(t) ≥ Ithr, (9.2)
where Nm is the number of agents collaborating in the particular investment project m.
Note that if Ithr is a fixed number, then a small number of “wealthy” agents can easily
overspend the threshold. There may be different investment projects m at the same time,
but at the moment it is assumed that each agent participates in only one investment project
at a time.
The first essential feature to be noticed for the formation of common investment networks
is the establishment of preferences between agents. It is assumed that the decision of
an agent to collaborate in a project will mainly depend on the previous history it has
gained with other agents. Consider an agent k which accepts to collaborate in the common
investment project m initiated by agent j. Thus, agent k receives the following payoff at
time t:
pkj(t) = xk(t) qk(t) rm(t). (9.3)
Reiterated interactions between agent k and agent j lead to different payoffs over time that
are saved in a decision weight:
wkj(t+ 1) = pkj(t) + wkj(t) e−γ , (9.4)
where γ represents the memory of the agent and the initial decision weight is zero, wkj(0) =
0.
The payoffs obtained from previous time steps t may have resulted from the collaborative
action of different agents,however, these are unknown to agent k, i.e agent k only realizes
the initiator of the project, agent j. Furthermore, in order to mirror reality more closely, it
is assumed that there are more investors than initiators of projects. For this, we consider
that from the population of N agents only a small number J are initiators, i.e. J  N .
Note that the reputation of an initiator j can be calculated as follows:
Wj(t+ 1) =
N∑
k=0
wkj(t). (9.5)
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In the same manner, the trust of an agent k to an initiator j can be calculated as follows:
Wk(t+ 1) =
J∑
j=0
wkj(t). (9.6)
For more complex trust and reputation models see [Sabater and Sierra, 2005; Walter et al.,
2008].
In general, the investment model proceeds as follows: At every time step t an initiator is
chosen at random from the population and an investment project is assigned to him. The
initiator randomly tries to convince other agents to invest in his project until it has collected
at least the threshold amount Ithr. For this, we use a Gibbs or Boltzmann distribution to
determine the probability that the contacted agent k may accept the offer of agent j:
τkj(t) =
eβwkj(t)∑J
i=1 e
βwki(t)
, (9.7)
where in terms of the weight wkj , the probability τkj(t) considers the good or bad previous
experience with agent j with respect to the experience obtained with other initiators; and
β denotes the greediness of the agent, i.e. how much importance does the agent give to the
decision weight wkj . In order to take a decision, agent k uses a technique analogous to a
roulette wheel where each slice is proportional in size to the probability value τkj(t). Thus,
agent k draws a random number in the interval (0, 1) and accepts to invest in the project
of agent j if the segment of agent j in the roulette spans the random number. Finally,
an initiator j stops to contact other agents if either the investment project has reached
the threshold Ithr or if all agents in the population have been asked for collaboration. In
order to keep the multiplicative-additive dynamics from the investment model studied in
previous chapters, only the initiator and investors of a launched project receive an external
income. Also note that the term β is typically called temperature and in this case for small
β values (for example β = 0.001), initiators are equally probable to be chosen. In terms
of the behavior of the agent this means that the agent decides to explore more the payoffs
that the initiators can offer by not taking into account the previous obtained payoffs. For
large β values (for example β = 1), previous experience with the initiators is enhanced, i.e.
the agent decides to explode more those initiators supplying the largest positive payoffs.
Finally, note that the initiator will always invest in his own project, i.e. he neither looks at
his own performance nor compares it with his experience with other initiators.
Now, if the project could be launched, then it has to be evaluated. The evaluation should
in general involve certain “economic” criteria that also reflects the nature of the project.
However, we do not want to include such assumptions and for simplicity we assume that the
failure or success of an investment project Im is randomly drawn from a uniform distribution,
i.e. r(t) ∼ U(−1, 1). A more realistic assumption would include also gains with r  1,
while the loss is still bound to the maximum investment value.
9.3. Results of Computer Simulations
In this section we investigate the dynamics of the investment model. In general, the model
has the following parameters: N the number of agents, J the number of initiators, Ithr the
investment threshold, xk(0) the initial budget of agent k, qk(t) the proportion of investment
of agent k, γ the memory and β the greediness. For simplicity, we assume that the initial
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budget is the same for all agents, i.e xk(0) = x(0), and the number of time steps t refer only
to established projects. Moreover, the proportion of investment is assumed to be constant
and the same for all agents i.e. qk(t) = q = const. We start our analysis by investigating
the dynamics of the evolution of the budget of the agents, the number of investors and
the reputation of initiators over time for different proportion of investment q. For this, we
consider the parameter values in Table 9.1 for the simulation experiments.
Table 9.1.: Parameter values of the computer experiments for the investment networks for-
mation model.
Parameter Value
Number of agents N = 10000
Number of initiators J = 100
Number of time steps t = 100000
Investment threshold Ithr = 9
Return on Investment (RoI) r ∼ U(−1, 1)
Initial budget of the agent x(0) = 1
Income of the agent a = 0.5
Memory of the agent γ = 0.1
Greediness of the agent β = 1
In the first computer experiment, the investment model was simulated for the parameter
values in Table 9.1 and for different constant proportion of investment q. Fig. 9.1 (left)
shows the evolution of the budget distribution over time for q = 0.5. It can be seen
that the probability distribution of the budget has a power law in the tail, a property of
investment models based on multiplicative processes repelled from zero, discussed previously
in Section 2.3. Note that the distribution of the budget for the investment model presented
in this Chapter follows the same distribution as for the investment model in Section 2.2.
This means that in the long run the distribution of the budget can be described using the
stationary solution in Eq. (3.26). Moreover, it can be seen that the most probable budget
value xmp agrees with the analytical result in Eq. (4.13) with xmp ≈ 50. However, note that a
larger number of time steps (established projects) are needed to reach convergence, because
now in this model the agents are not always performing investments. This is the case when
agents having a small fixed proportion of investment are not able to invest together more
than the investment threshold Ithr needed to establish a project. This is shown in Fig. 9.1
(right), where the distribution of the budget is shown at time step t = 100000 for different
proportion of investment q. Note that even for a large number of time steps, the budget
distribution for agents with a proportion of investment of q = 0.1 has not yet converged
to a stationary distribution, whereas for q = 0.5 and q = 0.9, the distribution reached a
stationary state after t = 70000 and t = 50000 time steps respectively.
Furthermore, in order to understand the role that initiators play in the dynamics of the
investment model, we examine the evolution of their budget and reputation over time. In
the experiments run previously a number of initiators of J = 100 was assumed. Note that
for a small number of initiators it is better, for the sake of clarity, to show the rank-size
distribution of the budget instead of the probability distribution of the budget. Later on, a
larger number of initiators is considered, which allows for appropriate visual representations
of the budget probability distributions of the initiators. Fig. 9.2 (left) shows the rank-size
distribution of the budget of the initiators, it can be seen that the slope of the distribution
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Figure 9.1.: (left) Evolution of the budget distribution over time for q = 0.5; (right) budget
distribution at time step t = 100000 for different proportion of investment q.
For parameter values as in Table 9.1.
increases over time. It is also interesting to examine the evolution of the budget of the
initiator with the largest and the smallest budget at the end of the simulation. This is
shown in the inset of Fig. 9.2 (left), where it can be seen that the budget of the best agent
was not always increasing over time. We note that, it would be interesting to show the
influence of successful and non-successful projects at the beginning of the simulation on the
evolution of the budget over time. However, because of the fact that initiators randomly
ask other agents to invest in their project, they do not really have a preference over wealthy
or non-wealthy agents, therefore, it is the reputation of the initiators the property of the
initiator that plays a more important role in the dynamics of the investment model rather
than its budget. Fig. 9.2 (right) shows the rank-size distribution of the reputation of the
initiators, Eq. (9.5). It can be seen that the distribution does not change over time, and only
for a small number of agents there is a significant increment or decrement of the reputation
over time. Moreover, it can be shown that the average value of the reputation has a shift to
larger positive values over the course of time. This occurs because of the external incomes a
in Eq. (9.1), which are implicitly included by the term xk(t) in the dynamics of the decision
weights in Eq. (9.4). Moreover, the inset in Fig. 9.2 (right) shows that the reputation of
the best and the worst initiator (in terms of reputation), which indicates the presence of no
symmetrical positive/negative reputation values.
Now, in order to understand the influence of the rest of the parameters in the dynamic of
the model, the proportion of investment is fixed to q = 0.5 and some computer experiments
are run for different number of initiators J . An interesting parameter in the dynamics of the
investment model is the number of initiators J . Note that if a less number of initiators is
considered, then more investors will be willing to invest in their project, which means that a
larger amount of investment can be collected by the initiators. In order to let a large number
of agents to invest in a project from the very beginning of the simulation, the investment
threshold Ithr has to be proportional to the initial amount of money that the initiators may
be able to collect. Because of this the following investment thresholds were assumed for
the corresponding number of initiators: Ithr = 490 for J = 10 ; Ithr = 9 for J = 100 ; and
Ithr = 4.5 for J = 1000. Fig. 9.3 (left) shows the budget distribution of the agents in the
population for the previous mentioned number of initiators J and investment thresholds
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Figure 9.2.: Evolution of the rank-size distribution of initiators for: (left) budget; (right)
reputation. Insets show the reputation of the best and the worst initiator.
Parameter values as in Table 9.1.
Ithr. Note that the tail of the distribution has a power law distribution and the larger J the
larger the slope of the power law. The reason for this is that a small number of initiators
collect more money from the investors leading to larger profits and looses which over time
lead to wider distributions than for a large number of initiators. Moreover, Fig. 9.3 (right)
shows the budget distribution of the investors and the initiators separately. It can be seen
that the initiators tend to accumulate more budget than the rest of the agents This occurs
because by definition, initiators invest more frequently than those that are no-initiators.
Figure 9.3.: Budget distribution for: (left) all agents and for different number of initiators
J ; (right) for investors and initiators separately for J = 1000. For proportion
of investment q = 0.5 and further parameter values as in Table 9.1.
Moreover, Fig. 9.4 shows the ranked size distribution of the reputation, Eq. (9.5), of the
initiators and the trust, Eq. (9.6), of the investors to the initiators. It can be seen that
both distributions have a similar form, however, we note that there is a small number of
agents with relative high or low reputation and trust values. This is due to the fact that
wealthy agents modify their decision weights much more than less wealthy agents. This
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larger positive or negative weights play an important role in the establishment of projects,
however, because of the fact that agents are contacted at random less wealthy agents are
still able to participate in projects. This can be seen from the budget distribution of the
agents which has the typical power-law behavior from other investment models.
Figure 9.4.: Ranked size distribution at time step t = 100000 for: (left) reputation of ini-
tiators, Eq. (9.5), and (right) trust of investors, Eq. (9.6). For proportion of
investment q = 0.5, number of initiators J = 1000 and further parameter values
as in Table 9.1.
9.4. Structure of Common Investment Networks
In this section the structure of the networks is analyzed. As we did in the previous section,
we start our investigations analyzing the topology of the networks for different constant
proportion of investment q(t) = const. For this, we run different computer experiments for
a small population of agents N = 1000 (N is also the number of nodes in the network)
and the other parameter values as in Table 9.1. The first experiment investigates the
influence of the proportion of investment in the properties of the network. Fig. 9.5 shows
the results for different proportion of investment q at time step t = 1000. Note that these
networks have two types of nodes, where the bold nodes are investors and the gray nodes
are initiators. Based on visual impression, the density of the network decreases with respect
to the proportion of investment. This occurs because agents investing more also tend to
loose more, which leads to more mistrust.
However, from the visual representation of the network it is not possible to draw many
conclusions from the dynamics of the networks. Because of this, the following properties of
the network are obtained:
• Number of links V and maximal degree kmax (the degree of the highest degree vertex
of the network).
• Average path length l: the average shortest distance between any pair of nodes in the
network, i.e. the average of the minimum number of links that are needed to cross from
one node to another node. The measure became important after the investigations
of Milgram [1967] who demonstrated in a series of interesting experiments that the
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spread of information from person to person verifies what it is now known as small-
world behavior.
• Clustering coefficient C: measures the transitivity of the network [Watts and Strogatz,
1998]. Based on the local value:
Ci =
number of triangles connected to node i
number of triples centered on node i , (9.8)
the mean clustering coefficient of the network is defined as:
C = 1
N
∑
i
Ci. (9.9)
This property is important as it has been shown by Watts and Strogatz [1998] that
in real networks the clustering coefficient is usually much larger than the clustering
coefficient in a random network with the same number of nodes and links.
• Degree distribution P (k): the probability that a randomly selected node of the net-
work has exactly k links, i.e. the fraction of nodes in the network that have degree k.
It has been shown that the degree distribution of many real networks have a power
law in the tail [Albert and Barabási, 2002; Albert et al., 1999]:
P (k) ∼ k−α, (9.10)
for some constant exponent α. Networks with a power-law distribution are also
called scale-free networks and have been investigated by many researchers [Albert and
Barabási, 2002; Dorogovtsev and Mendes, 2003; Ebel et al., 2003; Strogatz, 2001].
In order to understand better the dynamics of the networks that emerge from the inter-
action of the agents, some of the previous listed properties and measures are obtained on
the following.
Fig. 9.6 (left) shows the number of links V over time for different proportion of invest-
ment q. Note that the simulation results fit a power law, where the slope decreases if the
proportion of investment increases. As expected, the number of links increases much faster
over time for larger proportion of investment q, however, note that the number of links for
small q is much larger in the beginning of the simulations than for larger q. This occurs
because in the beginning the decision weights are zero and their values are much more
modified by the payoffs than by the previous weight. Note also that after a large number
of time steps, the number of links for q = 0.5 and q = 0.9 are of the same size and based on
visual impression, after a large number of time steps, the larger q, the larger the number of
links in the network.
To gain more insight into the dynamics of this model, Fig. 9.6 (right) shows the maximal
degree kmax over time for different proportion of investment q. It can be seen that the
maximal degree of the network also increases over time with a power-law behavior. Based
on visual impression, after t = 105 time steps the number of links and the maximal degree
have a similar value for both proportions of investment q = 0.5 and q = 0.9. This occurs
mainly because in the long run, the decision weights of some agents are largely modified by
the previous decision weights than by their current payoff.
Fig. 9.7 (left) shows the evolution of the clustering coefficient C over time for q = 0.5.
It can be seen that the clustering coefficient increases for small proportions of investment.
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This occurs basically because of the small number of initiators in the system. Note again
that a small proportion of investment leads to a higher clustering in the network because of
the mistrust that large losses generate in the investors. Note that the evolution of V , kmax
and C over time can be described by a power-law. Thus, an approach like the one used
in Section 4.3, could be used to obtain a scaling function for these measures with respect
to the number of time steps and the proportion of investment; however, this is beyond the
scope of this chapter and is left for further work.
Fig. 9.7 (right) shows the evolution of the degree distribution over time for q = 0.5. Note
that two degree distributions emerge from our model. The first one has small k values
and corresponds to the links of the non-initiators. The second one has large k values,
which, for visibility reasons, is shown in the inset of Fig. 9.7 (right) and corresponds to the
initiators. It can be seen that for both cases, the degree distribution follows a binomial
distribution. First studied by Erdös and Rényi [1959], random graphs show the property of
binomial degree distribution, which for large number of nodes can be good approximated
by a Poisson distribution. Thus, these experiments suggest that the investment networks
here obtained are of the type of a random graph. On the other hand, it has been shown
that many real networks present a “small world” property, which in general means that the
network has the following properties:
1. Relative high clustering coefficient, larger than the clustering from a random network
with the same degree, i.e. C  Crand.
2. Small average path length which scales logarithmically with the size of the network,
i.e. l ∼ logN .
3. Degree distribution with a power-law behavior in the tail.
Table 9.2 shows some of the most important characteristics for different number of investors
N and initiators J for a large number of time steps, i.e. t = 100000. For each network we
indicate the average degree 〈k〉 (the first moment of the degree distribution), the average
path length l and the clustering coefficient C. For comparison reasons we include the average
path length lrand = log (N)/ log (〈k〉) and the clustering coefficient Crand = 〈k〉 /N that can
be obtained from a random network with the same average degree 〈k〉 of the investment
networks.
Table 9.2.: Properties of the investment networks for different number of investors and ini-
tiators. For each network the properties measured are: the average degree 〈k〉,
the average path length l and the clustering coefficient C. For proportion of
investment q = 0.5, t = 100000 and further parameters as in Table 9.1.
N J V kmax 〈k〉 l C lrand Crand
1000 10 4847 517 0.9694 2.05766 0.74557 - 0.0009694
2000 20 19972 1050 3.9944 1.99365 0.71337 5.488 0.0019972
3000 30 41073 1475 8.2146 1.99314 0.71130 3.8018 0.0027382
10000 100 134279 1477 26.86 2.1563 0.24136 2.7989 0.002686
It can be seen that the average degree 〈k〉 increases with respect to the system size. This
is no surprise since according to Fig 9.7 (right), the degree distribution shifts to larger
positive values over time. Note that for the parameters: N = 1000; I = 10, the average
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degree path of the network is less than one, which means that the network has either trees
or clusters containing exactly one link. On the other hand, for the rest of the parameter
values in Table 9.2, it can be seen that the networks show a small average path length
l ≈ 2, meaning that any investor or initiator in the network is connected to each other,
through two links in average. It can be seen that for large number of nodes, the average
path of the networks is approximately equal to that from a random graph generated with
same average degree of the investment network. It can be seen from the Table 9.2 that
the clustering coefficient of the investment networks is larger than the clustering coefficient
that may be obtained from a random network, which indicates the presence of transitivity
in our networks. This occurs mainly because of the large number of investors connected to
initiators. Note that the values of C in our networks are similar to the clustering coefficient
obtained for real bipartite networks, for example, [Watts and Strogatz, 1998] report that
the clustering coefficient for the network of movie actors is C = 0.79. Note that a property
of random networks is that the clustering coefficient decreases with respect to the size of
the network. We see from the Table 9.2, that in our networks, the clustering coefficient also
decreases with respect to N .
9.5. Conclusions
The influence of the parameters in the dynamics of the budget and the dynamics of the
investment networks were investigated. It is shown that the budget of the agents reaches
a stationary distribution after some time steps and presents a power law distribution on
the tail, property extensively discussed in the first part of this PhD thesis. The topology
of the investment networks emerging from the model were analyzed showing that the net-
works present some of the typical characteristics of real-life networks like a high clustering
coefficient and short average path length. However, it is shown that the degree distribution
of the investment networks does not follow a power-law behavior, which is usually found
in real-world networks, but rather a binomial distribution which is more related to random
networks.
We have mainly focus our investigations on the feedback describing the establishment
and reinforcement of relations among agents and initiators, which dynamic is mainly driven
by the decision weights wkj(t), Eq. (9.4). This is considered a “social component” of the
agents’ interaction and it was shown how this feedback process based on positive or negative
experience may lead to the establishment of networks among agents. For simplicity, we have
just assumed a random selection of failure or success, but we note that more elaborated
economic assumptions, such as market dynamics based on supply and demand, can be taken
into account as well.
The investigations in this chapter showed results mainly for a fixed number of agents
N = 10000, we note that an analysis of the network order is needed, i.e. to analyze the
properties of the networks that emerge from simulations with different number of agents.
We note also that agent’s external incomes influence the ever increasing reputation and
trust of only a few number of agents. This occurs because the dynamics of the decision
weights of wealthy agents are mainly influenced by their current payoff, Eq. (9.4). These
results indicates that an extra mechanism or behavioral component needs to be added to
the model in order to obtain networks with a stationary power-law degree distribution,
property which is usually found in real-world networks.
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9.6. Further work
As we noted previously, because of the fact that two different type of nodes are present in the
system, the networks that emerge from these experiments are of the type “bipartite graph”.
These types of networks are also studied by converting them into one-mode networks, this
transformation is done by considering that two nodes of the same type are connected when
they are connected to a node of different type [Wasserman and Faust, 1994].
We note also that further experiments are needed for different memory γ and greediness
β values to understand the influence of these parameters in the dynamics of the networks.
It would be interesting to analyze the role of the memory γ and greediness β which
describe the exponential decay of the past experience and the importance of the weights
wkj(t) in the decision process respectively. For example, without memory, i.e. γ → ∞,
it is expected that agents just randomly gather for a certain project which may describe
the random scenario. On the other hand, if agents’ memory is too long, i.e. γ → 0, it
is expected that any positive and negative experience will last forever and changes in the
structure of the networks may hardly be observed, which may describe the frozen scenario.
As it was done in Chapter 7 a behavioral component could be also included in order to
account for the failure or success of the previous investments and to modify the investment
proportion q(t) of the agent accordingly. Another extension would be to include costs,
for example when asking other agents for investment (for the initiators) and for attending
requests (for the investors). For this, initiators need to incorporate an extra mechanism to
be aware of the advantage of asking those agents that they “believe” may accept to invest
in his project and not at random as it was done in our experiments. On the other hand,
investors need to somehow pay more attention to those initiator that they “believe” may
have successful projects, i.e. to be more or less greedy depending on the experience with a
particular initiator.
It would be also interesting to change the multiplicative additive random approach of the
investment model to a multiplicative entry/exit process, see Section 2.3.4. Note also that
using the approach of utility theory in Appendix 10.2, the investment model can be extended
to a model where agents may be willing to pay/receive money in order to persuade/accept
investing in a common investment project.
Another possible extension is to consider that the agent invests at the same time in
different investment instruments. This means that, in this case an agent has now the
opportunity to invest in one or more investment options.
In the literature, the problem for portfolio optimization has been handled by many re-
searchers from economics and finance [Cover, 1991; Kahnemann and Riepe, 1998; Markowitz,
1952, 1991]. Note that some of the problems related to optimal diversification of resources
can be investigated using the following extension of the investment model presented in
Eq. 2.9:
x(t+ 1) = x(t)
1 + Nm∑
j=1
rj(t) qj(t)
+ a, (9.11)
where now qj(t) stands for a diversified investment proportion vector and rm(t) corresponds
to the return obtained from each investment option m. This means that the agent invests
at time step t a portion I(t) of its total budget:
I(t) =
Nm∑
m=1
qm x. (9.12)
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Since qm represents always a portion of the total budget x invested in the market rm, it’s
bound to qm ∈ [0, 1] and to the following constraint:
Nm∑
m=1
qm <= 1. (9.13)
Finally, if the returns present correlations in time, i.e. are predictable as those presented
in Section 6.3 and Section 8.4.1, the proportions of investment may change according to the
portfolio selection strategy. Similar to the evolutionary approach conceived in Section 8.3,
a genetic algorithm can be considered, in which each chromosome describes the different
portfolio selection possibilities as it is depicted in Table 9.3
Table 9.3.: Chromosome description for proportional investment portfolio optimization.
chromosom1 = q1,1 q2,1 ... qm,1
chromosom2 = q1,2 q2,2 ... qm,2
...
chromosomn = q1,n q2,n ... qm,n
For this case, each qi,j ∈ (0, 1) represents the investment proportion of chromosome j for
the investment option i. Once the investment is performed, the fitness of the population
can be calculated, given the return ri(t) for each investment option:
fj(t) =
m∑
i=1
qj,i ri(t), (9.14)
where fj(t) is the fitness of the chromosome j at time step t.
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Figure 9.5.: Common investment networks for different proportions of investment at time
step t = 1000: (left) q = 0.1, (right) q = 0.5 and (bottom) q = 0.9. A link
between agents represents a positive decision weight, i.e wkj > 0. For N = 1000
agents and parameters as in Table 9.1.
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Figure 9.6.: Time dependency of (left) the number of links V and (right) the maximal
degree kmax for different proportions of investment q. The dashed lines show
the power-law scaling relations for V and kmax with respect of time. Further
parameters as in Table 9.1.
Figure 9.7.: (left) Time dependency of the clustering coefficient C, Eq. (9.9) for different
proportions of investment q. The dashed lines (left) represent the scaling re-
lations for C. (right) Time dependence of the degree distribution P (k) for
proportion of investment q = 0.5. The inset shows the degree distributions for
the initiators. Further parameters as in Table 9.1.
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10. Concluding Remarks
This Chapter presents the main contributions, conclusions and the future extensions for the
investigations in this PhD thesis.
10.1. Main Contributions
The main goal of this PhD thesis was to investigate the properties, behavioral rules and
learning mechanisms that lead an agent to obtain larger profits in random and periodic
investment environments. In order to achieve this goal, different investment strategies were
investigated, for which the function of the strategy depended on the available information
from the environment and the processing capabilities (internal architecture) of the agent.
For the sake of completeness, a summary of the main contributions is presented in the
following.
10.1.1. Investment Model and Fixed Investment Strategies
In Section 2.2, an investment model was presented for which the decisions of the agent (the
investor) do not affect the environment [Navarro and Schweitzer, 2003]. In Section 2.3, it
was shown that this simple approach can be related to theoretical results for multiplicative
stochastic process repelled from zero, which allows for analytical analysis of the investment
dynamics.
In Section 3.3, an analytical expression was derived for the stationary probability distri-
bution of an investor’s budget when investing constant proportions of budget in a random
environment, Eq. (3.26). In Section 4.4, it was shown that the most probable value of the
investor’s budget scales with the constant proportion of investment, the incomes and the
returns, Eq. (4.8). This result was confirmed both by analytical investigations and extensive
computer simulations for different stochastic processes [Navarro-Barrientos et al., 2008b].
10.1.2. Investment Strategies and Formation of Common Investment
Networks
In Chapter 6, different investment strategies were presented. These can be applied by
agents in an investment market scenario with periodic returns and different types and
levels of noise. Their performance was compared and analysed in Chapter 7, and it was
determined that the strategy based evolution, as described in Section 6.6.2„ outperformed
the other strategies in almost all scenarios. The reason for this is that this strategy discovers
the principle of always investing large amounts of money when the expected return is
positive and avoiding investment when the expected return is negative. It was also shown
that the best rule for investment was a daring behavior of always investing the complete
budget, which outperformed the more intuitive cautious behavior of investing an amount
proportional to the expected return [Navarro-Barrientos et al., 2008a].
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Another contribution from this PhD thesis is the adaptive investment strategy proposed
in Section 8.3, also called (GACE) Genetic Algorithm for Changing Environments, which is
a new approach based on evolution for the correct mapping of proportion of investment to
patterns present in the time series of the returns. The performance of GACE was analysed
for different scenarios and compared against other strategies in Section 8.4, showing that
even though GACE has no knowledge of the dynamics of the returns, after a given number
of time steps it may lead to large gains, performing as well as other strategies with some
knowledge about the environment [Navarro-Barrientos, 2008a,b].
Finally, in Chapter 9, a model for the formation of common investment networks was
presented [Navarro and Schweitzer, 2003]. The influence of the parameters in the dynamics
of the budget and the dynamics of the investment networks were investigated. It is shown
that the budget of the agents reaches a stationary distribution after a certain number of
time steps and presents a power law distribution on the tail, a property discussed in more
detail in the first part of this PhD thesis. The investment networks emerging from the
model were analysed, showing that, the networks present some of the typical characteristics
of real-life networks, such as a high clustering coefficient and short path length. However,
it is also shown that the degree distribution of the investment networks does not follow a
power-law behavior, which is usually found in real-world networks, but rather a binomial
distribution, which is more often associated with random networks.
10.2. Conclusions and Further Work
Recalling that one of the main goals of this PhD thesis was to find the extent to which the
internal complexity of agents influences their overall performance, it can be stated that for
scenarios with random returns, the agents with a simple architecture outperform those with
a complex architecture. On the other hand, for scenarios where returns present periodicities
or correlations over time, the agents with a complex architecture outperform the agents with
a simple architecture. The major focus on this PhD thesis was more related to issues of
computer science, however the results presented here can be also applied for scenarios where
an agent needs to optimize the way it manages its energy, resources, expected life time, etc.
Note that for the application of these results in an economic context, in particular to
financial markets, the results presented and discussed here can be useful for discerning the
performance of different trading strategies used in noisy market returns. On the other hand,
it is important to notice that the different investment models treated in this PhD thesis
assume that the actions of the agents have no effect upon the market and consequently,
the price of an asset and the return on investment are treated as exogenous variables.
This approach can be used to avoid complex assumptions when interaction between agents
is considered, i.e. by keeping the dynamic of the return on investment independent of
the investment of the agent, the model is analytically tractable and allows for an easier
comparison. For example, the analytical derivation of the stationary probability distribution
of the budget, Eq. (3.26), and the scaling law function between the most probable budget
value and the parameters characterizing the stochastic dynamics, Eq. (4.8). However, note
that one of the underlying assumptions of the investment model is that the RoI is constraint
to values between (−1,+1), where -1 means a complete loss of the investment and thus is
a reasonable lower bound and +1 means a doubling of the investment, chosen for reasons
of better tractability. These constraints for r(t) used during the computer simulations
may indeed result in deviations from the theoretical prediction if the underlying stochastic
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process for r(t) frequently gives values outside the interval (−1,+1), which then need to be
discarded. This is the case for returns drawn from a normal distribution or modeled using
an ARCH or a GACH process. In fact, as these values increase, the agreement between
the “truncated” computer simulations and the theoretical approximation based on the full
range of r values decreases. Nevertheless, this argument does not restrict the value of the
scaling obtained in Eq. (4.8), which is still valid if the analytical prediction is improved by
dealing with truncated distributions which affect the calculation of
〈
r2
〉
.
An interesting extension for the investment dynamics in Eq. (2.9) would be to extend it
to a portfolio scenario where both return r(t) and proportion of investment q(t) become
multidimensional variables. This would allow different investment strategies for different
assets as pictured in Eq. (9.11). It would be interesting to analyse the dynamics of the
budget for this more complex investment model which approximates reality more closely,
for example in financial markets, where multi-asset investments and portfolio strategies
play the most crucial role [Elton et al., 2003]. Multi-asset optimal investment strategies
for risky assets were already discussed 50 years ago, with an interesting relation to gam-
bling [Breiman, 1960]. More recently, investment strategies to readjust portfolios [Merton,
1990] have been extended [Maslov and Zhang, 1998] for a general distribution of return per
capital. Similar to the investment models presented in this PhD thesis, these contributions
consider exogenous returns which are drawn from a probability distribution or are modeled
by stochastic processes.
Despite the simplicity of the investment model presented in Section 2.2, this is not re-
stricted to artificial scenarios only. In fact, the dynamics of the RoI, r(t), can be taken
from real time series instead of being modeled by a stochastic process as shown in Chap-
ter 5 where real returns from the stock market were considered in the investment model for
fixed investment strategies. However, the most challenging application is in the dynamics of
the variable q(t) which describes the agent’s decision-making process about the portion of
the budget to be invested. Any realistic investment scenario deals with the problem of how
to correctly adjust the proportion of investment q(t) over time based on the observation
of previous returns r(t). For this, different investment strategies were presented and their
performance was compared for artificial generated stylized returns based on a sinusoidal
function. It was shown that an evolutionary approach based on a Genetic Algorithm (GA)
outperformed the other strategies for different scenarios. However, it can be shown that
for other type of periodic functions, the GA will eventually find the most proper strategy
in the same way as for the sinusoidal function. Thus, it is important to notice that the
investment models presented in this PhD are also suitable to be used as test-beds for invest-
ment strategies, assisting the comparison, analysis and understanding of the adaptability
and learning capabilities of strategies.
Regarding the behavior of the agent, another important extension would be to improve
the (representative) agent behavior by not only allowing decisions to be made based on
the expected return (risk neutral behavior), but also by considering risk-adverse agents
which indeed account also for the “variance” of returns in their decisions. Moreover, it
would be interesting to compare the performance of the investment strategies presented
in Chapter 6 and Chapter 8 for real returns. Another interesting direction would be to
compare the performance of the strategy based on a Genetic Algorithm against similar
approaches from the area of Machine Learning like Genetic Programming, Neural Networks,
and Reinforcement Learning.
Finally, it was shown in Chapter 9 how feedback processes based on a positive or negative
experience may lead to the establishment of networks among agents. This feedback is
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considered a “social component” of the agents’ interaction and describes the establishment
and reinforcement of relations among agents. The structures of the networks that appeared
between agents and project initiators show that the interaction described above leads to
the formation of common investment networks, where a positive experience with a given
project initiator causes the agent to further “trust” him and to continue investing in his
projects for a given number of time steps. It was shown that the agents’ budgets reach
a stationary distribution after a certain number of time steps and present a power law
distribution on the tail. Furthermore, the investment networks emerging from the model
showed that the networks present some of the typical characteristics of real-life networks
like a high clustering coefficient and short path length. However, the degree distribution
of the investment networks does not follow a power-law behavior which is usually found in
real-world networks, but rather a binomial distribution which is found in random networks.
For simplicity, we have assumed a random selection of failure or success, but we note
that more elaborate economic assumptions, such as market dynamics based on supply and
demand can be taken into account as well. It would be interesting to investigate the
dynamics of the networks for a feedback mechanism which joins the previous experience of
an agent with its further investment behavior. It would also be interesting to conduct a
more detailed investigation of the role that the memory of an agent plays in determining
the structure of the investment network. Finally, note that this model for the formation of
common investment networks can be easily extended with regards to more complex cases.
For example, it would be interesting to allow different projects to occur at the same time, as
this might lead to competition between the agents for the chance to invest. Finally, instead
of considering external incomes in the dynamics of the budget, it would be interesting to
investigate an entry/exit system, where if an agent goes bankrupt, it is replaced by a new
one.
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ARCH/GARCH Processes
Time series with heteroskedasticity represent an interesting scenario for investors trying to
find correlations in this type of time series. Because of this some researchers usually use
them to simulate time series from the Stock Market, foreign Exchange Market and other
financial time series [Podobnik et al., 2004]. One of the properties of heteroskedasticity is
that after performing a regression analysis of the time series a non-linear plot of the residuals
is observed. Typical stochastic process which generates time series with heteroskedasticity
are the ARCH and the GARCH processes.
An ARCH (Auto-Regressive Conditionally Heteroskedastic) process is a a stochastic pro-
cess with “nonconstant variance conditional on the past, but constant unconditional vari-
ance” [Engle, 1982].
An ARCH(p) process is defined by,
r(t) = (t)σ(t) (1)
σ(t)2 = α0 +
p∑
i=1
αi r(t− i)2 (2)
where r(t) is a random variable with zero mean and variance σ(t)2, t ∼ i.i.d.N(0, 1),
αi ≥ 0, α0 > 0 and p ∈ Z+.
[Bera and Higgings, 1993] provide a survey on ARCH models, where some properties of
these models and their applications are discussed.
A GARCH (Generalized Auto-Regressive Conditionally Heteroskedastic) process [Boller-
slev, 1986], is a stochastic process with an autoregressive representation of the conditional
variance and a moving average part. It is usually related to financial time series, because
it presents distributions with fat tails and volatility clustering.
A GARCH(p,q) process is defined by,
r(t) = (t)σ(t) (3)
σ(t)2 = α0 +
p∑
i=1
αi r(t− i)2 +
q∑
j=1
βj σ(t− j)2 (4)
where αi ≥ 0, βj ≥ 0, α0 > 0, p, q ∈ Z+ and t ∼ i.i.d.N(0, 1).
For more information about autoregressive processes see [Mantegna and Stanley, 2000].
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Equilibrium State of the Budget in Models
based on Multiplicative Random Processes
In the following, we want to discuss more in detail some analytical aspects of the evolution
and equilibrium state of the budget. In Section 2.2 it was shown that for the case of
fixed income and fixed investment proportion, the distribution of the wealth over time
reaches a stationary distribution presenting a power law in the tail. This was expected as
a consequence of the results shown in Section 2.3.3. In the following, we try to show some
theoretical aspects of the evolution of the budget over time and its equilibrium state.
To gain more insight into the dynamics of our investment model, we follow [Haan and
Karandikar, 1989] to transform Eq. (2.9) into a stochastic differential equation by assuming
that within a small time increment, 4t, the growth effects are reduced by this factor.
x(t+4t)− x(t) = (x(t) r(t) q(t) + a(t)) 4t (5)
x(t+4t)− x(t)
4t = x(t) r(t) q(t) + a(t). (6)
Taking the limit when 4t→ 0,
lim
4t→0
x(t+4t)− x(t)
4t =
dx
dt = x(t) r(t) q(t) + a(t). (7)
If we assume that changes in x(t) tend to be zero, dx = 0, we find:
0 = x(t) r(t) q(t) + a(t). (8)
From this previous, it can be seen that for a RoI with value of
r(t) = − a(t)
x(t) q(t) , (9)
there would not be changes in the process for two consecutive time steps, x(t)−x(t−1) = 0.
This means that for the process x(t) to stay constant, the returns have to be negative and
proportional to the income and the investment. Assuming that the agent has only control
on the investment propotion q(t) then, x(t) may not change over time if:
r(t) q(t) = −a(t)
x(t) . (10)
Note that the incomes are assumed to be a(t) ≥ 0, then a constant budget over time can
only be present for the following two cases: i) trivial case, if no incomes are present, a(t) = 0,
and no investment is performed, q(t) = 0; and ii) if incomes are positive a(t) > 0, returns
are negative r(t) < 0, and a proper q(t) is used to balance the increments and decrements
in budget due to incomes and returns. The latter case is visualized in Fig. 1, we show the
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logarithm of the budget instead of the budget in order to allow a graphical visualization of
the possible combination of RoI r(t) q(t) and incomes a(t) in Eq.(10), leading to a constant
budget, x(t)− x(t+ 1) = 0.
Based on visual impression, for x(t) > 0.1, as the budget increases (mainly because
of the successive addition of incomes, a(t)), the agent should decrease the proportion of
investment, q(t), in order to have a constant budget. On the other hand, if x(t) is small,
x(t) < 0.1, an equilibrium can only be achieved if the agent receives small incomes no
mattering the RoI.
Figure 1.: Payoff r q and income a for which the budget in Eq.(2.9) is stable.
However, the investor does not want to remain with the same wealth over time, on the
contrary, the investor would like to increase always the budget if possible. Thus, from
Eq. (10), it can be seen that even receiving large negative return, the investor can always
increase the wealth over time if the proportion of investment is updated as follows:
q(t) ≤ − a
x(t) r−max
. (11)
where r−max is the maximal negative return that the investor can receive, which in most of
our examples is r−max = −1. Thus, given x(t), a(t) and the most negative possible RoIs, the
values of q(t) that lead to a no-decrease of wealth, are any of those leading to values of x
above the plane in Fig. 1. However, this previous leads to the uninteresting situation that
as x(t) → ∞, q(t) → 0, which is another reason why in order to enforce the dynamics in
most of our simulations the minimum proportion of investment value has to be larger than
zero, see Section 2.2.
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Periodic Returns and Total Budget at the
End of a Cycle
For the sake of clarity, in the following, it is demonstrated that for periodic returns as those
described in Eq. (6.2), the budget at the end of the cycle is not being influenced by the
phase of the returns. Firstly, the returns here considered are as described in Eq. (6.2) for
w = 2piT + φ. Fig. 2 (left) shows the returns for different phase values: φ = {0, pi/2, pi}.
Secondly, Fig. 2 (right) shows the dynamics of the investment strategies here considered:
Constant Proportion (CP) Section 6.4.1, Ramp-Rectangle (RR) strategy Section 6.4.2 and
the Square-Wave strategy (SW) that is a variant of the RR strategy.
Figure 2.: (left) Return on Investment, Eq. (6.2), with w = 2piT + φ for different phase
values: φ = {0, pi/2, pi}. (right) Investment strategies: (long-dashed) Constant
Proportion (CP), (solid) Ramp-Rectangle (RR) and (short-dashed) Square-Wave
(SW).
Fig. 3 show the evolution of the budget over time for periodic returns showed in Fig. 2
(left) and the investment strategies showed in Fig. 2 (right). It can be seen in Fig. 3 (top)
that for the Ramp-Rectangle strategy (RR), which invests always a fixed investment, the
budget at the end of the cylce is the same as the initial budget. On the other hand, Fig. 3
(middle) shows that for the Ramp-Rectangle strategy, which invests always proportionally
to the return, the budget at the end of the cylce is larger than the initial budget, leading
to profits over 30 units, however, Fig. 3 (bottom) shows that for the Square-Wave strategy,
which invests all or nothing depending on the sign of the expected return, the budget is
much larger than for the other strategies outperforming the other two strategies.
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Figure 3.: Evolution of the budget for returns as in Fig. 2 (left) and for strategies as in
Fig. 2 (right): (top) Constant Proportion, (middle) Ramp-Rectangle and (bot-
tom) Square-Wave.
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Utility of Wealth and Fixed Investment
Usually, researchers use utility theory to express individuals different preferences among
possible situations, goods, choices, etc. In agent theory, utility functions are used for agents
to take decisions in different types of contexts. In general, the concept of utility can be
explained as the way an agent ranks all possible situations, choices or goods from the less
to the most desirable, in which the most desirable ones have a higher utility than the less
desirable ones. By this means, agent’s preferences can be expressed via a utility function,
which assigns to the possible combination of choices a single value which reflects how much
the agent would like to receive them. Note that because of the non-uniqueness of utility
measures, when comparing the utilities between for example two possible goods, it does
not matter how much is one preferred than the other, in other words, the only fact that
matters is that one choice is being preferred more than the other. Thus, we can have an
agent using the utility function U(X,Y ) to rank her preferences between two goods, where
X and Y represent the quantities of the two goods. Also note that the utility functions
can have other kind of arguments, for example the utility an agent gives to money U(x),
or agent’s consumption choice for different time periods can be described with the utility
function U(C1, C2), with C1 the consumption in the first period and in C2 in the second
period. For further details regarding utility theory in decision problems refer to [Nicholson,
1992, chap. 3] and [Russell and Norvig, 1995, chap. 14].
In the rest of this appendix, we describe the relationship between agent’s utility function
of wealth and her proportion of investment. For simplicity, we refer indistinctly to a variable
at time t with a functional or a subindex, for example the wealth of an agent at time step
t may be refered as x(t) or xt.
Consider an agent who wants to invest his money in an investment intrument that yields
a RoI r. Assume that he can choose between two possible proportions of investment q1 and
q2, where q1 > q2, the agent should decide between investing I1 = xtq1 or I2 = xtq2, where
xt is the actual budget. Fig. 4 (left) shows the utilities U1 and U2 for I1 and I2 respectively,
for an agent with a concave utiliy function of wealth. Note that U1(xt) < U2(xt), which
means that the agent would rather choose the proportion of investment q2 because this
leads to higher utility. However, he would rather like not to invest at all, because the utility
of the actual wealth is higher, U(xt) > U2(xt) > U1(xt).
Thus, for random returns, an agent with a concave utility function of wealth, d2U
dx2 < 0,
will always choose a small value of q, leading to smaller variability of return and if possible it
may not even want to invest or risk at all, i.e. q = 0. This kind of agent is called a risk-averse
agent. On the other hand, a risk-neutral agent will choose either of the two proportions
of investment and his behavior can be represented using a linear utility function of wealth,
whereas a risk-seeking agent will choose q2, i.e. the investment with larger variability
of return and his behavior can be represented using a convex utility function of wealth,
d2U
dx2 > 0.
Fig. 4 (right) shows an example of these different kind of behaviors, where xt is the
actual budget of the agent. In this example, a risk-averse agent is represented with the
utility function Ua(x) = b log (x) where b = 1/0.3, note that d
2Ua
dx2 =
−b
x2 , i.e.
d2Ua
dx2 < 0.
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Figure 4.: Utility function of wealth for: (left) an agent with a concave utility function and
budget xt, two possible investments I1 and I2 for a random return r. In this case,
if I1 > I2, then U1(xt) < U2(xt); (right) Utility functions of wealth for: (dashed)
risk-averse, (solid) risk-neutral and (dashed-point) risk-seeking agent.
The risk-neutral agent has an utility function Un(x) = x, and the risk-seeking agent has an
utility function Us(x) = exp (c x) where c = 1/b, note that d
2Ua
dx2 = c
2 exp (c x), i.e. d2Us
dx2 > 0.
Note that if the the odds are even (fair bets) and the agent has the possibility to double
his investment or to lose it, then a risk-averse agent will always refuse to invest, whereas
a risk-neutral agent will be indifferent in investing or not, and a risk-seeking agent will
always accept to invest. Thus, given an agent’s utility function of wealth, we can find out if
agent’s behaviour is risk-averse, risk-neutral or risk-seeking, as well as if he’ll like to invest
in a double or nothing Return on Investment (RoI). However, it would be useful to quantify
the degree of risk-aversion of an agent. Pratt [1964] showed two different measures of risk
aversion known as ARA (absolute risk aversion) and RRA (relative risk aversion) which
quantify how averse an agent is when making decisions in risky situations. These measures
of risk-aversion are based on agent’s utility function of wealth and can be interpreted as
a measure of agent’s liking to be insure or to be propense to the risk. Furthermore, these
measures are also used to obtain the risk-premium, which in the case of a risk-averse agent is
the amount the agent will be willing to pay in order to avoid the bet, i.e. to avoid performing
the investment. In the following, we discuss briefly these measures of risk-aversion and the
calculation of the risk-premium as they are described by Pratt [1964].
Let us assume that at every time step, the agent has to choose between receiving: (i)
a random amount z = I r, where, I is the amount of wealth being invested and r is a
random variable which represents the RoI; and (ii) a non-random amount E[z] − pi(x, z),
where E[z] denotes the expected value of the random amount z and pi(x, z) is the risk-
premium. Thus, if the market has equally probable negative and positive returns, then the
agent would be indifferent between receiving the random amount z and the non-random
amount E[z]−pi(x, z). For example, if we assume that the returns are binomial distributed,
i.e. r ∈ {−1,+1}, this means that the agent would be indifferent between risking his
investment in a market which doubles or takes agent’s investment; and receiving for sure
the non-random amount −pi(x, z) (note that in this case E[z] = 0). Then, if an agent is
risk-averse, pi(x, z) > 0, this means that he would be willing to pay at most the amount
pi(x, z) in order to avoid taking the risk (performing the investment), which in other words
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means that this agent would be willing to receive at least the amount pi(x, z) to be convinced
to perform the investment. On the oher hand, a risk-seeking agent, pi(x, z) < 0, would be
willing to receive at least the amount pi(x, z) to neglect the investment, which conversely
means that he would be willing to pay at most pi(x, z) to have the opportunity to perform
the investment. These previous situations may sound strange to the reader at first, however,
these can be explained in other terms. For example, the situation where an agent may be
willing to pay in order to avoid the risk can be expressed in terms of insurance premiums
and credit interests. Consider an agent who is afraid of losing some ownership, he may
me willing to pay for some protection against the possible loss. In the same situation, an
agent may be convinced to give a credit if it is promised to receive also some interests. This
rewards the risk of not having his money back.
On the other hand, the situation where an agent may receive money to neglect taking
the risk can be expressed in terms of employment/unemployment. Consider an agent that
wants to leave firm A and would like to try luck in firm B which gives higher incomes and
promises a nicer environment. Firm A in this case would like to convince the agent not
to resign by raising his salary. Thus, the agent would be willing to receive at least some
raise amount in order to neglect taking the risk accepting the employment offer by firm B.
Conversely, if the agent has a fixed-term contract with firm A, he would like to pay firm
A the corresponding penalty because of resigning before the expiration of his employment
contract (for example when being part of a project).
Now, let us focus in the case where the agent invests a fraction q of its wealth x, i.e. the
agent invests the amount I = q x. For completeness, we start describing the absolute risk-
aversion measure (ARA) which is defined for fixed investments I = const and is calculated
as follows:
ARA(x) = −U
′′(x)
U ′(x) , (12)
where U ′′(x) = d2U
dx2 and U
′(x) = dUdx . The risk-premium, pi(x, z) is proportional to the
measure of absolute risk-aversion ARA(x) and can be calculated as follows:
pi(x, z) = 12 σ
2
z ARA(x) + o(σ2z), (13)
where σ2z is the variance of the random variable z = I r, and o(·) is a term of smaller order.
Note that if we assume that agent’s utility function of wealth is defined as
U(x) = − exp (b x) ; b < 0, (14)
then the ARA measure of aversion is constant, ARA(x) = −b, which means that the agent
has a constant absolute risk-aversion (CARA) for all his levels of wealth.
To clarify this fact, consider an agent with an utility function of wealth Eq. 14 with
b = −1. This means that the agent has a constant absolute risk aversion of ARA(x) = 1. If
the agent has a budget of x = 1 and the possibility to invest the fixed amount I = 0.1, then
his risk-premium would be pi(x, z) = 0.005. This means that he would be willing to pay
at most the amount 0.005 to avoid taking the risk. Note that the same amount would be
payed by the agent if he has a budget of x = 10 or x = 100. Moreover, if the agent increases
his risk aversion using b = −2 and b = −5 in Eq. 14, then the risk premiums would be
pi(x, z) = 0.01 and pi(x, z) = 0.025 respectively, i.e. quantities that are proportional to the
measure of absolute risk aversion ARA(x).
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Now, consider the case where the agent is investing not a fixed amount of money but a
fraction q of his wealth x, i.e. I = q x. In this case, if the market has equally probable
negative and positive returns, the agent would be indifferent between receiving the random
amount x z and the non-random amount E[x z] − xpi?(x, x z), where E[x z] denotes the
expected value of the random amount and pi?(x, x z) is the relative risk-premium, which is
calculated similarly to Eq. (13) by:
pi?(x, x z) = 12σ
2
zRRA(x) + o(σ2z), (15)
where σ2z is the standard deviation of z and the measure of relative risk aversion (RRA) is
calculated as follows:
RRA(x) = −xU
′′(x)
U ′(x) . (16)
Consequently, the relative riskless amount
ρ?(x, x z) = E[x z]− xpi?(x, x z), (17)
is the amount that makes an agent to be indifferent in choosing between the random and
the non-random amount. Note that the sign of ρ?(x, x z) denotes if the agent has to pay
(negative sign) or to receive (positive sign) the corresponding amount ρ?.
Thus, a quadratic utility function of wealth exhibits a decreasing RRA(x), for example
for U(x) = a+ b x+ c x2 we have RRA(x) = bb+2 c x − 1, whereas an exponential exhibits an
increasing RRA(x) for example Eq. 14 has a RRA(x) = −b x, and logarithmic and linear
functions exhibit a constant relative risk aversion (CRRA), for example U(x) = b logx and
U(x) = x with RRA(x) = 1, and RRA(x) = 0 respectively.
However, the following power utility function of wealth is of special interest for us:
U(x) = xk (18)
Interestingly, this utility function exhibits a CRRA which value depends only on the value
of k,
RRA(x) = 1− k (19)
By this means, it is possible to relate k with agent’s attitude towards risk, for example if we
assume k ∈ [−1, 3], we find that a risk-averse agent has a RRA(x) > 0 with k ∈ [−1, 1). The
smaller k the more risk-averse the agent would be. A risk-neutral agent has a RRA(x) = 0
with k = 1 and a risk-seeking agent has RRA(x) < 0 with k ∈ (1, 3]. The larger k the
more risk-seeking the agent would be. These different attitudes toward risk are also shown
in Fig. 5, where the utility functions of wealth Eq. (18) is drawn for different k values in a
log-log plot.
Consider an agent with the utility function of wealth in Eq. (18), an initial wealth of
x = 1 and decides to invest a fraction of q = 0.1 of his wealth in an investment instrument
with binomial returns r ∈ {−1, 1}. This means that the agent may lose or gain q x with
equal probability, where the standard deviation of z = q r, is σ2z = q2. Replacing Eq. (19)
in Eq. (15), we can express the relative risk-premium for binomial returns as follows:
pi?(x, x z) = 12 q
2 (1− k) (20)
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Figure 5.: Utility function of wealth, Eq. 18, for different values of k. For agents that are:
risk-averse (dot-dashed) k ∈ [−1, 1), risk-neutral (solid) k = 1, and risk-seeking
(dashed) k ∈ (1, 3].
Thus, if the agent has k = −1 this means that the agent is risk-averse with RRA(x) = 2,
then his relative risk-premium is pi?(x, x z) = 0.01, i.e. ρ(x, x z) = −0.01. This means that
he may be willing to pay at most the amount of 0.01 in order to avoid performing the
investment. Now, if the agent has x = 10 and the same proportion of investment q = 0.1,
then his relative risk-preimum would be again pi?(x, x z) = 0.01, i.e. ρ(x, x z) = −0.1. In
this case he may be willing to pay at most the amount of 0.1 to avoid the investment.
This linear relationship between the relative riskless amount, ρ(x, x z), and the budget
x is shown in Fig. 6 (left) for different k values, in which we assume that the agent has
a proportion of investment q = 0.1. As it was mentioned before, for this case the agent
would be indifferent between risking the amount q x in an investment option with binomial
returns and receiving for sure the amount ρ(x, x z).
However, if the agent has x = 10, q = 0.1 and utility Eq. (18) with k = 0, he is risking the
amount I = 1 and he would be willing to pay no more than 0.05 to avoid the investment,
which is much less than the investment amount he would be investing. On the other hand,
if the agent has q = 0.99, the agent now may be investing almost his whole capital, I = 9.9,
in the investment instrument, in which case he would be willing to pay no more than 4.9 to
avoid the investment. It is clear from Fig. 6 (right) that the relative risk-premium pi?(x, x z),
Eq. 20, is not linearly proportional to the proportion of investment q for all values of k,
excluding k = 1. This non-linear relationship may be intuitive realistic. For example, for
a risk-averse agent the larger q the larger the amount that he would be willing to pay in
order to avoid the investment.
However, one may be interested in having a linear relationship between pi?(x, x z) and q.
To our knowledge such a linear relationship between the proportion of investment and the
relative risk premium has not been proposed yet, thus, we proceed to find it by including
the proportion of investment q in the utility function of wealth. Assume that the exponent
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Figure 6.: Relation between: (left) the relative riskless amount ρ(x, x z), Eq. (17), and the
budget x, for q = 0.1 and different k; (right) the relative risk-premium pi?(x, x z),
Eq. (20) and the proportion of investment q for different k values.
k in Eq. (18) is now defined by,
k = 1 + 2 q `
σ2z
, (21)
where ` describes the risk-propensity, ` ∈ [−1,+1]. If an agent chooses ` = −1, this means
that the agent is completely risk-averse, for ` = 0 means the agent is risk-neutral, whereas
for ` = 1 the agent is completely risk-seeking. Then, the utility function of wealth can be
described by the risk-propensity ` and the proportion of investment q, given the standard
deviation of the returns, σ2z . Fig. 7 shows (for visibility reasons) the natural logarithm of
this function for different values of ` and for two different fixed proportion of investment
values q = 0.1 (left) and q = 0.5 (right). Observe that the range of utility values decreases
as q increases. For this case we assumed binomial returns, i.e. σ2z = q2, and we observe
that as in Fig. 5, there are power law relationships between the utility and the budget for
different parameter values.
Now, by substituting Eq. (21) in Eq. (18), the resulting utility function has the following
first and second derivatives:
U ′(x) =
(
1 + (2 q `)
σ2z
)
x
(
2 q `
σ2z
)
(22)
U ′′(x) =
2 q `
(
1 + (2 q `)
σ2z
)
σ2z
x
(
−1+ 2 q `
σ2z
)
(23)
And using Eq. (12) and (16), the ARA and RRA are respectively:
ARA(x) = −2 q `
x σ2z
(24)
RRA(x) = −2 q `
σ2z
(25)
Interestingly, if Eq. (25) is substituted in Eq. (15) we find that the relative risk premium is
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Figure 7.: Utility function of wealth Eq. (18) with k defined as in Eq. (21) for fixed propor-
tions of investment: (left) q = 0.1 and (right) q = 0.5. For binomial returns and
different risk-propensity `.
given then by,
pi?(x, x z) = −q `. (26)
Fig. 8 shows the linear relationship between the relative risk premium and the proportion
of investment q for different risk-propensity `.
For example, if the agent has budget x = 10, and proportion of investment q = 0.1, i.e.
I = 1, if we assume that the agent has ` = −0.9, this means that ρ = −0.9 and he may
be willing to pay the amount of 0.9 in order to avoid the investment. The previous may
sound irrealistic, but consider the case in which the agent wants to be really sure that he
will have a small amount of money for the next time step, in this example at least 0.1.
Obviously, the case where agent has ` = −1 may imply that the agent wants to endow or
donate the amount 1, giving no chance to random amounts. On the other hand, assuming
the previous parameter values and a risk-propensity ` = 0.9, the agent now wants to invest
and he would be willing to neglect the investment only if he receives an amount larger than
ρ = 0.9 Finally, if the agent has ` = 1, this may imply that the agent is 100% sure that the
investment will yield very large profits and because of this, he lets no chance to non-random
amounts.
Note that this previous is true for all types of returns because the random properties of
the returns r are taken into account in the utility function only, specifically in the standard
deviation of z = q r, via σ2z . In the previous presented examples, we considered binomial
returns, r(t) ∈ {−1, 1} with equal probability of ocurrance, which leads to σ2z = q2. If the
returns are drawn from other distributions, we may want to calculate the value of σ2z for the
utility function. For example, if returns are randomly drawn from a uniform distribution
r ∼ U(−1, 1), we have:
σ2z =
∫ q
−q
z2 dz = 2 q
3
3 . (27)
Thus, in terms of utility theory, the investigations done in Chapter 3 showed results for
an agent that has a constant proportion of investment q. In other words, this means that
the agent is characterized by a power utility function of wealth as in Eq. (18) with k defined
as in (21) with risk-propensity ` = 0, i.e. in this case the agent is risk-neutral with utility
165
Utility of Wealth and Fixed Investment
Figure 8.: Relative risk-premium Eq. (26) is linearly proportional to the proportion of in-
vestment q for any value of the risk-propensity ` in the range [−1, 1]. For an
agent using the utility function of wealth in Eq. (18) with k as in Eq. (21).
function of wealth U(x) = x. However, note that these previous explanations imply that the
investigations in this PhD thesis can be extended to include utility theory without losing
generality.
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